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There is a consensus amongst film historians that the practice of making narrative feature 
films started 110 years ago in Australia with The Story of The Kelly Gang (Charles Tait, 
Australia, 1906), the first released feature film. But what precisely is the practice of making 
narrative feature films? 
 
There is a significant body of literature regarding the intrinsic nature of narrative cinema, as 
well as how to write, direct or produce narrative films. However, whilst much of this literature 
seeks to improve the practice of narrative feature filmmaking, what constitutes the practice – 
in the teleological sense – is a fundamental question in its own right.  
 
In this thesis I articulate and defend an account of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking in 
terms of the purpose the current social practice of making mainstream narrative feature films 
serves. The central proposition defended is that the practice of making mainstream narrative 
feature films is intrinsically the practice of constructing an argument: to move the audience to 
a worthwhile conclusion in a worthwhile way.  
 
I examine existing literature on the subject of argument in mainstream narrative feature films 
from academic and professional perspectives to demonstrate that it is not simply a case that 
mainstream narrative feature films have the capability to argue, or that some films can argue 
well, but that currently the practice of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is 
fundamentally the practice of designing and delivering edifying arguments. If a film’s 
argument is removed or significantly flawed, then the film fails to meet the internal standards 
of the practice of mainstream narrative filmmaking.  
 
In defending this claim, I set out in detail what is meant by the terms ‘mainstream’, 
‘argument’, ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in terms of the current practice, how argument manifests 
and functions within a cinematic context, as well as an account of how films compensate for 
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The Scope and Scale of the Project 
 
1.1 The Scope and Scale of the Project	
 
The origins of this thesis lie in the claim that narrative feature films can actively perform 
philosophical argument. As I researched this argument, more fundamental questions about 
mainstream commercial cinema began to emerge. Are not mainstream narrative feature film 
screenwriters and directors trained (knowingly or unknowingly) in argument building? At one 
level, are not mainstream narrative feature films dramatized arguments, arguments that 
function to convince the audience of a point-of-view? This led to my main research question, 
put most simply as: What is the current practice and tradition of mainstream narrative 
feature filmmaking from conception to delivery? 
 The thesis is concerned with practice in the teleological sense, in terms of providing 
an explanation of practice in relation to the purpose the practice serves, rather than a 
sociological account as typified by Bourdieu (1972) and Giddens (1976) which primarily 
seeks an explanation by which practices arise. Both Bourdieu and Giddens are pioneers of 
practice theory, yet it should be noted that their notion of social practices include far smaller 
units of activity that will be used in this study. Giddens defines social practice simply as an 
“ongoing series of practical activities,” (1976, p. 81), and Bourdieu developed his theory of 
habitus to explain individual human social practices as formed by subconscious dispositions 
located within the body itself (both physical and mental), created in response to social 
constructs (1990, p. 53). The precise definition of social practice used in this thesis will be 
outlined in detail in the next section and further interrogated in Chapter 3, and comprises a 
wider set of interconnected human activities over and above the straightforward execution of 
plan, method or the customary way of doing something.   
 The teleological approach also differs from a more traditional cultural studies 
approach, which – although sociological in nature – rather seeks to explain and interpret the 
specific cultural origins and impacts of practices and texts (for an example of this with 
specific recourse to the film industry, please see Graeme Turner’s, Film as Social Practice, 
1988).  
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The teleological approach has been taken as the ultimate objective of the thesis is one 
of application. The study draws from and contributes to various bodies of knowledge: film-
philosophy, notions of morality and virtue, and industry best practice – yet the primary 
purpose of the thesis is to be used as a tool to contribute to the improvement of the practice:  
to help filmmakers make better films. The study is significant as it develops from these 
complementary but disparate disciplines a new conceptual hermeneutic, one that is founded 
on the broader conceptualisation of narrative feature filmmaking as social practice rather than 
creative practice. Informed by the notion that film is a form of argument, this hermeneutic is 
designed for practitioners to assess and enhance their output. The thesis does not contribute 
solely to film philosophy, nor is it a typical screen craft work for industry, but rather a 
combination of the two with a singular aim.  
 
Methodology 
The thesis defended is comprised of three unequal elements: 
a) The tradition and current practice of making mainstream narrative feature films is 
based on the ‘Internal Goods’ of the practice, as all practices are so governed.* 
b) The ‘Internal Goods’ of the practice of making mainstream narrative feature films 
is to move people in a worthwhile way to a conclusion that is worth having: not 
simply to make an argument, but to make an argument worth making and to make 
it with integrity. 
c) Most practitioners do not conceptualize mainstream narrative feature films in this 
way, which makes the tradition an incognizant practice.  
 
*The ‘Internal Goods’ will be defined and explored in 1.2 Definitions of Key  
  and Related Concepts.  
 
The study is fundamentally an exercise in critical hermeneutics. The thesis will be defended 
by: 
a) A summary of current thinking with regard to the ability of film to argue, citing 
and exploring philosophical thought on the matter. 
b) An analysis of the practice of the construction of mainstream narrative feature 
films from conception to delivery, citing industry-dominant theories of 
professional training and production in both major creative storytelling areas of 
screenwriting and directing. This will include a re-examination of filmmaking’s 
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first principles with regard to cinematic storytelling tools, an extrapolation of what 
constitutes the ‘Internal Goods’ of the practice of constructing mainstream 
narrative feature films using the work of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), and an 
account justifying why these goods are singular, rather than multiple in nature. 
c) Evaluation and critique of other dominant conceptions of the internal goods of the 
practice. 
d) An account of how the practice survives despite most outputs failing by the 
internal standards of the practice (an account comprising new conceptual work 
entitled the Cinema of Compensation defined in the following section and 
explored in Chapter 6).      
e) Case studies of mainstream narrative feature film, including examples and 
counter-examples which would then modify the thesis, if necessary; and finally 
f) An examination of the implications of this account of the internal goods of 
narrative filmmaking for professional practice. 
 
The development of this thesis was due, in part, to the fact that I am both an academic and a 
practicing professional filmmaker with over 20 years of experience in the mainstream 
narrative feature film sector as a screenwriter, director and producer. Where it is possible, 
relevant and advantageous to the analysis I will include critical reflection on my own 
professional practices, but never as evidence to confirm or reject a theory.  
 
Elements beyond the scope 
This study is exclusively concerned with the tradition of mainstream narrative feature 
filmmaking. This puts other forms of mass media fiction, such as the novel, short story, radio 
play, television series, television serial, webisodes and podcasts, outside the scope of the 
thesis. There are concepts explored here that may also be applicable to these other narrative 
forms, but the focus is restricted to mainstream narrative feature films.  
The focus on film-text construction to the point of delivery also puts all theories of 
film spectatorship beyond the scope of the thesis. Cognitivism, psychoanalysis and semiotics, 
and all theories of film that do not explicitly deal with the practice of filmmaking, are not the 
focus of this study. The thesis is not attempting a grand unifying theory of cinema, but 




1.2 Definitions of Key & Related Concepts 
 
As has been referenced above, the thesis uses very precise – and sometimes uncommon – 
definitions of key concepts. 
 
Practice 
The thesis being defended is that mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is the practice of 
arguing. But what is meant by practice? As stated earlier, the study uses a teleological 
approach, chosen as the key outcome of the thesis is to contribute to an improvement in the 
practice. Alasdair MacIntyre develops a teleological account of what he calls social practice 
in After Virtue (MacIntyre, 1981), utilising ideas of internal and external rewards or goods of 
a practice. These concepts are at the heart of the study’s conception of the professional 
practice of mainstream narrative filmmaking and will be explored at length in Chapter 3.  
 In addition to MacIntyre’s teleological approach, his theories have been chosen due to 
their ubiquity and impact across multiple disciplines. When discussing educational theory, 
Hager (2011) begins with the question, “Why have MacIntyre’s views on practice enjoyed 
such pre-eminence amongst philosophers of education, seemingly to the exclusion of other 
writers on the topic?” (p. 546). In over three decades since publication, MacIntyre has 
experienced relatively little contestation to his fundamental concepts. His critics, typified by 
Hager and David Miller (1994), focus more on the application of these concepts to specific 
practices (or non-practices), tending to discuss what qualifies as a practice and evolving 
MacIntyre’s definitions and tacit implications rather than attacking the core underlying 
principles, which are essentially Aristotelian in nature (see also Frazer and Lacey (1994) for a 
feminist application of social practices and a defence of the notion of evil practices). Hager 
and his contemporaries (such as Smith 2003, and Wain 2003) are primarily concerned with 
justifying why teaching should be considered a practice (the exclusion of which is perhaps 
one of MacIntyre’s most controversial claims), and Miller develops the concept further by 
subdividing the notion of MacIntyre’s practice into ‘self-contained’ and ‘practical and 
productive practices’ which may influence the precise nature of the internal goods of specific 
practices (1994, p. 250). MacIntyre defines a social practice as:  
 
Any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
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definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically 
extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a 
football with skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess.   
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 187) 
 
As noted above, this definition of a social practice is more complex than those offered by 
Bourdieu (1972) and Giddens (1976) and mainstream narrative filmmaking can be classified 
as a social practice in precisely the sense MacIntyre sets out. It is a complex form of socially 
established co-operative human activity (filmmaking is an established art and craft that 
comprises of many intricate stages (development, pre-production, production, post-
production) and requires cast and crew that often numbers in the thousands).  
MacIntyre claims that the internal goods of a practice are realized through the pursuit 
of forms of excellence that are partly definitive of an activity, with a resulting refinement of 
conceptions of that activity. This is why throwing a football with skill is not a practice, as it is 
both too simple to be a practice and it is not part of the action of throwing a football to reflect 
on the internal good and ultimate ends of throwing a football. The same can be said for tic-
tac-toe. MacIntyre gives the example of chess as a practice. It is a game just like tic-tac-toe 
but much more complex and part of the practice of playing chess is to consider what excellent 
chess-play consists in, which something that evolves (1981, pp. 188-189). (For example, it 
may not suffice to win a preponderance of games in order to count as an excellent chess 
player. A computer that achieves this inelegantly, through brute force of calculation, may not 
be such a thing.) 
Much the same can be said for filmmaking. It is clear from the literature both in the 
professional and academic world (examined in later chapters) that introspection and analysis 
of the practice and a constant defining and re-defining of its key excellences is a key part of 
the practice of filmmaking. These key excellences are governed by reference to the internal 
goods of the practice. 
Paraphrasing MacIntyre (1981, pp. 188-189), the definition of ‘internal goods’ can be 
said to have two aspects:  
 
1. Internal goods can only be specified in terms of a specific practice 
2. Internal goods can only adequately be identified by participating in that 
practice  
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According to MacIntyre, this, in turn, renders any without the relevant experience 
incompetent as judges of internal goods. MacIntyre then broadens the idea of internal goods 
to encompass three universal virtues inherent in any internal good: “we have to accept as 
necessary components of any practice with internal goods and standards of excellence the 
virtues of justice, courage and honesty” (1981, p. 192). These he regards as universal human 
virtues that the practitioner must hold if they are to truly experience the internal goods of the 
practice.  
By contrast, external goods are characterized as goods that:  
 
…[W]hen achieved … are always some individual’s property and possession… 
External goods are therefore characteristically objects of competition in which there 
must be losers as well as winners. Internal goods are indeed the outcome of 
competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good 
for the whole community who participate in the practice.   
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 190) 
 
A good example of this is the chess player. A brilliant chess player who evolves the elegance 
of style of play (arguably an internal good of the practice of chess playing) achieves the 
internal good of excellence of play and the chess-playing community benefits as they learn 
new modes of (better) play. Contrast this with the chess player who cheats to win. They get 
the glory of the win, but the community receives no benefit, and will suffer if the dishonesty 
is ever discovered.  
MacIntyre also sees a disconnect and potential danger with internal goods related to 
practices and the institutions that make those practices possible: 
 
Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with what I have called 
external goods…  they distribute money, power and status as reward… Indeed so 
intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions…  that institutions and practices 
characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of 
the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the 
cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the 
competitiveness of the institution.  
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 193) 
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MacIntyre presents the relationship between the practice and the institution as one of dramatic 
irony. The institution enables the practice, but by its very nature is perhaps its most significant 
enemy. However, MacIntyre offers a solution by recourse to the virtues.   
 
In this context, the essential function of the virtues is clear. Without them, without 
justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of 
institutions…  
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 193) 
 
These virtues are crucial as without them practitioners would neither be able to achieve nor 
comprehend the internal goods that govern their practice. Think of the portrait painter 
(another discipline that MacIntyre defends as a social practice) who does not hold the virtue 
of truthfulness. If the internal good of portrait painting is to capture both the physical 
appearance and the soul of the subject, the virtue-less painter will be tempted to lie, to not 
discover the truth of the subject. They would also be unlikely to recognize the truth of the 
picture had they happened to mistakenly capture the essence. Furthermore, an agent not 
searching for truth would be unable to meaningfully re-examine the key excellences of the 
social practice.  
To apply this to the social practice of filmmaking, if the internal good of the 
construction of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is ‘to move people in a worthwhile 
way to a conclusion that is worth having: not simply to make an argument, but to make an 
argument worth making and to make with integrity’, then, if filmmakers (and the study will 
fine tune this definition further below) do not hold the virtue of truthfulness then it is very 
unlikely for them to achieve the internal goods of the practice. Nor are they likely to enjoy or 
properly appreciate these goods if by happenstance they manage to construct a film that 
argued with integrity.   
The relationship of a social practice to the institutions that both empower and obstruct 
it is a complex and problematic one. On the one hand, the practice works within a set of 
institutions that depend on it (and it on them) but the social practice itself can be inimical to 
these institutions and the practice suffers because of this. 
In terms of the practice of mainstream narrative filmmaking, the relevant institutions 
are the production company (a company whose function is to physically produce the film but 
not to distribute or exhibit it), the studio or organization that has contributed finance to the 
budget of the film, the distribution company responsible for releasing the film in a given 
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territory, the exhibitor, usually cinemas but increasingly online portals such as iTunes, as well 
as marketing institutions and public relations institutions. It must be noted that sometimes one 
institution can house all of these other institutions (usually with the exception of cinematic 
exhibition, which in the US between 1948 and 2020 could not be part of a production and 
distribution institution), but this is rare (Fisher, 2020). It must also be noted that we are in the 
era where one single individual can produce, finance, distribute, exhibit, market and promote 
their film, where this clearly is not occurring at an institutional level. A common combination 
is the financier/distributor institution, and most significant film studios operate on this level 
with regard to mainstream narrative feature films and it gives them significant power and 
influence over the product submitted by the filmmakers (Lobato and Ryan, 2011).   
To use the studio as an example of the problematic relationship between the practice 
of constructing mainstream narrative feature films and the institutions that empowers it, it is 
clear that, as mainstream narrative feature films have very large production costs (according 
to industry budget and revenues monitoring website BoxOfficeMojo.com, the recent romantic 
comedy, Bridget Jones’ Baby (Maguire, 2016) with no special effects or stunts cost $35 
million US dollars), there would be no large scale practice without the support of significantly 
financed institutions. Yet the problem lies that the priority of the institution is not the same as 
the agents of the practice, and the training and skills base of the individuals involved in the 
institutions is different from those engaged in the practice. The institutions of feature 
filmmaking nonetheless have a strong influence over the result of the practice, namely the 
film itself.  
The film studio (production company/distributor) is a corporation concerned with 
external goods, specifically the generation of income. In fact, it is their legal and fiscal 
responsibility to their shareholders or stakeholders to maximize profits. Unless an internal 
good of the practice is directly responsible for financial gain, it can only ever be of 
instrumental concern. If the internal good of a mainstream narrative feature film is to ‘to 
move people in a worthwhile way to a conclusion that is worth having: not simply to make an 
argument, but to make an argument worth making and to make with integrity’, but this 
conflicts with the potential maximization of box-office revenue, then the studio will attempt 
to involve themselves in the practice to change the product to best achieve their external good.  
For example, the studio insisted on a change to the end of the film that launched Tom Cruise 
as a star, Risky Business (Brickman, 1983) to make it more, as Tom Cruise reflected three 
years later in a conversation with Cameron Crowe, “upbeat and commercial” (Crowe, 1986). 
The director, Paul Brickman, resisted heavily but did not have ultimate power to defend his 
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story, so the change was made. This equivocation of happy endings with commerciality is 
something that will be explored further in Chapter 6. 
 
Mainstream Narrative Feature Film 
Initially the widest possible definition of a mainstream narrative feature film will be used. A 
mainstream narrative feature film is a fictional story that runs between 65-300 minutes where 
a series of events unfold usually with obvious causal connections and typically with the same 
group of characters, intended to be seen in one sitting requiring continuous attention from the 
audience, and deemed releasable to the general public by current established feature film 
distribution companies (both multiplex and art-house). It should be noted that this is a 
deliberately ‘platform-agnostic’ definition, as it does specify on which type of screen the film 
should be viewed. Streaming platforms such as Netflix, Amazon Prime and Disney+ are 
vertically integrated producers, distributors and exhibitors of their work, be it in the 
traditional cinema setting on a mobile phone screen. 
The latter part of the definition is linked to the practices of current film distribution 
companies. Because the mainstream evolves as the medium evolves, the definition must have 
the capacity to evolve also. What counts as a mainstream narrative feature film varies over 
time and in different cultural contexts: mainstream narrative feature films in the US in 1927 
were silent films, making the first ever ‘talkie’ (even if it was merely five minutes of sound at 
the end of a silent movie) The Jazz Singer (Crosland, 1927) the risky avant-garde outlier. A 
current mainstream Bollywood feature film is considered to be a predominantly Indian cast in 
a musical/action epic spectacular in the Hindi language, such as the romantic-comedy-
adventure Chennai Express (Shetty, 2013). 
What is important in the initial definition of the mainstream narrative feature film 
offered here is a relativisation to the standards and practices of distribution networks. In an 
important sense, a mainstream film is just a film widely accepted as mainstream by that 
culture and can include non-narrative feature films. To qualify as a mainstream narrative 
feature film, the story must depict characters and events that are in some way causally linked. 
A film such as Koyaanisqatsi (1982), Godfrey Reggio’s experimental documentary tone-
poem about human impact on the environment, is indisputably a mainstream feature film – 
widely released (by major studio MGM in the USA), and indeed very popular (it currently 
holds an 8.3/10 rating from over 26,000 reviews on global film database site Imdb.com). 
However, it is not a narrative film because it lacks the presence of characters and causally 
linked events. However, it must be noted that these casual links between events in a 
	 10	
mainstream narrative feature film need not be simple, linear, or even complete. In fact some 
mainstream directors, such as Robert Altman specialize in stories of coincidence and parallel 
rather than causal closure (see dramas Short Cuts, 1993 and Prêt-à-Porter, 1994). Considered 
a landmark of avant-garde cinema, Wavelength (Snow, 1967) demonstrates that both 
characters and causally linked events must be both present and identifiable in mainstream 
narrative feature film as the film has a tight causal structure but no identifiable character. 
Indeed Snow is often thought of as a ‘structural’ writer and director, where the shape of the 
film is the point, the actual content peripheral (Sitney, 1979, p. 349). 
There is much more that needs to be said about the role causally linked events and 
characters play in the construction of cinematic argument in mainstream narrative feature 
films and the study will take up this issue further chapters.  
Although he is in no way attempting to be a ‘structuralist’ in the avant-garde sense, 
two-time Academy Award winner William Goldman theorises that feature film screenplays 
are nothing more than structure (Goldman, 1983, p. 195). He is clearly making a point to 
fledgling screenwriters, but structure is undeniably fundamental to feature films due to their 
significant running times designed to be experienced in one sitting. Using an analogy to the 
architect, a one-storey wattle-and-daub mud hut will need neither foundations nor much prior 
planning, but as the building gets higher new technologies are required. A narrative feature 
film is like a high-rise, it is not simply a collection of huts one above the other – it requires a 
completely different design to stop the building from falling down: the argument is that 
structure.  
It is also key to the structure of a narrative feature film that the narrative (and therefore 
the argument) is completed in some way. Any ongoing television/web series or serial may 
cumulatively last longer than a narrative feature film but are designed to be open-ended which 
fundamentally alters the capabilities of the form and therefore the practice. As Mittell (2015) 
notes, “…the serial text itself is less of a linear storytelling object than a sprawling library of 
narrative content that might be consumed via a wide range of practices, sequences, fragments, 
moments, choices, and repetitions” (p. 7).  
Traditionally, long form storytelling in television has taken four forms: Serial, Series, 
Mini-Series and Soap Opera. These are standard industry and consumer terms, and for the 
purposes of this chapter the definitions of Fiske (2011) will be used.  
A serial is one long story arc (with subplots) that span it’s entire run (sometimes 
referred as ‘season’ in the US). Serials “have the same characters, but have continuous 
storylines, normally more than one, that continue from episode to episode. Their characters 
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appear to live continuously between episodes, they grow and change with time, and have 
active “memories” of previous events,” (Fiske, 2011, p. 151). This would make it difficult for 
a viewer to start watching mid-way through the serial. A series is sometimes what is also 
referred to as ‘episodic television’ even though serials are split into separate episodes, and is a 
series that is structured around stand-alone episodes that have an arc that concludes within 
each episode. “There is “dead time” between the episodes, with no memory from one to the 
other, and episodes can be screened or repeated in any order,” (Fiske, 2011, p. 151). A series 
is designed for a viewer to be able to enter mid-season, which was very important in the days 
of terrestrial pre-video recording television, and much less relevant in the modern era of on-
line viewing and DVD box sets. One useful example of a serial that became a series is the 
science-fiction television show Dr. Who (1963 onwards). It ran as a serial from its inception 
in 1963 until 1989. When it returned in 2005 it was structured as a series, perhaps in an 
attempt to maximize new viewers to the show.  
The term mini-series is actually a misnomer, as it is a fixed episode stand-alone serial, 
rather than series. Roots (1977 and 2016) and Band of Brothers (2001) are well-known US 
examples of the miniseries, and the romance novelist Barbara Taylor Bradford had no less 
than four novels adapted into mini-series in the 1980s – A Woman of Substance (1984), Hold 
the Dream (1986), Act of Will (1989), and Voice of the Heart (1989).  
The soap opera is essentially a never-ending serial, best epitomized by the UK soaps 
Coronation Street (1960-) and Eastenders (1985-) which have been broadcast without hiatus 
for the last 56 and 31 years respectively. As Fiske notes, soaps are defined by their “ongoing, 
serial form with its consequent lack of narrative closure, and the multiplicity of its plots,” and   
“work through an indefinitely extended middle,” (Fiske, 2011, p. 182). The term ‘soap’ is also 
used as an indication of domestic, relationship and family-based plot arcs, so a series can be 
referred to as having ‘soap elements’ if these arcs are present. To muddy the definition even 
further, the popular US serials Dynasty (1981-1989) and Dallas (1978-1991) were referred to 
as ‘supersoaps’, as although they were about the lives and loves of the super-rich, they did 
have specific and separate seasons. 
So how do all these forms differ from mainstream narrative feature films? They all 
contain both characters and events that are causally linked. Three forms: Serial, Series and 
Soap Operas are open-ended, in that even if they ultimately are ‘axed’ as a show, as they 
inevitably must be (even Coronation Street and Eastenders will eventually cease 
broadcasting), due to the limitations of the industrial mode of production the makers of those 
shows will often not know which will be the last series and so are unable to write a cohesive 
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conclusion. The current trend is for season finales (final episodes) to leave more questions 
than answers to convince the audience and networks that the show must be renewed for a 
further season in order to answer these questions. On very rare occasions, and the high profile 
and highly regarded Breaking Bad (2008-2013) was one of those, the makers of the show 
decide to stop once they believe the dominant story arc has completed (Plunkett, 2013). This 
is rare as the networks will want a series to continue as long as there is money to be made 
from its exploitation, and it is worth noting that the ‘Breaking Bad’ universe did continue in 
the spin-off series Better Call Saul (2015-), and the feature film El Camino: A Breaking Bad 
Movie (2019).  
If a series, serial or soap opera is open ended, it cannot function as a coherent 
argument as there is no end. Another way to conceptualize this is to say that they can only 
ever be an incomplete argument, so the practice of making mainstream television series, 
serials and soap operas evolved in a different way. These formats can contain a consistent 
sensibility, for example The West Wing (1999-2006) clearly has a left-leaning liberal 
progressive bias, but there is little more structure that can be developed within it. Another 
negative impact that the industrial nature of television production has on the ability of a 
series, serial or soap opera to be able to function as an argument is that the longer a show 
continues, the more likely the key creative personnel will change, and with it as change of 
sensibility of the show, however subtle or extreme. Writers are replaced throughout the 
duration of a single series, and the showrunners, the overall creative heads of the television 
series/serial (Fisher, 2019a), may have longer tenures but often they too will be replaced  
whether they created the series or not. One high profile case was the firing of Frank Darabont 
as showrunner of The Walking Dead (2010-) despite being the series creator.  
This brings us back to the fixed episode mini-series, now also referred to as ‘limited’ 
or ‘event’ series. It should be noted that the difference in these terms is purely marketing-
based, with the head of the US television network FX explaining that the term ‘mini-series’ is 
tainted as “it became synonymous with big, cheesy melodrama,” (Landgraf, quoted in Rose 
and Goldberg, 2014). However they are marketed, these series come to a definitive and 
planned end, so perhaps the practice of constructing mini-series is also intrinsically the 
construction of an argument? To investigate this in any detail is beyond the scope of this 
study, but it is certainly a possibility. However, to tentatively argue the counter position, the 
mini-series is split into typically four or eight parts, so unlike with mainstream narrative 
feature film the construction of the mini-series is likely to take into account that the viewer 
may not watch all parts (life has a nasty habit of getting in the way of viewing 8 to 10 hours 
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of programming) therefore much narrative redundancy has to be built into each episode, 
making any attempt to construct a convincing argument awkward at best. That is not to say 
that it is not possible that the mini-series could function as a coherent argument, but that the 
traditional practice of the construction of mini-series is unlikely to be the traditional practice 
of constructing an argument, as argumentation is not necessary and therefore not definitive of 
that practice.   
However, in recent years the worlds of television and narrative feature films have been 
converging ever closer together both in terms of visuals and artists involved, and the 
argument could be made (although the study does not make it here) that modern serials, mini-
series and ‘event series’ such as the aforementioned Breaking Bad, Stranger Things (2016-) 
and True Detective (2014-) are thought and referred to as more ‘cinematic’ (Stefansky, 2018), 
not because of high production value or the presence of Hollywood stars, but due to the fact 
that as these series and serials not only have  definite ends, but can be ‘binge-watched’ on 
subscription video-on-demand services such as Netflix. This allows for them to be watched in 
one (very long) sitting, which enables the writers, directors and showrunners to create 
something much like an 8-13 hour mainstream narrative feature film. In fact, True Detective 
is an anthology serial, where it is not each episode that is self-contained under a series title 
(Schneider, 2016), but each returning season is based around a whole new cast and scenario, 
essentially making each season resemble separate long standalone feature films.  
 
Argument 
The following definition will be outlined at length in Chapter 2, but to provide a brief 
overview the thesis claims that narrative feature films convey arguments – yet these need not 
be philosophical arguments. The bar set for what constitutes a philosophical argument is still 
hotly debated, but is set far higher than what is expected of a conventional argument 
(Livingston, 2006, p. 15). A philosophical argument is an argument that satisfies a particular 
standard. It is not merely an argument to a philosophical conclusion. For example, a judgment 
that the body and mind are separate substances is a philosophical conclusion. Consider the 
argument: “The mind and body are separate substances because I very much want to be 
immortal and my immortality is most easily assured if the mind is a separate substance to the 
body.” This is an argument to a philosophical conclusion, but it isn’t a philosophical 
argument. Thus an argument counts as a philosophical argument only if it meets a particular 
standard of argument. It must supply philosophical reasons for a conclusion, not just any 
reason at all for a philosophical conclusion. But what is a philosophical reason? Perhaps the 
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most justifiable account of it is that a philosophical reason is one that meets a minimal 
standard of ‘good reasons’. It needn’t be perfectly logical (there are plenty of logically flawed 
philosophical arguments) and it needn’t be sound or plausible, but its reasons must be relevant 
and potentially persuasive, depending upon other assumptions, particularly philosophical 
assumptions, and it must be logically attractive in the sense that it must be possible to see how 
a reasonable person might hold it to be logically valid when supplemented with appropriate 
additional premises. Cinematic arguments need not be philosophical arguments in this sense. 
For this reason, the study begins working with a minimalist conception of what an argument 
is, which can be stated thus: An argument is an assertion supported by reasons to believe such 
assertion. 
The contrast between rhetoric, logical argument and sound argument is very relevant 
in examining how precisely film argues. To delineate the different forms of argument, this 
study uses the negative connotation of the term ‘rhetoric’ to mean the discipline of persuading 
others through the appearance of truth (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020). Aristotle’s specific use 
of the concept and its constituent parts will be explored separately in Chapters 2, 5 and 7. 
Because rhetoric aims at the appearance of truth, rather than truth as such, it may employ false 
reasoning without undermining its project. For examples, one has only to look at most 
arguments made by the Trump presidential campaign of 2016, cited as the start of post-truth 
politics (Davies, 2016). For instance, the argument a that a wall will keep out Mexicans is 
good example of rhetoric as it feels true (walls stop people from gaining access) but fails to 
take into account either its height or the effectiveness of a wall so long that it is still 
essentially an unguarded border. In spite of this obvious point, the idea of a wall as a means of 
keeping others out feels effective, which contributes to the overall effectiveness of the 
rhetorical argument for it (Donald Trump’s Mexico Wall: Who is going to pay for it?, 2016). 
A logical but unsound argument is one that is internally systematic and logically valid but 
starts from a false premise (such as it is logical to assume that if climate change does not exist 
no action is necessary); a sound argument is a logically valid argument that starts from true 
premises (climate change does exist so we have to do something about it). How mainstream 
narrative feature films argue, and whether this allows for rhetoric and unsound arguments, 
will be interrogated fully in Chapter 2.  
 
Filmmakers 
As the construction of mainstream feature film is a creative collaboration, it is necessary to 
delineate precisely what the study means when it refers to a ‘filmmaker’. The answer is not as 
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straightforward as it seems, as the various roles that can be attributed to ‘filmmaker’ have 
very different skill bases. 
Notwithstanding the plural term ‘filmmakers’ which can refer to the production team 
as a whole, there are three key candidates when it comes to the mantle of filmmaker. First, the 
director of the film: as Bordwell, Thompson and Smith comment, “it is the director who 
makes the crucial decisions about performance, staging, lighting, framing, cutting and sound,” 
(Bordwell, Thompson and Smith 2018, p. 34).  The film is the director’s ‘vision,’ and they 
steer this vision onto the screen, being involved in the project in terms of script, pre-
production, production and post-production. Their job is complete when they deliver the film 
to the producer or production company or distributor. Unless the director is extremely high 
status, the director will not have ‘final cut’ of the film, the term for final say over the released 
cut of the film (Haase, 2007, p.64).  
The term filmmaker can also be attributed to the producer of the film. There are 
typically four types of producer (in order of importance): the ‘Executive Producer’ (usually 
referred to as the ‘E.P.’) puts money into the film, either as an individual as head of the studio 
or production company – no industry experience or knowledge is required, just access to 
finance; the ‘Producer’ is the equivalent of Head of Business, they are part of the project from 
the very beginning, usually hiring the writer and director before organizing the finance for the 
film and seeing it through to delivery; the ‘Associate Producer’ is a junior role which involves 
liaison with stakeholders and technical personnel; and finally, the ‘Line Producer’, an 
employee of the production hired to organize the day to day running of the production  
(Bordwell, Thompson and Smith 2018, pp. 17-18). 
Screenwriters are also sometimes referred to as filmmakers, but less often as their job 
primarily takes place off-set, their primary role to “prepare the screenplay,” (Bordwell, 
Thompson and Smith 2018, p. 18). Alternatively, screenwriters are referred to as filmmakers 
when they are also the director. Occasionally, as noted above, the entire crew is referred to as 
‘filmmakers’ when a screen-related article wants to make a general point about the production 
and wants to personalize it.  
The industrial nature of narrative feature film production means that almost no two 
films have the same combination of screenwriters, producers and directors working in exactly 
the same way, with consistent power dynamics, and none of these roles require any specific 
qualification, creative or otherwise. Literally anybody can legally call themselves a 
screenwriter, producer or director.  
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As a director, hired to steer your vision of the film onto the screen, creative control is 
key. But as described earlier, the industrial nature of production (the influence of the 
institutions) can throw this process out of kilter. The first most common circumstance is that 
even though the director is the head creative, the real power lies with whoever finances the 
film. This essentially means that the E.P. is potentially the key creative, but usually defers to 
the director. (This is an example of the institution not interfering in the practice.) However, if 
an E.P. does get involved, this can radically alter the creative elements of the mainstream 
narrative feature film. This is not the only corruption of the practice. Another way the process 
is thrown out of kilter is when there is a significant star involved. Even though they are ‘just 
an actor’ and officially have no power in terms of overall direction of the film creatively, if 
they choose to do so, they can exert irresistible pressure, often to the extent that the E.P. will 
defer to them creatively. This is in part due to the likely fact that the E.P. wants to keep the 
star happy, and often partly due to the fact that if the star decides to walk off the set, millions 
will be lost and the film may languish incomplete. (Directors can always be replaced, but not 
actors once a significant portion of the film has been shot.)  
In this way, even though the director should technically be overseeing all creative 
aspects of the production, depending on the production, the producers, E.P. or even actors can 
be the real lead influencer of its creative elements. Ultimately, even if production has gone 
smoothly, the producers still have the right to change the film.  This can be problematic as 
producer roles not only do not require any formal or informal training in storytelling, it is not 
the skills base of such roles.  
This is a critical distinction. Screenwriters and directors will likely have dedicated 
their life to the study of story and storytelling (either formally or informally) and there is an 
industry expectation, if not a reliance, that they have a strong conceptual grip of how to 
construct a feature film narrative. The industry expectation of a producer is that they will be 
highly conversant in how to structure finance and close deals, and perhaps be an effective 
assessor of talent, but there is not the same expectation or reliance that they have a developed 
sense of story. This is troublesome for a role that can hold ultimate creative control.  
There are always exceptions, and producer ‘pairs’ are a recognised structure – such as 
Nik Powell and Stephen Woolley in the UK and Don Simpson and Jerry Bruckheimer in the 
US. In these cases , one producer is good with the deal and one is good with material and 
talent. However, producers primarily need to know how to trigger finance and oversee 
physical production, not improve story. Another exception is that to retain more creative 
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control, directors often work as producers on their own films, which is why writer/producer/ 
director is a common production credit.  
Sometimes the producer will be a representative of the institution, in the sense that 
they reflect the fundamental financial interests of the institution, sometimes they will be 
independent (Bordwell, Thompson and Smith 2018, p. 17), but in both cases the position does 
not require (even if it is welcomed) an advanced understanding of cinematic storytelling. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, ‘filmmaker’ is either a screenwriter or director. As 
the term is particularly fluid, from this point on the study will instead refer to screenwriters or 
directors (singularly or collectively) as ‘practitioners’. Wherever there is a third-party 
reference to ‘filmmakers’, the study will clarify the definition and specify a precise 
production role.  
 
Delivery 
As stated earlier, the thesis will develop an account of the practice of making mainstream 
narrative feature films from conception to delivery. But what precisely is delivery and how 
does it work? And how does this affect the scope of the study? 
On a typical mainstream film production (either independently financed or through a 
studio), delivery is the point in the production: when the director delivers the completed film 
to the distributor. (As has already been mentioned, in a studio film the production company is 
often also the distributor, so in this case it can be thought of as the distribution department). 
Most film directors do not have final cut. It is rare as it means other stakeholders have no 
legal control over the material, with distributors only able to cancel release, rather than 
modify the work itself. Prior to the final cut, a distributor (who, even if they are not the 
principal production company, usually puts finance into the production budget of the film to 
secure the release in their territory) may have a say over the material. A distributor will only 
‘accept delivery’ once they are happy with the work. This is a legal position, as once the 
distributor accepts delivery they are liable to pay for it. Delivery can be rejected for either 
technical reasons (the film master has physical glitches) or creative concerns. These creative 
rejections can range from the head of the distribution company not liking certain elements 
personally, or due to poor test screening ratings (if the distributor engages in test screenings). 
A very public example of this is the ‘Alan Smithee’ director credit (Pendreigh, 2000), created 
to reflect the scenario of a director’s being unhappy with a final cut they had no control over 
(due to studio/financier/distributor interference).  
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In the US, as part of Director’s Guild of America (DGA) rules, if a director is 
unsatisfied with the final cut they are able to remove their name from all credits – and until 
the year 2000 the ‘name’ of the director would be credited ‘Alan Smithee’. This credit is no 
longer in use as the audience became aware of the practice, so presently a director is still able 
to take their name from the credits but a range of different alternative names are used to 
replace their name.  
Whether a director has final cut is not crucial to the study. It is concerned with the 
construction of the mainstream narrative feature film up to the point that the director makes 
their first delivery to the distributor. It is at this point that the film is fully completed. This 
version of the film may be rejected by the distributor, but the film delivered to the distributor 
represents the total creative output of the social practice of constructing a mainstream 
narrative feature film. It must be noted that in some cases the output may or may not have 
suffered – or may have been improved by – interference by the executive producer, producer, 
financier, studio or distributor during the practice, but navigating institutional interference 
does represent part of the practice for the screenwriter and director. 
Why the first delivery production point is critical is that is represents the moment 
when the film becomes wholly controlled by institutions and not those involved in the 
practice. What happens next is completely beyond the control or influence of those involved 
in the practice (the screenwriter or director), and these institutions, as previously discussed, 
have a whole different set of priorities focused on external rather than internal goods.  
It must be noted that a film can be re-delivered any number of times. Again, looking at 
DGA rules (Director’s Guild of America, 2019), as early institutional interference (during the 
first cut) has been recognized as problematic, the director is able to ban everybody from the 
editing suite for 10 weeks in order to deliver a cut of the film free of any interference. If the 
distributor does not like this version of the film as delivered, they are within their rights 
(unless the director has final cut) to ask for changes and this process can be repeated until the 
distributor is happy with the final product. If the director refuses then the distributor is able to 
fire the director and hire new crew to re-cut (and sometimes re-shoot) the film. If the director 
dislikes the new cut they are entitled to remove their name from the credits, as with the Alan 
Smithee example.   
Because the practice of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is only responsible 
for first delivery to the institutions, its internal success as a practice cannot depend on the 
eventual audience response. A film might be internally successful at first delivery, but made 
internally unsuccessful at final cut due to studio/distributor interference. In this case, it is not 
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that the final film is internally unsuccessful. It is that the internal success of the practice is not 
allowed to translate into the internal success of the screened product.  
 
Success and Failure 
If the thesis is correct and the practice of mainstream narrative filmmaking is a social practice, 
with a robust and constitutive set of internal good or goods pursued in a set of institutional 
contexts that supply external goods for the practice, then the term ‘success’ will have several 
meanings. A film that secures external goods for filmmakers need not be a film that secures 
internal goods. A film can be deemed successful in either of these senses. Mainstream 
narrative feature films that have been deemed ‘successful’ in terms of reception (either by 
critics, audiences or financial grosses) need not have secured the internal goods of the practice 
of narrative filmmaking.  
The concept of success that principally concerns the study is the attainment of the 
internal good of the practice of making mainstream narrative feature films. This is to move 
audiences in a worthwhile way to a conclusion that is worth having: to argue with integrity. 
However, art as in life is rarely perfect so most films can be expected to ‘fail’ to varying 
degrees for a variety of reasons, be they institutional interference in the practice or directors 
whom do not have the skills, luck or virtues necessary for the attainment of the internal good 
of the practice.  
 
The Cinema of Compensation 
Given the account of internal success developed above, it is clear that many commercially 
successful films are internally unsuccessful and many internally successful films are 
commercially unsuccessful. Furthermore, it may well come as a surprise to many film 
practitioners that the internal success of their practice depends upon their success in 
constructing an argument. They may readily claim to aim at nothing more than entertainment 
or affective modulation of an audience. (“My aim in making a film is to scare the pants off 
my audience,” or “my aim is to keep them on the edge of their seats,” and so on. These 
alternate conceptions will be fully interrogated in Chapter 4). Yet what is happening in such 
cases? If the construction of a mainstream narrative feature film can be conceptualized as the 
construction of an argument, then these self-conceptions of the practice of filmmaking 
confuse the methodology with the objective. ‘Entertainment’, as illustrated in Chapter 4, is a 
function of the well-constructed argument; a well-constructed argument lays the foundation 
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upon which rests the ability of mainstream narrative feature films to entertain. It is the 
incognizance of this practice that allows such confusions among practitioners.   
The Cinema of Compensation is an account offered in Chapter 6 that organizes 
various creative components when it comes to the construction of a mainstream narrative 
feature film. A compensation is a creative element that usually (but not always) exists as part 
of the original fabric of the mainstream narrative feature film, but is given undue prominence 
in the film in order to compensate for a flaw in the film’s argument. A compensation is not 
usually a freestanding element but a level of emphasis: the creative combination is decisive. 
The flaw may be major (such as both being confused, unsystematic or based on obviously 
false premises) or minor (such as a momentarily lapse of logic with regard to a less significant 
area of the argument). As the study will argue that the practice of film-as-argument is an 
incognizant practice, this will most likely be conceptualized by the practitioners either 
generally as a ‘bad’ film, or more specifically as a film that might not entertain or engage.  
Below is a current working list of the main creative elements that can be ‘remixed’ (or 
sometimes added with varying degrees of emphasis) so as to function as compensations. 
These will be explored further with recourse to specific film exemplars in Chapter 6.   
 
1. Happy Endings 
2. Franchise 
3. Genre Conventions 
4. Casting & Performance 
5. Author 
6. Visual pleasure  
7. Spectacle 
8. Sensation 
9. Wish fulfilment 
10. Music 
11. Puzzle solving 
12. Promise of the Premise 
13. Recognition of Self 
14. Dialogue 
15. Strong Sequences 
16. ‘Based On A True Story’ 
17. The First 
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18. Homage 
19. Fan Service 
20. Obscurity/Chaos/Confusion 
 
Compare a mainstream narrative feature film to the culinary arts. If the film is a plate of food, 
then in order to make up for a dish that the chef fears is not palatable enough (through design 
or execution), the chef may overuse the condiments. The salt and pepper were always meant 
to be a part of the dish, but now the balance is out (and in some extreme instances, extra 
ingredients are included that were never part of the original recipe). The taste may be more 
palatable as a result, but that is not the original point of the dish.  
To convert this analogy to an example of a mainstream narrative feature film, let us 
briefly examine the 24th Bond film, Spectre (Mendes, 2015). Let us agree that the argument 
the film is making, as so many action films do, is that natural justice will always prevail, that 
good ultimately will triumph over evil, even if the methods of the good sometimes have to be 
questionable. In order to be convinced by this argument, we have to believe that both the 
characters and the plotting make logical sense. If not, the argument fails (full case studies will 
be explored in Chapters 7 and 8). However, in Spectre there are many character 
inconsistencies and breakdowns of logic. (Bond is injected with an established torture device 
that, for no explainable or established reason, does not seem to work on him; women 
consistently throw themselves at Bond sexually, despite his having no demonstrable charm.) 
Each of these inconsistencies weakens the argument to differing degrees. However, the 
director has the opportunity to distract from the impact of these flaws by using other creative 
elements. In this case, it could be argued that potentially the visual pleasure (Compensation 6) 
of the torture sequence (the intricacy of the torture device), the overtly tense sequence itself 
(Compensation 15), or the immediately ensuing spectacle (Compensation 7) of a high 
production value chase sequence was sufficient to distract the audience. Now these elements 
were always designed to be part of the fabric of the film, but would have to be intensified if 
they are to be used as a compensation – so that the device is extremely intricate and beautiful 
or the sequence is phenomenally tense, more than would have been required for the narrative 
if the argument were better constructed. An example of a compensatory element that was not 
part of the original design of the film would be, in Bond’s case, if he were made to disrobe for 
the torture, adding an exploitation element to the proceedings that would qualify as both 
visual pleasure and sensation (Compensations 4 and 6).    
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It must also be noted that this list of compensations can also function as ways to 
maximize the external goods of the practice. As stated earlier, as the concept of film-as-
argument is not currently a dominant way of thinking about the social practice of the 
construction of mainstream narrative feature films, this would currently be conceptualized by 
both practitioners and institutions not as how to compensate for a flawed argument but as how 
to insure against a film not being entertaining or engaging, and the more pragmatic extension 




This chapter has set out the central thesis to be defended: that mainstream feature filmmaking 
is fundamentally the social practice of incognizant argument design and delivery. It has 
defined the key concept of social practice in the teleological rather than sociological or 
cultural sense, and with it the associated ideas of internal and external goods of the practice. 
Success has been defined exclusively in respect to fulfilling the internal goods of this practice, 
allowing a mainstream feature film to be a commercial and critical success, yet a failure in 
terms of the practice. The account of the Cinema of Compensation has been offered to 
articulate how these failures achieve these other, more externally quantifiable, notions of 
accomplishment.   
 This thesis, if proven to a satisfactory degree, has the potential to be highly 
contentious. There is currently no literature in either the academy or industry that 
conceptualises film in this way. However, it would be naïve to make the claim, however well 
researched, that industry practitioners have either misunderstood and/or are largely unaware 
of essential the nature of their practice, and not expect some resistance. As a case in point, the 
fact that the study includes screenwriters and directors but excludes producers from the 
definition of industry practitioners is likely to inspire vigorous debate alone.    
To that end, it is critical as the study begins, to state (perhaps counter-intuitively), 
what the thesis is not. Most crucially, the thesis is not attempting to be a general theory of 
story or narrative, nor any universalisable conception of art. It is concerned exclusively with 
an account of the internal goods that are specific to the practice of making mainstream 
narrative feature films. It does not take an ontological approach to attempt to define what 
mainstream narrative feature films are; it is a study that does not speculate what films could 
be doing or should be doing, but rather making a viable case as to what the social practice of 
their creation is at this moment in cinematic history.  
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 The specificity of the form is decisive, and although there may be some inevitable 
overlap it is not intended that any of the conclusions or arguments of this thesis be applicable 
to any other forms – especially other screen forms – be they emerging or established. For 
example, this thesis does not, and is not intended to apply to ‘soap opera’. The open-
endedness of the form, and the industrial rather than practitioner-focused mode of production 
(manifested by constant changes to the creative workforce) do not allow for the tradition of 
the internal goods to evolve as worthwhile argument and delivery.   
What the thesis represents is a new teleological account of the internal goods of the 
practice that it is hoped will positively impact professional application. The conceptual 
hermeneutic developed by the notion of film as argument is designed solely for practitioners 
to assess and enhance their output: a diagnostic for industry, not a theory of spectatorship 
even if elements can be applied as such (please see Chapters 2, 7 and 8).  
The origins of the thesis was borne from industry self-reflexion on the research 
question of mainstream narrative feature film’s ability to argue philosophically, rather than a 
more traditional film studies approach of a literature review that revealed a resultant gap in 
knowledge. As the thesis is essentially a cross-discipline work, it is structured around two 
separate literature reviews. The first, in Chapter 2, is less traditional in that it outlines current 
thinking on film as philosophy to demonstrate the feasibility of film to function as argument, 
with section 2.2 a first demonstration of the conceptual hermeneutic when applied to a 
mainstream feature film. Chapter 5 is more traditional, and examines dominant theories of 
professional screenwriting and directing to establish precisely how industry practitioners are 
guided understand the practice. Chapter 3 further defines and defends the key conceptual 
frameworks of internal goods, external goods, virtues and agency, with Chapter 4 
interrogating other competing accounts of the practice to establish flaws and lapses in logic. 
Chapter 6 outlines the Cinema of Compensation, new conceptual work demonstrating how the 
industry is able to function despite consistently failing the internal goods of the practice, with 
Chapters 7 and 8 comprising key examples and counter-examples of mainstream narrative 
feature films designed to both illustrate and test the thesis.  





Current Thinking on Film as Philosophy 
 
2.1 Can Film Do Philosophy? 
 
This thesis takes the position that the practice of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is 
the practice of argument. As will be demonstrated in further chapters, this position has in 
some way been presupposed by filmmakers, critics, teachers, academics and film ‘gurus’ 
(self-styled or otherwise) for the last century of professional practice, but is not a commonly-
held belief. The study will argue that argument making structures the practice of feature-
length narrative filmmaking, even if filmmakers are not consciously aware of it. However, not 
only has the idea of film-as-argument not been explicitly and extensively defended, and is 
therefore not accepted as received wisdom, the proposition that film is able to argue at all 
continues to be hotly debated. 
 As stated in Chapter 1, as the thesis is essentially a cross-discipline work, it is 
structured around two separate literature reviews considering the major academic and industry 
discourses, debates and theories that inform and challenge the central thesis. The literature 
review contained in this chapter is less traditional, in that it outlines current thinking on film 
as philosophy within the academy to demonstrate the feasibility of film to function as 
argument, with section 2.2 wholly dedicated to exploring both how and what films argue, and 
how the conceptual hermeneutic can be applied. Chapter 5 is more traditional, and gives a 
brief overview of the relevant professional literature, before focusing on the dominant 
theories of professional screenwriting and directing to demonstrate precisely how 
practitioners are educated in terms of their own practice, and what critical concepts are 
underdeveloped or missing. 
 Academic debate about film’s capacity to argue focuses primarily on philosophical 
argument. As the study will examine in this chapter, the parameters of what constitutes an 
argument per se is less stringent than those that constitute a philosophical argument. If film 
can be judged able to ‘do’ philosophical argument, then the case for film being able to argue 
coherently and understandably is solid. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to defend the 
possibility of film argument, in advance of the defence of the necessity of film argument (in 
successful mainstream narrative feature films). 
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 Significant current participants in the debate – both for and against film being able to 
perform philosophical argument (which is usually referred to as ‘film as philosophy’) –  
include: Noel Carroll (1985, 2006), Damian Cox (2013, and with Michael P. Levine, 2012), 
Christopher Falzon (2002), Paisley Livingston (2006, 2009), Stephen Mulhall (2002), Robert 
Sinnerbrink (2011, 2016, 2018), Murray Smith (2006) and Thomas E. Wartenberg (2006). To 
maintain focus, this chapter will detail the debate among these thinkers, even if the debate is 
clearly built upon the ideas of others. Stanley Cavell is perhaps the most notable absentee. His 
work was groundbreaking (the Cavellian tradition is very much the idea of film being able to 
embody philosophical thought) but the general case for philosophy as film is most clearly and 
explicitly delineated by the authors listed above. Gilles Deleuze is perhaps a less surprising 
absentee. Deleuze had a strong interest in the intersection of film and philosophical thought 
(although not specifically philosophical argument), naming his study of images and thought 
“noology” (1995, p.49). He never stated that film is or is not capable of a complete argument, 
but did allow that some, but not all, films are capable of thought through image, noting that, 
“Godard transforms cinema by introducing thought into it. He didn’t have thoughts on 
cinema, he doesn’t put more or less valid thought into cinema; he starts cinema thinking,” 
(2003, p. 141). However, as Deleuze takes a primarily semiotic approach (although at times 
also a sociological, technological, psychoanalytical, biological and historico-cultural one), 
concerned with classifications, taxonomies and typologies (most notably his notions of the 
‘time-image’ (1986) and the ‘movement-image’ (1989)) his theories relevant to this thesis are 
those of spectatorship and as such are beyond the scope of this research.  
 
Four Theses of Film-Philosophy 
There are four main theses when it comes to the ability (or not) for film to perform 
philosophical argument. They are The Bold Thesis, The Null Thesis, The Modest Thesis and 
The Moderate Thesis, as defined by Cox and Levine (2012, pp. 8-10):  
 
The Bold Thesis 
This thesis sets the bar far higher than is required for the purposes of this study. “The bold 
thesis claims that a film’s contribution to philosophy, if genuine, must be irreplaceable or 
irreducible to any other forms of communication,” (Cox and Levine, 2012, p. 8). This is not a 
set of criteria that is necessary for this study, for the reasons the authors state, “…[W]hy think 
that the philosophical value of film is determined by its philosophical uniqueness?” (Cox and 
Levine 2012, p. 8). There is nothing in any conventional definition of argument that includes 
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a notion of exclusivity. This thesis is concerned with film as argument, not film as a unique 
form of argument.  
 
The Null Thesis 
By contrast, the Null Thesis requires film only be an inspiration for, or source material to, 
support philosophical argument. 
 
[Film’s] only role is to provide an impetus to, or material for, philosophical work that 
is done wholly linguistically in written and verbal texts. Films don’t themselves make 
philosophical points…  To make philosophical points films must be paraphrased, 
interpreted, and then integrated into philosophical argument... 
(Cox and Levine, 2012, p. 8) 
 
This thesis sets the bar significantly lower than is required for this study. If film is just 
material to be used in a philosophical argument, it lends no weight to the idea that films can, 
in themselves, meaningfully argue.  
 
The Modest Thesis 
The Modest Thesis sits between the Bold and Null theses, putting film on an even footing 
with other forms of argument. 
 
…[T]he modest thesis denies the uniqueness of film-philosophy. A cinematic 
performance of philosophy is not untranslatable into verbal philosophical forms; the  
philosophy can be re-expressed verbally without loss, at least in principle. 
(Cox and Levine, 2012, p. 9)  
 
This allows for films to argue philosophically even if these arguments can be translatable into 
other forms.  
 
The Moderate Thesis 
The Moderate Thesis adds further weight to the idea of film being able to argue as it takes 
into account that film has ways of arguing that are particularly powerful. 
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The key idea behind the moderate thesis is that films can sometimes be better at 
presenting certain kinds of philosophical material than standard philosophical genres 
are. This is not just because film can be more emotionally engaging and entertaining.  
(Cox and Levine, 2012, p. 10) 
 
Filmic arguments are not necessarily unique in and of themselves, but the way the various 
forms and structures are combined in film makes for strong persuasive and argumentative 
capabilities. These forms and structures will be further analysed over the course of this study. 
 
Significant arguments in the debate   
To begin with Cox and Levine, both are in the ‘moderate thesis’ camp, arguing that “…films 
tell stories, make assertions, and state or intimate hypotheses that give people, and by 
extension philosophers, material to critically assess,” (2012, p. 7), and that “…film can 
sometimes offer nuanced investigation of fundamental features of our experience, well 
beyond the ordinary achievements of written philosophical texts, and in doing so robustly 
refute hollow and simplistic ways of understanding life,” (2012, p. 12). 
 Cox and Levine also believe that a philosophical view may be ‘embedded’ in a film 
without it being the intention of the director (or writer). This is obviously possible, especially 
concerning minor viewpoints, but less likely regarding significant viewpoints. For example, a 
1960’s Bond action adventure very obviously concerned with demonstrating good’s ability to 
vanquish evil, can nevertheless express sexist viewpoints dominant of the time (Fisher, 2019). 
The study will return to this idea of authorial intention as it is a concern to many philosophers, 
and of direct importance to the defence of the thesis.  
 What is of particular relevance is Cox and Levine’s ideas when it comes to precisely 
how a film argues:  
 
An important part of the way a film does philosophy is that it is able to capture 
argument in affective ways, i.e. in ways that have emotional as well as intellectual 
resonance for us. The emotion generated by a film can focus attention and enables one 
to “see” or consider or appreciate aspects of an argument that might otherwise go by 
the wayside. Except in the cases of empirical facts (i.e. “I see the cat is on the mat”) 
belief is more often than not a function of desire and emotion as well as reasons and 
evidence. 
(Cox and Levine, 2012, p. 16) 
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This ability to stimulate emotion in cinematic argument is key. Emotional engagement is a 
significant power of mainstream narrative feature film, one that has had a profound impact on 
the development of the practice. It is in part film’s ability to argue well that has allowed the 
social practice of film as argument to evolve. This idea will be explored further in section 2.2, 
and fully interrogated in the case study Chapter 7.  
 Another strong supporter of the film-as-philosophy concept is Stephen Mulhall. In his 
book On Film, (2002) Mulhall classifies the Alien tetralogy as anything but disposable 
popular culture: 
 
I do not look to these films as handy or popular illustrations of views and arguments 
properly developed by philosophers; I see them rather as themselves reflecting on and 
evaluating such views and arguments, as thinking seriously and systematically about 
them in just the way that philosophers do. … They [the films] are philosophical 
exercises, philosophy in action – film as philosophizing.  
(Mulhall 2002, p. 2) 
 
What is represented here is the idea that these films are somehow unique as they are ‘self-
aware’ of their thematic issues. Mulhall implies that only a few, genuinely philosophical 
films, manage this level of self-awareness. However, as this thesis argues, Mulhall’s claim 
here indicates a misunderstanding of the production methods and realities of mainstream 
narrative feature film; a tradition that requires its practitioners to have explicit awareness of 
the argument the film is making, even if those practitioners hold a distinct (and the study 
argues confused) notion of the internal goods of the practice.  
 Mulhall’s discussion of the Alien franchise films is consistently referenced and 
dissected by many of the philosophers in this chapter, among them Thomas Wartenberg 
(2006). The fact that Mulhall seems to separate the Alien films from other feature narratives, 
leads Wartenberg to conclude that: 
 
This dichotomy suggests that there is a domain of serious and systematic 
philosophical thought – to which the films he is interested in belong – and one 
consisting of handy or popular illustrations of the views developed by philosophers 
that does not count as involving serious and systematic thought.  
(Wartenberg 2006, p. 23) 
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This is a view seemingly shared by most philosophers, especially Noel Carroll (2006): some 
films are special as they can argue (philosophy). Whilst both Wartenberg and Carroll are in 
the film-can-do-philosophy camp, this does not necessarily make them strong supporters of 
the film-as-argument thesis. Their interest is focused on the question of whether film can 
sometimes, in some conditions, argue philosophically. Someone could believe this without 
being tempted by the film-as-argument thesis. The film-as-argument thesis is that, at the most 
intrinsic level, the practice of narrative feature film is the practice of the construction of an 
argument. This implies that all narrative feature films are arguments and the idea that only 
one or a few are, contradicts this. However, the film-as-argument thesis does not entail that 
every film succeeds in argument. Rather it is the view that argument is the implicit goal, the 
internal good, of the social practice of narrative filmmaking. As the thesis will examine, 
many, perhaps most, films will fail to reach this goal. So it is possible that Carroll and 
Wartenberg have simply seen such a number of failed arguments, they are therefore inclined 
to think that film does not, invariably, seek to argue.   
 Wartenberg argues further that not only can some films argue philosophically, but the 
very idea of films simply illustrating manifestations of certain philosophical positions is in 
itself a form of argument. He does this by using a scene from Chaplin’s Modern Times 
(Chaplin, 1936) where Chaplin’s production line worker continues to act as if he is on a 
production line even in other social contexts in order to demonstrate significant philosophical 
points about the “mechanization of the human under capitalism,” (Wartenberg 2006, p. 30). 
 However, this scene-by-scene form of argument – or point making – is not the most 
significant form of argument for the film-as-argument thesis as it is the overall construction of 
argument that is primarily implicated. However, another comment from Wartenberg is worthy 
of note. He writes that “While philosophy is a practice guided by the desire to attain truth, 
films are normally made to engage their audiences,” (Wartenberg 2006, p. 20). 
This again indicates an understandable, but fundamental, misconception of how films 
are produced. It could reasonably be viewed that all art requires an engaged audience, but this 
does not necessarily mean that engagement at any cost, or mindless, pointless engagement is 
the aim of the practice. This will be further delineated when the study explores the ‘cinema of 
sensation’ in Chapter 4. Speaking as a professional film screenwriter, producer and director, 
perhaps the most used word when it comes to engaging audiences through creative voice, 
narrative, situation or character is ‘truth’: therefore the separation of the two concepts is 
problematic to the well-trained and experienced practitioner. As this study will demonstrate, 
the tradition of the practice of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is an appeal to truth. 
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It is a win-win scenario: presenting truth is an internal good of the practice, and the audience 
connecting with truth is a fundamentally engaging experience.  
 But what is meant by ‘truth’? In terms of narrative feature storytelling, there is a  
presupposition to a partial and aspectual conception of (certain kinds of) truth. If a 
practitioner makes a film about love, their truth may be that it is positive – whilst another 
practitioner may create a film about how it is negative. Both are right, both speak the truth, as 
they are exploring different aspects of a complex abstract concept. The truths aimed at in 
narrative feature filmmaking are not immovable philosophical certainties. They are the honest 
apprehension of an aspect of reality, of lived experience or social insight. Now, there are 
practitioners who work self-consciously, or self-deceptively, to tell falsehoods: comforting 
lies instead of difficult truths. Audiences must be engaged or the film will fail both creatively 
and financially, and those involved in a production may, for reasons of risk (big budget films 
need to big box office), take an easy way out and provide a comforting lie as the core 
argument of their film. Usually there is a middle ground, a comforting if unedifying and 
somewhat simplified truth – but sometimes a bad choice is made. However, the thesis claims 
that in this circumstance, if the practitioners were questioned about their production they 
ought to admit to, on this occasion, having ‘failed’ as storytellers.   
 Christopher Falzon, (2002) is another philosopher who believes that films can ‘do’ 
philosophy. But Falzon, understandably, has an incomplete understanding of their 
construction: 
 
Even if films are visual narratives that tend to make their points in the realm of ‘action 
and appearance’, we should not be misled by this into thinking that they have nothing 
to do with more abstract or general concerns… films are thoroughly constructed. As 
such they inevitably presuppose and draw on a multiplicity of ideas, conceptions of 
life and action, general views of the world and so on, even if these remain in the 
background, largely unreflected upon. There may be questions over what particular 
philosophical assumptions are being made in a film, but the general claim that films 
unavoidably make certain philosophical assumptions seems difficult to dispute.  
(Falzon 2002, p. 6) 
 
One the one hand, Falzon takes into account that films are “constructed”, but this idea that 
they are constructed through “unreflected upon” views of the world is problematic. 
Unreflected upon by whom? The characters? The practitioners? The audience? In the 
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development of a narrative feature film all aspects of a story are reflected upon in great detail, 
especially the central theme, or what is often called the ‘controlling idea’ (McKee, 1998, p. 
115), so named as it literally controls every other creative aspect of the enterprise. It seems 
that some philosophers know that films are made, but think that practitioners are only 
concerned with the surface aspect of action and image and other elements just fall where they 
may. 
 Falzon also has an interest in the role of the image itself in philosophy.  
 
My own interest in images is not so much in the role of image in philosophy as in the 
philosophy we can discern through the image… As such, my interest is primarily in 
the cinematic image insofar as it serves to illustrate, insofar as it captures in a concrete 
way some aspect of philosophical thought. That is already to do more than simply 
illustrate philosophical thinking. To recognize philosophical ideas, themes, and 
perspectives represented in a concrete form is to call into question the perception that  
philosophy is remote from everyday existence, concerned only with abstraction and 
universalization.  
(Falzon 2002, p. 5) 
 
Falzon’s concern for the power of images to represent philosophical thought leads to an 
emphasis on micro-argument, of the kind discussed in Wartenberg’s analysis of the scene 
from Modern Times and is consistent with a Deleuzian notion of general cinematic ‘thinking’ 
(1995, p. 49) rather than cinematic argument. This underestimates the full function of 
argument in the construction of film, and it is part of this thesis to demonstrate that a truly 
successful narrative feature film is a fully unified argument – every moment, every image, 
every scene, constructs the argument.  
 Falzon also shares some similar concerns with Murray Smith (2006), namely that 
there is a plethora of creative elements in a narrative feature film which affect its ability to 
argue philosophy effectively: 
 
[I]t needs to be reiterated that whatever engagement films themselves may have with 
philosophical themes and content, this can only be a part of what is going on in the 
film. Film is about a lot else besides, and in the end even the most ‘philosophical’ film 
has to get on with the action.  
(Falzon 2002, p. 7) 
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The conceptualization here that all elements of a film are not all connected in their 
construction is erroneous (‘bad’ films notwithstanding). Falzon might be talking about very 
specific philosophy being related in films by way of exposition and not film-as-argument per 
se, but his point is clear: on-screen action is separate from philosophy. This concept is false: 
action is a manifestation of argument – it would be like trying to remove zeros and ones from 
binary code; to an experienced practitioner, the idea is absurd.  
 Noel Carroll (2006) attempts to prove that just one film he has so far encountered, 
Serene Velocity (Gehr, 1970) can genuinely be proved to be an example of film doing 
philosophy by making a coherent philosophical argument. In this way, he is simultaneously a 
supporter and a critic of this thesis (even though Serene Velocity is not a narrative feature):  
 
For though state-of-the-art philosophy may be found in these [other] motion pictures, 
it has not really been made by means of the art of the moving image – namely, by 
means of the characteristic expositional devices of the various motion picture genres, 
including their recurrent visual, audio, and narrative structures.  
(Carroll 2006, p. 174) 
 
By requiring “characteristic expositional devices” of the medium itself, he seems to be stating 
a version of the ‘bold thesis’, in that in order to do philosophy, a film must communicate in a 
uniquely filmic way. This is an often-cited criteria for ‘film arguments’ to fulfil, as it 
precludes a simple recording of a philosophical lecture (or argument). Citing just one 
example, he also could be taking the moderate line, that some films in some circumstances 
can argue philosophy better than written texts. The thesis being defended here has no such 
constraints. In the right circumstances, a scene where a character lectures philosophy, even if 
it isn’t the ‘whole’ argument, is an example of film argument.  
Carroll addresses the concern that films cannot help but typically be about a single 
case, whereas philosophy is about general claims – and that implies an incompatibility 
between the two.  
 
So the skeptic argues: philosophical knowledge, like all knowledge, requires, among 
other things, justified belief. A moving image may be capable of conveying a belief 
and even promoting a general belief. However, the tendency of the motion picture 
toward particularity, both in its images and its stories, entails that it is highly unlikely  
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that a motion picture could ever justify any general or universal belief of the sort to 
which philosophy aspires. Consequently, the art of the motion picture is an 
implausible source of philosophical knowledge.  
(Carroll 2006, p. 175) 
 
If a moving image is capable of promoting a general belief, then its capacity to convey 
argument is vindicated because film arguments typically aim at establishing general beliefs. 
Even if Carroll is right to worry about the capacity of film to convey philosophical 
universality and generality – and it is not yet clear that he is – it remains possible that film 
arguments unburdened by demands of philosophical generality are made by films as a matter 
of course.  
 Carroll continues to test the idea of film doing philosophy with his fictional ‘skeptic’.  
First this skeptic is concerned that films do not provide enough ‘evidence’ to convince: 
 
[The Film] is still evidentially challenged, since the “evidence” has been constructed 
precisely to cast to best effect the general hypothesis the film is advocating. Or, to put 
it less charitably, the evidence has been cooked. Moreover, when one recalls that 
many of the films that may be said to do philosophy are fictional – with made-up 
stories expressly designed to fit their general theme – one may feel compelled to agree 
with the skeptic that much of the evidence in fiction films is not only statistically 
insufficient, but arguably tainted (or skewed) to boot. 
(Carroll 2006, p. 176) 
 
This idea of ‘film as evidence’ is a particularly significant element of film’s power of 
persuasion and will be examined in the next section of this chapter. Notwithstanding this 
element, Carroll’s skeptic worries that films might evoke a belief, but do so by encouraging 
the viewer to think about the theme, guiding their meditation but not arguing as defined in this 
study. In other words, films can be thought experiments, but not arguments. Carroll counters 
by using Wittgenstein:  
 
Wittgenstein posed thought experiments whose precise ramifications were unstated; 
he left them to be worked out in the minds of the audience. But they were no less 
thought experiments for being less than user-friendly.  
(Carroll 2006, p. 181) 
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It is the thought experiment that does the philosophical work, that moves the mind of the 
prepared listener, and not the accompanying exegesis. Indeed, most often, the prepared 
listener may have no need for the exegesis.  
 
The skeptic should not mistake the accompanying exegesis for the argument. It is the 
thought experiment that constitutes the argument, not the prosaic explanation of the 
thought experiment. The skeptic must not confuse a predilection for explicitness for 
argumentation.  
(Carroll 2006, p. 181) 
 
Just because the work is not explicit does not mean there is no argumentative work being 
done, and an explanation is just that, an explanation of an argument, not the argument itself. A 
good thought experiment is textured and creates in the mind of the audience just the desired 
reaction and response. It is a main tenet of narrative feature film storytelling that it is far 
better to let the audience do the work and come to the (right) conclusion that to tell them 
explicitly. Billy Wilder, the director of Some Like It Hot (1959), reportedly had ten story 
commandments of which number seven was “Let the audience add up two plus two. They’ll 
love you forever,” (Stevens Jr., 2006, p. 320).	
 The thought experiment and the ‘paraphrase’ of the film argument are two concepts 
that form the main battlegrounds between those philosophers for and against film-as-
philosophy. This chapter has so far concentrated on those optimists who believe film can-do 
philosophy, and in many cases, better than other forms – but both the aforementioned Murray 
Smith (2006) and Paisley Livingston (2006), reject the notion as overambitious.  
To first examine Smith, his paper Film Art, Argument and Ambiguity (2006) is directly 
concerned with the ability of narrative feature film to argue, and not necessarily 
philosophically. Referencing Mulhall, he notes that, “It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that 
Mulhall believes that films, when acting as vehicles of philosophy, embody arguments (albeit, 
presumably, of an implicit and informal nature) in support of theses (“views”),” (2006, p. 34). 
However, Smith has significant issues with this claim: 
 
The trouble is – a narrative is not, literally speaking, an argument. Of course, the idea 
that a narrative might imply an argument, or is some other way act to realize an 
argument, is an ancient idea. It is implicit in the assumption that certain narratives 
carry “messages,” “morals,” or “lessons,” in the sense that these “morals,” are like the 
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conclusion of an argument. Some critics and theorists have spelled out this intuition 
more explicitly: Andre Bazin, for example, wrote that the “thesis implied” by Ladri di 
biciclette [Bicycle Thieves] (Vittorio de Sica, 1948) is “wondrously and outrageously 
simple: in the world where the workman lives, the poor must steal from each other in 
order to survive. But this thesis is never stated as such, it is just that events are so 
linked together that they have the appearance of a formal truth while retaining an 
anecdotal quality”. What distinguishes Mulhall is the strength of the claim he wishes 
to make with respect to the potential argumentative “force” of narrative form.  But the 
precise relationship between narrative and argument remains impressionistic and 
undertheorized. What is needed is an analysis of how a narrative can deliver the basic 
constituents of argument – premises, a pattern of inference, and a conclusion.  
(Smith 2006, p. 34) 
 
Smith begins his theorizing by widening the discussion of the idea of films as thought 
experiments, and points out what he believes to be the fundamental difference: thought 
experiments in philosophy serve primarily epistemic purposes, thought experiments in 
narrative feature films serve primarily artistic purposes. However, as the study will show, this 
definition of the ‘artistic’ is problematic.  
Smith uses the Steve Martin/Lily Tomlin comedy All of Me (Reiner, 1984) as an 
example. It is a film where two consciousnesses have to share the same body (one male, one 
female). One takes the left side, the other the right:  
 
… [T]he film uses the thought experiment primarily as a vehicle of comedy… So the 
film has an epistemic dimension – we might well be brought to reflect on personal 
identity by the film and learn something from it – but it is subsidiary to its comic 
imperative. This subordination of the epistemic to the artistic is surely the main reason 
by narrative films based on philosophical themes, like All of Me, will often 
compromise the “logic” of the philosophical problem that they dramatize… As that 
sage of Hollywood, Sam Goldwyn, might have put it: “Pictures are for entertainment – 
if I wanted to make a philosophical point, I’d publish an essay in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society. 
(Smith 2006, p. 39) 
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Whilst what Smith claims seems highly plausible, even likely, it is unfortunately speculation 
that does not account for how mainstream narrative feature films are constructed. For the 
practitioner, the internal good of the practice cannot separate the artistic from the epistemic. 
For a narrative feature film to function correctly, all must be unified – theme, plot, character – 
and this is what will make the comedy work, the entertainment work (as will be explored in 
Chapter 4). For a director to sacrifice conceptual logic for a comedy gag merely makes them a 
bad director (or to be diplomatic, a director who has made a poor creative choice). It is worthy 
of note that the Sam Goldwyn quote cited, although clearly included to illustrate the point, is 
actually apocryphal (Berg, 1998). In reality, as an experienced producer, it was highly likely 
that Goldwyn was well aware of the practice of narrative feature filmmaking. (In fact, he was 
almost always misquoted for comic effect, usually by his own press department at his behest 
as it made him a very marketable brand. Other famous yet apocryphal quotes include, “Our 
comedies are not to be laughed at,” and, “The next time I send a damn fool for something, I’ll 
send myself,” (Boller Jr. and Davis, 1987).  
As noted earlier in this chapter, Smith, as with Falzon, is concerned that film has too 
many elements with which to conduct a coherent argument: 
 
The difference raises the suspicion that the thought experiment serves different 
purposes in philosophy and artistic storytelling, respectively. Just what is all that detail 
doing there?! 
(Smith 2006, p. 35) 
 
This seems to be a case of claiming something is unlikely because it is highly complex. “All 
the detail,” are all the elements of a convincing filmic argument as the study will outline in 
further chapters. Smith does, however, allow that the epistemic priority does depend on genre: 
 
The conveying of knowledge or prompting of conceptual thinking is certainly an 
important part of the artistic value of many genres; in some cases, like that of 
documentary filmmaking, the epistemic value of a film may be absolutely central to 
the artistic value of the film. 
(Smith 2006, p. 39) 
 
Whilst the epistemic status of raw documentary footage is far higher than that of fictional raw 
footage, and the documentary film may more regularly make appeals to more objective than 
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aspectual truths, the argumentation is equally shaped. In fact, the practice of constructing a 
documentary feature narrative is almost identical to that of constructing a fictional feature 
narrative, the elements of unity and truth to all creative elements integral; it is just the order of 
the construction that differs. Documentarians often ‘rewrite’ the film during the edit, based on 
discoveries made during the filming process. Whilst this also happens in fiction film 
construction, it is less recognized as normative and rather serves a corrective function.   
In this way Smith could be viewed to agree with the moderate thesis “in some cases”, 
although not the thesis defended here which makes the claim that the practice dictates the 
epistemic value is central to the artistic value for all mainstream narrative feature films. As 
the internal good of the practice, it is the very reason the filmmaker wishes to tell the story – 
be it aiming at a specific, general, objective or relative truth.  
 Smith attempts to prove his approach by appealing to notions of art in general. He 
invokes discussions of poetry, more specifically the quotes of Cleanth Brooks: 
 
When we consider the statement immersed in the poem, it presents itself to us, like the 
stick in the pool of water, warped and bent. Indeed, whatever the statement, it will 
always show itself as deflected away from a positive, straightforward formulation. 
 (Brooks, 1968, p.172) 
 
However, poetry is a very different medium to narrative feature film: the specificity of form is 
critical and is the reason many screen forms are beyond the scope of this thesis. Smith also 
uses Brooks to introduce the idea of ‘paradox,’ the idea that an artwork can hold in balance 
contrasting attitudes or meanings. Again, this may be a key element in the practice of poetry 
construction, but less so for mainstream narrative feature film production. As with any 
artworks, multiple interpretations are possible, but the internal good of the practice requires 
not contrasting but complementary meanings.   
 In contrast to Smith, Livingston’s (2006) rejection of film’s ability to argue 
philosophy is by recourse to the very restrictive bold thesis. He defines it as:  
 
(1) a conception of which sorts of exclusive capacities of the cinematic medium (or art 
form) are said to make a special contribution to philosophy and (2) claims about the 
significance and independence of the latter contribution.  
 With regard to (2), a modest and uncontroversial claim is that films sometimes 
express or give rise to well-known philosophical questions and ideas… An even 
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bolder contention would be that a film can provide a historically innovative 
contribution to knowledge regarding some philosophical topic, doing so in a 
significantly independent or autonomous manner, that is, the contribution would not 
be dependent on a subsequent paraphrase.  
(Livingston 2006, p. 11) 
 
According to Livingston, for films to be able to make significant philosophical contributions, 
they will have to use techniques exclusive to film, be historically innovative and not require 
‘paraphrase’ to be understood. Yet the requirement for historical innovation is surprising, as 
normal verbal philosophical argument does not have to be innovative. As Wartenberg (2006, 
p. 27) comments, “it is worth recalling that most philosophers philosophize without making 
original contributions to the discipline”.  
 It should be noted that the concept of ‘paraphrase’ as Livingston uses it is not the same 
as used in everyday language. Livingston’s ‘paraphrase’ is a paraphrase of a film that contains 
the complete argument inspired by events on screen: the film does not argue, it is all in the 
‘paraphrase’. However, as Robert Sinnerbrink says in New Philosophies of Film (2011): 
 
…[W]e are not dealing here with an argumentative claim so much as an interpretive 
proposal: a ‘philosophical paraphrase’ is not a theoretical claim about a film’s 
philosophical content, but an interpretative claim or instance of philosophical film 
criticism.  
(Sinnerbrink 2011, p. 134) 
 
In short, films do argue independently of paraphrase, with the paraphrase merely interpreting 
what is present in the film. This can be demonstrated by appeal to the evidence of the 
narrative feature film itself. 
 For example, take the film Lethal Weapon (Donner, 1987). Hollywood script 
consultant Dara Marks, in her book Inside Story: The Power of the Transformational Arc 
(2006), claims it makes the argument (as so many films do) that to live a life that functions as 
it needs to, one needs the right mix of danger and caution. The film is actually a dual 
protagonist story, in that there are two genuine heroes of the story who both learn the same 
lesson (in most circumstances there is a single protagonist, even if the film has multiple 
‘leads’). The set-up is simple. Two cops find themselves partners: Riggs (Mel Gibson) has a 
deathwish after the loss of his wife and does reckless, highly risky things to catch villains; 
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Murtagh (Danny Glover) is five days from retirement and wants to play it super-safe so he 
can live a full life with his family. Both approaches are shown to be wrong (wrong as neither 
man is able to achieve the outer goal – to catch the villains). Only when they shift their lives 
into balance (Riggs having more caution, Murtagh taking more risks) do they achieve both 
their inner and outer goals. Endings of films are key in communicating the point-of-view of 
the practitioners, functioning in much the same way as a conclusion in a more formal written 
argument.  
 Whilst with any mass text aberrant decodings are possible, if a film is correctly 
constructed with a unity of vision, then the argument should be clear by recourse to the film 
alone. If Riggs and Murtagh embrace their changes but die in the end, for instance, then the 
film cannot be presenting the argument that these changes are key to living a better life. 
However, the creation of a film involves many elements and it takes a truly skilled team to 
express an argument with clarity; a film that lacks creative clarity and unity is a film that 
makes an unconvincing argument (for further interrogation of these ideas, please see Chapters 
2.2, 5, 7 and 8).  
 Livingston’s restrictions seem particularly arbitrary, and they have little impact on the 
film-as-argument thesis as it has no such restrictions about the type of argument made by 
films. Films argue, but they do not have to be uniquely ‘cinematic’ (a slippery term at best), 
original, innovative - nor resist ‘paraphrase’ by any definition. In fact, paraphrasing (in the 
traditional sense of the term) the controlling idea is a key part of the script development 
process (McKee, 1998, p. 115).  
 Another key battleground is the idea of artist intentionality. This can be problematic 
when discussing film as it is a collaborative medium, involving many creative teams. The 
precise nature of the power relationships fluctuates from film to film (often the star holds a lot 
of creative power), however when it comes to the overall construction of a film and 
overseeing how the ‘argument’ is delivered, the design is usually to empower the director as 
the creative head responsible for most of the artistic intention of the piece (Bordwell, 
Thompson and Smith 2018, p.34).  
 Livingston gives some concessions to the film-as-philosophy camp, but takes a 
variation on the intentionalist line (2009, pp. 60-121). In fact, he defends an account of a 
concept he calls ‘partial intentionalism’, which involves “a ‘meshing’ or congruence relation 
between intentions and features of the audio-visual display,” (2009, p. 7). Livingston only 
allows that films can do philosophy – can argue – if it can be proved using discourses 
surrounding the film that the director intended to philosophize seriously and significantly. 
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However, Sinnerbrink again holds a counter-position, that “It is not in the critical detection of 
artistic intention, but in the aesthetic transformation of these intentions, that we find the film’s 
original and independent philosophical contribution,” (2011, p. 131). 
 This is key to the thesis defended here. The process of creating a narrative feature film 
is essentially ‘aesthetically transforming’ the argument into a narrative that performs the same 
work to a more effective degree. Sinnerbrink himself sees film-philosophy in much broader 
terms than is taken up in this thesis. He states that “The encounter between film and 
philosophy invites us to explore novel ways in which our conventional understanding of 
philosophy – and aesthetic receptivity to new kinds of experience – might be renewed and 
transformed,” (2011, p. 117). 
 To continue with Sinnerbrink, the final film-philosopher examined here, he has further 
developed some highly detailed theories of cinematic ethics (2016, 2018) that are particularly 
complementary to the central thesis and its defence of a cinema of ‘worthwhile’ conclusions 
and argumentation, especially in how films express ethical ideas and what kinds of ethical 
experience cinema is able to evoke. Sinnerbrink believes that, “There are four dimensions to 
the cinema-ethics relationship, including an aesthetic dimension, which refers to the ethical 
experience of cinema. The latter, in turn, can be analysed into three strands,” (2018, p. 196). 
 The four dimensions are (a) to focus on ethics within cinematic representation, (b) the 
ethics of cinematic presentation, (c) the ethics of cinema as a medium symptomatic of broader 
cultural-historical or ideological perspectives, and (d) the aesthetic dimensions of cinema as a 
way of evoking ethical experience and thereby expressing ethical meaning (2018, p. 197-
198).  
Elements (a), (b) and (d) are particularly relevant, namely how a narrative frames 
thematic ideas, the moral code to which practitioners hold themselves during production 
(which will be explored further in Chapter 3) and the complex interweaving techniques which 
film uses to articulate ethical meaning which will be explored further in the second half of this 
chapter. 
 Sinnerbrink further delineates ‘ethical experience’ in the cinema into three strands:  
(1) the shared cinematic experience of engaging with the perspectives of other (fictional 
characters) depicted in complex situations, (2) where the viewer is moved to reflect ethically 
on what they are seeing through emotional engagement and moral sympathy (see Guyer 2018, 
Kneller 2018), and (3) responses to the cinematic experience brought about the aesthetic 
means, often by questioning the viewers beliefs, that can involve broadening the viewer’s 
ethical horizons of meaning and deepening their moral understanding (2018, p. 198).     
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  Whilst it is not necessary to interrogate these ideas in further depth here, it is clear that 
Sinnerbrink strongly promotes the theory that cinema is a meaningful vessel to present ethical 
ideas within a narrative, express ethical meaning, and have an impact on the viewer’s beliefs 
through emotional engagement. This is both an affirmation of film’s ability to argue 
philosophically and the principles that are the foundation of the central thesis. 
 
2.2 How a Film Argues 
 
[T]he cinema is quite simply becoming a means of expression, just as all the other arts 
have been before it… After having been successively a fairground attraction, an 
amusement analogous to boulevard theatre, or a means of preserving the images of an 
era, it is gradually becoming a language. By language, I mean a form in which and by 
which an artist can express his thoughts, however abstract they may be, or translate his 
obsessions exactly as he does in the contemporary essay or novel. That is why I would 
like to call this new age of cinema the age of camera-style (camera-pen). This 
metaphor has a very precise sense. By it I mean that the cinema will gradually break 
free from the tyranny of what is visual, from the image for its own sake, from the 
immediate and concrete demands of the narrative, to become a means of writing just 
as flexible and subtle as written language. 
(Astruc, 1968, p. 19)  
 
Film practitioner, critic and theorist, Alexandre Astruc was crucial to the creative renewal of 
cinema and provided the building blocks for the French New Wave with his essay Birth of a 
New Avant-Garde: La Caméra-Stylo (1968). In the essay, Astruc calls for a personal approach 
to filmmaking where the camera is essentially the director’s pen, or “la caméra-stylo”, with 
the film able to communicate as nimbly, subtly and effectively as the written word.  
 Although often referred to as comprising five stages (development, pre-production, 
production, post-production and exhibition), the ‘making’ of a film is essentially like any 
other manufacturing procedure, in that it is a two-stage process comprising the creation of the 
plans followed by the production of the product. In this case, the plans are the screenplay, the 
completed film the product. For the purposes of this thesis, which is an account of the social 
practice overall, these two stages will be delineated to demonstrate their various different yet 
complementary and symbiotic tools of argumentation.  
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 So what precisely is a screenplay and how is it conceptualized within the industry? In 
A Philosophy of the Screenplay, Ted Nannicelli defines a screenplay as a verbal object, one 
that is: 
 
…[I]ntended to repeat, modify, or repudiate the ways in which plot, characters, 
dialogue, shots, edits, sound effects, and/or other features have historically been 
suggested as constitutive elements of a film by prior a screenplay(s) or screenwriting 
practice (in accordance with recognizable and live purposes of that practice…)”  
(Nannicelli, 2013, p. 31) 
 
Nannicelli considers the screenplay as a transient form over time, consistent with the practice 
of narrative feature filmmaking overall. His reference to the “constitutive elements of a film,” 
will inevitably be incomplete, as a screenplay cannot include every constitutive element of a 
film as to do so would make it an impractically dense document at best. Screenplays operate 
much like digital compression; the elements are compressed into the document (with non-key 
areas left out altogether, for example, the colour of the wallpaper on the wall of a location) to 
be uncompressed at the other end by the director, various heads of department and the actors. 
It is these ‘gaps’ that are often the most interesting creative spaces but also potential areas of 
contention if exploited in different and conflicting ways.  
 Despite having a somewhat dual modern life as both a sellable intellectual property in 
itself as well as being a working industry document, a screenplay ordinarily contains few 
literary devices or written sleight-of-hand, as it can only describe what the reader is seeing 
and hearing at the time they are seeing and hearing it. As a series of instructions to cast and 
crew, it should have encoded all the foundational elements of the argument (such as character, 
plot, tone, setting, theme, point-of-view) which ideally will then be translated to the screen in 
an impactful way, as the ‘gaps’ will have been filled by a director in ways that strengthen the 
argument using singularly cinematic, rather than, literary, devices. This evolution is a natural 
and expected part of the filmmaking process.  
If the narrative feature film has a different writer than director, it is integral that they 
both agree that the narrative feature film is making the same argument. Otherwise the film 
essentially has two conflicting authors and the argument breaks down in the ultimate telling of 
the story; the screenplay is not the film. Yet before the study can fully interrogate how films 
ultimately argue, it must first offer a more complete definition of cinematic argument than has 
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As has been previously discussed, the parameters of what constitutes an argument per se for 
the purposes of this thesis is less stringent than those that constitute a philosophical argument 
as debated by film-philosophers.  
 Although they contain cognitive content, cinematic arguments need not be, and indeed 
on the whole are not, philosophical arguments. They adhere to a minimalist conception of 
argument, as an assertion supported by reasons to believe such assertion. This very much 
embodies Sinnerbrink’s contention that cinematic argument is the process of “aesthetic 
transformation” (2011, p. 131), provided that the transformation is a reason-responsive one; 
that is, aesthetic experience is not mere emotional manipulation, but opens up a receptivity to 
reasons. The proffered minimalist conception of argument meets the requirements described 
by Smith of the constituent elements of argument: “premises, a pattern of inference and a 
conclusion,” (2006, p. 34). To Smith’s concerns about the plethora of detail in feature films, it 
is this detail that constitutes both the argument and pattern of inference, as the case study will 
outline below. Furthermore, cinematic argument need not be intentional, as even if it is a rare 
occurrence, lack of intention does not have a necessary impact on the shape of material and it 
is the incognizant nature of the practice that this thesis hopes to establish. Success in 
achieving the internal goods might be often coincidental, but there are bona fide successes 
nonetheless. Cinematic arguments also do not require paraphrase, either be it via Livingston’s 
(2006, p. 11) or the more common usage of the term; if a film is executed successfully, in that 
it has achieved the internal goods of the practice, the argument is wholly present in the film 
itself. 
 This is not to say that film excels in making certain types of argument, for instance the 
fully formed fictional world is a perfect vessel to be used as a thought-experiment that guides 
the viewer to the desired conclusion, “ineluctably, rather as the punch line of a joke leads the 
listener to its interpretation” (Carroll, 2006, p. 180). The cinematic screen is also particularly 
effective in providing a counter-example scenario to a universal proposition (Carroll, 2006, p. 
175), as an argument of original conceptual points that do not require evidence (Carroll, 2006, 
p. 176), or even as Wartenberg’s illustration of ‘certain philosophical ideas’ (2006, p.30). 
 However, the internal good of the practice is for the assertion to be ‘worth having’ and 
the method of argument to be ‘worthwhile’, terminology that needs further examination. As 
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noted above, in order to satisfactorily define these terms it is also necessary to give an account 
of what films argue.  
 
What Films Argue 
To remind ourselves of the central thesis, the ‘internal good’ of the practice of making 
mainstream narrative feature films is to move people in a worthwhile way to a conclusion that 
is worth having: not simply to make an argument, but to make an argument worth making and 
to make it with integrity. 
 So, what is a conclusion worth having? Sinnerbrink (2016, 2018) holds that films are 
vessels for aesthetic ethical experience, able to meaningfully challenge and potentially even 
change beliefs and opinions in the mind of the audience – therefore it might justifiably be 
expected that knowledge, or at least truth is a worthy goal. However, perhaps counter-
intuitively, neither is a necessary bar when it comes to conclusions ‘worth having’. This thesis 
is not suggesting an account of the practice as either contribution to global knowledge, nor 
elucidations of objective truth, just that the conclusion being argued has some intrinsic value. 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, the conclusion in a cinematic argument 
needs merely to be edifying, so rather than knowledge and truth it is plausibility and 
significance that are the requirements. Implausible conclusions require fallacious 
argumentation; trivial conclusions are simply not ‘worth having’.  
 There are plenty of worthwhile conclusions that generate worthwhile argument that 
ultimately are proved wrong. Until the 3rd Century BC almost every civilization believed the 
Earth was flat (Main, 2016). This conclusion was clearly edifying (both plausible and 
significant), and the arguments put forward were usually well-reasoned and certainly 
worthwhile – albeit all of them completely wrong. To give another example that is primarily 
aimed at children (and some parents), a film that carried the conclusion that ‘children should 
eat their greens so they grow up big and strong’, would not be considered edifying, as 
although plausible and significant, it is one that – if not self-evident from tacit knowledge – is 
something that children are likely to have already been told consistently, certainly in Western 
culture. It may be true and valuable, but not worth reminding people of because there is no 
value in its social or cultural re-enforcement.  
 To address how films argue in a ‘worthwhile way’, this is essentially how any 
argument is made with integrity, by moving the audience to the conclusion in a sincere, non-
manipulative way using reason as opposed to using misleading claims or appeals to emotion – 
even if the conclusion is edifying, plausible and significant. This disqualifies such techniques 
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as ‘rhetorical argument’ as previously defined, which attempts to persuade others through the 
appearance of truth and may employ false reasoning without undermining its project. It, 
however, does not preclude unsound arguments, which are internally systematic and logically 
valid but start from a premise that is eventually discovered to be false. 
 
Methods of Cinematic Argument 
Cinematic argumentation that is presented in a worthwhile way is not a straightforward as it 
seems, as essentially cinematic technique is manipulation that appeals to emotion, with the 
latter being a key argumentative device. The question of how a film argues really becomes a 
question of how a film sincerely convinces us of a plausible, significant assertion. To 
convince us of the assertion a film must convince us in all other areas of story: it must 
convince us that the world is authentic, it must convince us that the characters are authentic, it 
must convince us that the situations are authentic and it must convince us that the resolution 
(or non-resolution) is authentic. If it fails in any of these factors, then the argument is lost. 
When engaging with any piece of art, audiences are expected to suspend disbelief to the form-
relevant degree – in film terms, this means that genres such as comedy have to accommodate 
a higher suspension of disbelief than a domestic drama. It is expected that a conventional 
moviegoer will accept plot contrivances such as ‘the coincidence’ far more readily in the 
detective comedy Ace Ventura: Pet Detective (Shadyac, 1994) than in the war drama The 
Hurt Locker (Bigelow, 2008), as well as the impossible over the improbable. As long as the 
logic of the story world is consistent, audiences are much more likely to suspend disbelief that 
an alien can fly (Superman) than the reputed top investigative reporter in Metropolis (Lois 
Lane) cannot recognize him when he wears spectacles.  
 
Aristotelian Modes of Persuasion 
It is worthy of note that when Aristotle is invoked in terms of screen storytelling, especially 
that of three-act structure, it is usually his Poetics that forms the basis of enquiry, even if it is 
often imperfectly quoted, understood and applied (Brenes, 2014). Chapter 5 will give an 
overview of the most relevant of those texts, as part of the investigation into dominant 
industry-facing literature. However, this study is primarily concerned with Aristotle’s theories 
of persuasion (as outlined below) and virtue (as will be interrogated in Chapter 3).  
Like argument in any form, films use the three modes of persuasion as outlined in 
Aristotle’s The “Art” of Rhetoric in 322 B.C.E. (this study uses the 1982 translation by John 
Henry Freese). Even though Aristotle was referring to these modes when using the spoken 
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word, he was working in a time before moving pictures. It is worth considering an 
Aristotelian view of narrative feature film as he also saw persuasion as a form of 
demonstration, and narrative feature film is certainly a very efficient form of demonstration 
(1982, p.9).  
The first book of Aristotle's Rhetoric advances the view that persuasion is achieved by 
the combination of three main elements (1982, p. 17): 
Ethos: The source of the argument being credible.  
Logos: The argument is internally logical (sometimes with appeal to facts and 
            statistics); and 
Pathos: The argument invokes the emotions and senses. 
 
It is worthy of note that ethos is from the Greek word meaning “character”, to mean the 
ideology that characterizes a community, and is also used to refer to the power of music to 
influence the listener, a tool used to great effect in cinema (see Chapter 6). The idea of the 
‘source’ of the argument being credible can be interpreted in two equally valid ways. It can be 
taken to mean that the ‘author’ of the work is credible, be it the practitioners or the institution 
responsible for the film. Taking the example of Paul Thomas Anderson’s drama Phantom 
Thread (2017), the Ethos could come from either Anderson’s reputation or that of production 
company Annapurna Pictures, or distributor Focus Features, a subsidiary of NBC Universal. 
The alternate interpretation is that the world of the film itself is credible, convincing in terms 
of the aforementioned genre-consistent suspension of disbelief. 
However, it is pathos that is a key power of cinematic argument. It is pathos that gives 
written drama more impact than simple intellectual debate, performed drama further impact 
over written drama, with film (and its ability to combine performance with other purely 
emotive elements such as music) perhaps providing the most impact of all. This equates to the 
moderate thesis as outlined by Cox and Levine and film’s ability to emotionally engage: 
 
Just as we often believe what we want (or would like) to believe rather that what we 
have good reason to believe, we often believe things because we feel a certain way.  
Emotions influence belief, as do desires. This is a fact that cinema often exploits, and 
one that largely accounts for its ability to engage an audience.  
                     (Cox and Levine, 2012, p.5) 
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Reason and emotion overlap with the Aristotelian concepts of logos and pathos. Narrative 
feature films, especially when it comes to comparison with stories designed for the television 
or computer screen, trade in various manifestations of desire, especially sexual, sadistic and 
voyeuristic desire (Mulvey, 1975). Mainstream narrative feature films, be they Hollywood or 
Bollywood, trade in iterations of glamour both on and off the screen. It is why film stars, even 
‘character actors’ are traditionally more handsome and beautiful than ‘ordinary’ non-actor-
star individuals. The process has even become a well-worn verb, the ‘Hollywoodization’ of a 
story. This process starts with the screenplay: it is all encoded in the blueprint, and as 
patriarchal values currently dominate, it is in the descriptions and casting of female actors that 
it is most clear. There is now, as of 2020, even a twitter account run by American producer 
Ross Putman named ‘@femscriptintros,’ that tweets the character descriptions of female 
characters to highlight the uniformity of this process. No matter how downtrodden or unusual-
looking the character, she is always attractive: “JANE, 26, a freckled hottie in a powder blue 
skirt-suit,” (Putman, 2019).   
 In a ‘successful’ film that argues in a ‘worthwhile’ fashion, the logos should be 
augmented and supported by the ethos, and appeals to pathos and desire. They are not to be 
distractions from either the conclusion or the argumentation. However, with so many 
elements to balance this is a difficult process which requires a mastery of the craft and a 
significant reason why most narrative feature films will fail to a more or lesser degree. 
Chapter 6 is an account of the ways a film can fail in its argumentation yet still achieve the 
external goods of the practice. A film can argue in an insincere way simply by emphasis, by 
too much reliance on desire or sentimentality to cover a minor or major flaw in logic or even 
to disguise false premises. 
 
Case Study: Butch Cassidy & The Sundance Kid 
The above methodologies can all be present in the screenplay, but this thesis is concerned 
only with completed works. Therefore, the best way to demonstrate the aesthetic 
transformation of argument into film argument is by recourse to finished films. The following 
is an initial illustration of how the key concepts are applied, with full case studies examined in 
Chapters 7 & 8 which include how the hermeneutic responds to Barthes’ notion of The Death 
of the Author (1967).  
The over-arching view from the film-philosophers so far examined in this chapter is 
the false notion that somehow theme and argument are separate from action, drama and 
comedy (Smith 2006, Falzon 2002), as if one exists and then the other is somehow inserted, 
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or one stops when the other begins. However, in mainstream narrative cinema, every moment, 
every image, every gesture, every sound constructs the argument; action is argument. As 
influential screenwriting mentor Linda Seger states:  
 
Writers can communicate theme through story choices that they make. Events have 
meaning, and they communicate what you believe about why things happen in life. 
Deciding that a character gets robbed and mugged because they happen to be in the 
wrong place at the wrong time can communicate your idea that life is haphazard and 
nonsensical. Choosing characters that respond compassionately to each other can 
communicate that you believe the world is a loving and caring place. Showing  
characters whose lives continually meet and intersect may communicate your idea 
about fate and destiny.  
                     (Seger, 1994, p. 130) 
 
We will examine the minutiae of dominant industry thinking in Chapter 5, but the received 
wisdom from Seger and other influential screenwriting mentors is that to isolate the key 
thematic element of an argument is a process of observing what idea is being consistently 
tested, almost on a scene-by-scene basis, by the film (McKee, 1998, p.118). The narrative 
feature film screenplay can be thought of as being split into two distinct streams that must be 
unified for the film to function correctly; the study will refer to them as the Dramatic Stream 
and the Thematic Stream.  
 As Chapter 5 outlines, most screenwriting ‘how to’ books tend to concentrate on the 
Dramatic Stream, the fundamentals of the ‘Main Character/Goal/Conflict/ Resolution’ 
paradigm simple to explain and comprehend. However, it is the Thematic Stream that governs 
the social practice. This stream contains the assertion, traditionally comprised of a central 
singular abstract concept and a standpoint to that concept. The film is then wholly constructed 
around the demonstrating of that assertion (even if the practitioner conceptualizes this in a 
different way, using different terminology) with every creative element unified in this goal. 
The entire scriptwriting process can begin with the assertion, but this is rare. Usually there is 
another inspiration to start the process (scenario, character, music, sequence, genre) but 
development and fine-tuning of the assertion can come at any time in the development 
process (Seger, 1994, p. 132).   
The traditional tools of the screenwriter are time, place, characters and events. (In 
fact, Russian formalist Vladimir Propp (1968) suggested that all stories in any medium can be 
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made up of a combination of a total of seven character types and thirty-one story functions). 
The primary reader of the screenplay is an industry professional who is looking to draw out 
relevant material for their particular department: the actor is looking for indications of 
character and dialogue, the production designer is looking for clues as to physical setting and 
so forth.  
 It is the traditional tools of the director that constitute how the film is ultimately 
delivered to the audience. Cox and Levine note that: 
 
…[S]ome philosophers (for example, Iris Murdoch (1970) and Martha Nussbaum 
(1990)) think that philosophy…  is more at home… in literature and the arts than it is 
among the philosophers… Film however has an even larger bag of tricks than novels. 
The camera takes us precisely to where the director wishes to take us, and a point of 
view can be further emphasized with sound or music. And films show us faces; they 
give full rein to our capacity to read faces and grasp the significance of gesture. 
             (Cox and Levine, 2012, p. 11) 
 
The director must create a myriad of distinctly cinematic moments, each of which must make 
precisely the right impact if the argument is to succeed. These moments may be intellectual, 
emotional, sensual or sexual. Using the case study of Michael Haneke’s bleak drama Amour 
(2012), Sinnerbrink (2018) demonstrates that impact by emotional engagement can counter-
intuitively include both emotional estrangement (invoking ambivalence, clashing emotional 
and evaluative responses that resist reconciliation or unification) and moral-cognitive 
dissonance (as opposed to unified emotional-cognitive understanding). 
The tools that the director has overlap but differ from the screenwriter – the 
screenwriter can describe or indicate a shot, but it is a wholly different experience to read a 
description of a picture to seeing a picture. Directors always have to ‘show,’ not tell – a 
screenplay can indicate an emotion, but the film must make us experience it. As mentioned 
earlier, the screenplay delivers information, but can also be considered as a blueprint of ‘gaps’ 
that the director fills: if the script was an exhaustive list of instructions then the director would 
be superfluous, but the raw material requires creative shepherding to the screen. Much of the 
work the director does is intangible, creating thoughts, ideas and emotions in the mind of the 
audience, in addition to the more measurable elements of light and sound. Whereas the 
screenwriter has simply printed words on a page in which to communicate, the director has a 
profusion of medium-specific tools at their disposal. These approaches will be fully 
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interrogated in Chapter 5, but the most significant techniques include the strategic 
implementation of the size of shot, composition, blocking, lenses, camera movement, lighting, 
production design, palette, editing, transitional effects, sound design, casting and 
performance. Each in isolation are phenomenally powerful argumentative devices, and 
although non-verbal are capable of influencing the audience’s opinion of a moment, scene and 
therefore entire argument; taken together they can be virtually irresistible. 
 In western Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (Hill, 1969), the Dramatic Stream of 
Main Character/Goal/Conflict could be stated as ‘two bandits want to maintain their lifestyle 
but are prevented by the ‘wild west’ rapidly becoming developed’. The Thematic Stream 
could be stated as ‘people need to evolve both who they are and how they fit into their 
community if they are to survive, even if they will not thrive’. This Thematic Stream is 
usually referred to in the professional industry literature as the ‘controlling idea’, (McKee, 
1998, p.115) as it literally controls all creative elements in the screenplay and the eventual 
film. However, more fundamentally, it functions as the conclusion to an argument to which 
all creative elements become devices to prove the conclusion; this is creative unity, and if a 
film is successfully unified then the argument manifests through each element. 
Analysing the film from an Aristotelian perspective, the ethos is provided by the fact 
that the film was written by William Goldman, directed by George Roy Hill and released by 
Twentieth Century Fox. Goldman had not yet achieved worldwide fame as the epitome of a 
screenwriter that had achieved both commercial and critical acclaim, but had already had 
modest success with a studio film Masquerade (Dearden, 1965), and Hill had previously 
directed Julie Andrews in the well-received Thoroughly Modern Millie (1967). Both were 
highly credible storytellers. The film world presented is also highly consistent and credible. 
Artistic licence is taken in terms of its ‘Hollywoodization’, but it is in line with genre 
conventions.  
The story lays out reasons logically why Butch and Sundance have to change (most 
dominantly by showing the inevitability of social and societal change) using various 
techniques throughout the film, from the visual metaphor of the railroad bringing civilization 
to the ‘wild west’, to the dialogue with Butch, Sundance and their mutual friend Etta as they 
discuss their futures. The central values of the film are consistent; all characters who embrace 
change are rewarded, and all who reject it are punished, most critically the titular characters 
themselves. At one point in the narrative Butch and Sundance attempt to ‘go straight’ but find 
they neither have the authentic desire to do so, nor are they their best selves when attempting 
to play by their society’s usual rules.  
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Pathos, perhaps cinema’s most effective argumentative device, is provided by the 
presentation of the cinematic elements, the ‘detail’ that Smith (2006) has significant concerns 
about. This detail will also invoke not just the emotions, but the senses and desires in the 
audience. This presentation begins with the casting, in this case Paul Newman, Robert 
Redford and Katherine Ross. All are hugely attractive and charismatic individuals whose 
natural essence, played up for the screen, is to invite desire and empathy. This is further 
heightened by the use of camera and light, highlighting both their attractiveness (soft lighting) 
and giving the audience insight into the nuances of their feelings through the use of close-ups 
to make their eyes large and easy to read. If we truly care about these characters and become 
emotionally invested their journey, what happens to them will have impact on our beliefs. As 
the humanistic approach to teaching and learning demonstrates, we most effectively learn 
from those we like (Brooks, 2019). An individual look, gesture or intonation carries great 
power to make us like, hate or doubt a character – and each moment builds towards the 
conclusion that unless these men can change, they will die. However, the conclusion is more 
nuanced, and the film demonstrates this through a key moment when Sundance realizes he 
needs the adrenaline in order to remain the fastest shot in the west. It builds to the realization 
in both the characters and the audience that perhaps death is their best option; they might 
survive if they succeed in changing – but they will not thrive. This abundance of detail is 
required in order for us to understand and empathize with these men. The conclusion is 
essentially about immobility of innate nature, told through personal tragedy. When Butch and 
Sundance realize they can’t change at the end of the second act, the scene is played as a death 
scene, even though their literal deaths don’t take place until (just after) the final frame of the 
film.  
 On a ‘well-constructed’ film, the argument is always clear: what theme is consistently 
being tested (necessity for change), and what happens in the end (death through lack of 
change). It would be a fallacy to attempt to make the entire argument within each scene (such 
as in an Eisensteinian intellectual montage (Eisenstein, 1969), but each is an important 
building block required to convince the audience of the validity of the conclusion. In 
mainstream narrative cinema it is the ending that is decisive and delivers the ultimate 
conclusion, so narrative art forms that are ongoing are unable to function as arguments.      
 To evaluate whether or not Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid is a successful film 
requires a two-stage assessment of: (a) whether the conclusion is thought of as edifying 
(plausible and significant); and (b) the argument relies on reason with appeals to emotion, 
desire and the senses without reliance on misleading facts, sentimentality, titillation or 
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sensation. Using these criteria, the film is indeed successful in achieving the internal goods of 
the practice. Carroll’s notion that films can only persuade using “an argument of original 
conceptual points that do not require evidence”, (2006, p. 176) belies a further key strength 
(in addition to pathos) of mainstream narrative feature film’s ability to argue effectively: it’s 
ability to function as both the argument and the evidence for the argument simultaneously. As 
Carroll states, the film itself is the perfect case study for the argument it is making, and his 
contention that film is “evidentially challenged” as the evidence has been “cooked” (Carroll 
2006, p. 176), may mean that films fail to argue convincingly by philosophical standards, but 
not by the internal goods of the social practice.  
As has already been outlined, mainstream narrative feature films are not required to 
generate knowledge, present truth or inspire enlightenment. They simply have to convince, 
even if the argument is ultimately proved to be unsound. The evidence may have been 
“cooked”, but the practice itself is the practice of cooking it, and although this may lower the 
epistemological value of the film, it is effective evidence nonetheless, be it cooked in a 
worthwhile or cynical way. It works, not by providing new empirical information (even if 
some audiences may regard it as such), but by reminding audiences of what is important, 




Maurice Nadeau [has claimed]… “If Descartes lived today, he would write novels.” 
With all due respect to Nadeau, a Descartes of today would already have shut himself 
up in his bedroom with a 16mm camera and some film, and would be writing his 
philosophy on film: for his Discours de la Methode would today be of such a kind that 
only the cinema could express it satisfactorily. 
(Astruc, 1968, p. 19)  
 
Although he was not speaking strictly about mainstream narrative feature film, Astruc 
believed in the ability of film to argue as effectively, if not more effectively than other forms 
of communication. This chapter has explored the current thinking behind cinema’s 
relationship to argument from the strictest demands of philosophical argument, as well as 
interrogating how films argue in a cinematic context using Aristotle’s three tenets of 
persuasion, what they attempt to argue, and how the new conceptual hermeneutic informed by 
film-as-argument can be applied.   
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The aim of this chapter was to defend the possibility of film argument, as a precursor 
of the defence of the necessity of film argument in successful mainstream narrative feature 
films. To that end, it has shown that there are serious and significant academic theses that 
support film as functional argument, be they bold, modest or moderate, with new branches of 
enquiry continually being developed (such as Sinnerbrink’s notion of ‘ethical cinema’). The 
chapter has established that although debate within the academy about film’s capacity to 
argue focuses primarily on philosophical argument, the consensus is that films can argue, 
even if they do not always do so. Further, the chapter has demonstrated that if the parameters 
of what constitutes an argument per se are less stringent, such as this study’s definition of an 
assertion and reasons to believe an assertion, the consensus of films’ ability to argue is 
compelling.   
 Yet even if films can be judged to argue, it is not decisive in proving that the internal 
good of the practice of narrative feature filmmaking is to move the audience to a worthwhile 
conclusion in a worthwhile way. Chapter 3 lays out in more detail the conception of internal 
goods and how they specifically relate to mainstream narrative feature filmmaking, with 





The Practice: Goods, Virtues, Success & Agency 
 
3.1 Internal Goods 
 
As was stated in Chapter 1, the key research question of this thesis is “What is the best way to 
characterize the current practice and tradition of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking 
from conception to delivery?” As the primary goal of the study is to make a contribution, 
however incremental, to the improvement of the practice it takes a teleological approach to 
define the practice in terms of its constituent ends using MacIntyre’s (1981) concepts of social 
practice and internal goods: the latter those aspects of the social practice that are valued for 
their own sake, not for the sake of external rewards such as wealth and reputation. The 
primary internal good of the practice of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking, the study  
suggests, is argumentative success. It is to move people in a worthwhile way to a conclusion 
that is worth having. Yet to fully defend this thesis, it is necessary to fully interrogate this 
concept of ‘internal goods’. 
 In his seminal text After Virtue (1981), Alasdair MacIntyre is primarily concerned 
with discovering the key human virtues and the role they play in our lives and our self-
understanding. He is aware that any human quality that motivates behaviour could be 
regarded as a virtue, depending on the social conventions of the particular culture to which 
that human being belongs. He examines the thought of three prominent thinkers on this topic: 
Aristotle, Homer and Benjamin Franklin.  
 Aristotle holds, rightly or wrongly, that humans must have an overall objective or final 
end or telos. The final end for humans, as Aristotle articulates in Nicomachean Ethics, is to 
achieve ‘Eudaimonia’ – a good life (2014, p2). This good life is achieved through the exercise 
of the virtues, which are, for Aristotle, excellent character traits. In fact, MacIntyre argues that 
Homer, Aristotle and Franklin each consider virtue to be a secondary concept only capable of 
being expressed within social and moral life: 
 
One of the features of the concept of a virtue which has emerged with some clarity 
from the argument so far is that it always requires for its application the acceptance of 
some prior account of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which it has 
	 55	
to be defined and explained. So in the Homeric account the concept of a virtue is 
secondary to that of a social role, in Aristotle’s account it is secondary to that of the 
good life for man conceived as the telos of human action and in Franklin’s much later 
account it is secondary to that of utility.  
 (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 186) 
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to individually interrogate the validity of Aristotle’s, 
Homer’s and Franklin’s separate conceptions of the virtues, save to note that MacIntyre uses 
the common denominator unifying each school of thought – that of virtue as a secondary 
concept – to pursue a core conception of a virtue. What becomes clear is that virtues are 
defined in terms of social practices; social practices are not defined in terms of the exercise of 
virtues. This requires a concept of social practice that is independent of the exercise of 
virtues. Virtues are traits that are necessary for practitioners to excel in a social practice – 
they are not definitional of what it is to excel at a social practice. This is where the concept of 
an ‘internal good’ becomes critical – it is how practitioners understand what it is to excel at a 
social practice.  
 
To reiterate, the MacIntyreian concept of a social practice is: 
 
…[A]ny coherent and complex form of socially established human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and 
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended.  
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 187) 
 
So to qualify as a practice, not only must the practice be sufficiently complex and realize 
internal goods in attempting excellence, but it must involve a self-reflexive element; to 
engage in the social practice meaningfully is to consider the nature of the social practice itself 
with a view to evolving it.  
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, mainstream narrative filmmaking can be classified as a 
social practice in precisely the sense MacIntyre sets out: a complex form of socially 
established co-operative human activity that comprises many intricate production stages 
(classed broadly as development, pre-production, production and post-production), and one 
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that is constantly challenging the definition of itself and its core excellences. These key 
excellences are governed by reference to the internal goods of the practice that are enabled by 
the virtues of the screenwriter and director of the mainstream narrative feature film. 
 To interrogate the central thesis further, if the internal good of the practice of 
mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is to make an edifying argument with integrity, just 
what specific human virtues are necessary for the mainstream narrative feature filmmaking 
practitioner to hold?  
 
3.2 The Virtues 
 
MacIntyre believes there are three universal human virtues that the practitioner must hold if 
they are to achieve and comprehend any internal good in any form of social practice, “we 
have to accept as necessary components of any practice with internal goods and standards of 
excellence the virtues of justice, courage and honesty,” (1981, p. 191). 
 MacIntyre makes a strong case for these virtues by appeal to the need for fair and 
functional relationships between those who participate in the practice (pp. 191-192). 
However, when it comes to the specifics of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking, further 
media-specific virtues are plausible. Based on my own reflective practice as a professional 
screenwriter and director, including observation and interaction with those practitioners who 
are generally well-regarded by their casts, crews, peers and audiences, the study makes the 
case below for three further mainstream feature film-specific virtues. For the practitioner to 
achieve the goods internal to the practice the virtues of curiosity, ‘creative compassion’ and 
‘creative generosity’ should be added. To clarify further, all virtues should not be mistaken 
for the skills required to make a ‘successful’ film. These are virtues that can be split into two 
broad categories, regulatory virtues and motivational virtues, and as a whole they are 
necessary to achieve goods internal to the practice but not sufficient in themselves. This 
makes the relevant set of virtues as follows: 
 
Regulatory (virtues that regulate action) 
COURAGE:  So as to have the courage to tell the story (at the risk of harm). 
HONESTY:  So as to tell the story honestly (narrative honesty) 
JUSTICE:  So as to be fair in the telling of the story (narrative justice). 
So as to be fair to one’s colleagues in the social practice.  
So as to be fair to oneself.  
	 57	
Motivational (virtues that inspire action) 
CURIOSITY: So as to have the constant inspiration to explore and understand.  
CREATIVE COMPASSION: So as to have empathy for all characters.  
CREATIVE GENEROSITY: So as to want to share your story.  
 
To give an example, a screenwriter or director who embodies these virtues may still make a 
failure of a film by any definition (artistic, commercial, failure of argumentation) due to 
further advanced craft skill-sets that they do not hold, such as the ability to get performances 
from actors (the director) or the ability to write convincing dialogue (the screenwriter). 
However, without being honest, having courage or a natural sense of justice, intrinsic 
curiosity for the world, having empathy for creative inventions and wanting to share the story 
for the benefit of others, the screenwriter or director is unlikely to be able recognize or 
achieve the goods internal to the practice.  
 
3.3 Terrence Malick: A Case Study in Virtues & Success 
 
To recap, the claim is that the six virtues of courage, honesty, justice, curiosity, creative 
compassion and creative generosity are practically necessary (but not sufficient) for the 
narrative feature film screenwriter or director to make a worthwhile argument in a worthwhile 
way. To explore and test this claim in more detail a case study is useful. The screenwriter and 
director Terrence Malick is a helpful candidate, as he was widely considered to be one of the 
finest screenwriters and directors of his generation, even though his output was miniscule in 
comparison to his peers. In recent times, his output has increased but his reputation has almost 
universally diminished (Leigh, 2017), and a close analysis both of some of his films and his 
reputation should bring some clarity to the way the virtues intersect with the internal goods of 
the practice.  
 Terrence Malick is an American screenwriter, director and producer (although he does 
not perform all three tasks on every project) originally from Illinois. Born in 1943, he was 
educated in Austin, Texas before graduating in Philosophy Phi Beta Kappa (which, 
incidentally means “Love of learning is the guide of life”) from Harvard in 1965. He did 
graduate work as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University but left with a degree after a 
disagreement with a tutor regarding Wittgenstein (Solomons, 2011).  
 After working as a screenwriter (sometimes under the pseudonym David Whitney), 
Malick made two films in the 1970’s as screenwriter and director: Badlands (1973) and Days 
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of Heaven (1978) both considered of such note that they are officially conserved in the 
American National Film Registry (National Film Registry, 2019). 
 Malick took a 20-year hiatus until The Thin Red Line (1998), then a seven-year break 
until The New World (2005). He then made four films in the next seven years: The Tree of 
Life (2011), To the Wonder (2012), Knight of Cups (2015) and Song to Song (2017). Whilst 
Tree of Life won Malick the Palme d’Or at Cannes, his latest three films have been so derided 
by both critics and the public that a now common debate is whether or not Malick should 
continue to make films (Debruge 2017, Rose 2017).  
  Malick is also often (but wrongly) called a recluse, as he does not do interviews nor 
promote his work in any way (Blackall, 2011). But even if he was the most open of social-
media personalities, the caveat must be noted that this case study only speculates as to his 
virtues based on a close reading of his films, and therefore is not dealing with Malick per-se, 
but a conception-of-Malick as justifiably indicated by his body of work. The films that form 
the case study are, in order of production: Badlands (1973), Days of Heaven (1978), The Tree 
of Life (2011) and Knight of Cups (2015).  
 Inspired by the real-life murder spree of Charles Starkweather and Caril Ann Fugate in 
1958, Badlands is the story of Holly (Sissy Spacek), a 15 year-old emotionally-disconnected 
girl and 25-year-old Kit (Martin Sheen), a handsome sociopath, as they cross America on the 
run after Kit kills Holly’s father for not letting them be together. Comparisons are inevitably 
made to Bonnie & Clyde (1968), (Ebert, 2011), and the Quentin Tarantino-penned film True 
Romance (1993) is a clear homage to Malick’s film (even down to a remarkably similar music 
score and theme).  
 The plot plays out thus: Set in 1959, the story is narrated in voice-over by Holly. 
When the audience meets her, she lives in a small South Dakota town of Fort Dupree with her 
sign-painter father (Warren Oates). Her mother died a long time before, and her relationship 
with her father is distant. One day Holly meets the charming Kit, who looks a lot like James 
Dean, whom Holly adores. The two have a connection, which on the surface looks to be 
romantic, if emotionally stilted. Holly's father wants Kit to stay away, so attempts to take 
away all of Holly’s spare time and shoots her dog as a punishment. While Holly’s father 
paints a sign, Kit attempts to convince him that the relationship is meaningful, and when he is 
rebuffed, enters Holly’s house and shoots her father dead. Holly remains emotionally distant 
throughout the whole event.  
Kit tells her she can call the police but he will suffer because of it. The couple then 
fake their joint suicide by burning down the house and go on the run, making their way 
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towards the ‘badlands’ of Montana. They build a tree house in some isolated woods and live 
there for a while before being discovered by three armed men. Apparently having some 
military training, Kit shoots them dead and they run, finding temporary refuge with Kit’s old 
friend Cato (Ramon Bieri).  
 When Cato tries to call for help, Kit shoots him. Cato doesn’t die instantly and the 
three of them have a ‘normal’ conversation whilst Cato lies on the bed dying. Kit then also 
shoots a teenage couple who arrive to visit Cato, although it is unclear whether or not they 
have been killed. 
 Kit and Holly are now very high-profile outlaws and are hunted across the Midwest. 
They stop at a mansion to replenish supplies and steal a car, but spare the lives of the rich 
owner of the house and the housemaid.  
Holly becomes tired both of Kit and of life on the run. As their capture becomes 
inevitable she refuses to go with Kit. Kit leads the police on a final chase, final because he 
wants to get caught. He has an opportunity to get away but shoots his own tyre.  
 Kit surrenders peacefully and puts all his efforts into charming the police and armed 
forces that have been pursuing him. Initially they are insulting and dismissive, but eventually 
warm to him and there is a strong hint of admiration at his audacity. Kit seems genuinely 
fulfilled as he basks in their attention, fielding their questions and cracking jokes. Six months 
later Kit is executed, whilst Holly receives probation and marries her defence attorney's son. 
Days of Heaven (1978) is set in America in 1916. Bill (Richard Gere) and Abby 
(Brooke Adams) are in a romantic relationship but pretend to be brother and sister to ‘stop 
people talking’. Linda (Linda Manz) is Bill’s little sister and she provides the narration for the 
film. Bill has a hot temper and flees from Chicago to Texas after assaulting the foreman at a 
steel mill where he worked as a labourer. 
Along with dozens of others, the three of them are hired by a young, rich, dying 
farmer (Sam Shepard) for seasonal work in the fields. The farmer (he is not given a character 
name) falls in love with Abby, and Bill encourages her to marry him so they can inherit his 
money after he dies. Abby is torn but eventually agrees.  
 After the marriage Bill stays on as Abby's "brother". The farmer's Foreman (Robert J. 
Wilke) suspects their plan but is sent to a remote part of the farm by the Farmer after he 
voices his concerns.  
 The Farmer's health does not deteriorate as expected, and Abby finds herself falling in 
love with her husband. Bill takes the news with grace, but their obvious non-platonic body 
language leads the Farmer to realize Bill and Abby’s true relationship. After a swarm of 
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locusts attack the wheat fields, the Farmer lets his anger get the better of him and sets the 
fields on fire. After they are destroyed, he goes after Bill with a gun, but Bill kills him with a 
screwdriver, fleeing again with Abby and Linda. The Foreman and the police pursue and 
eventually Bill is killed by the police.  
 Abby inherits the farmer's money and leaves Linda at a boarding school, believing it is 
best for her. Abby leaves town on a train with soldiers departing for World War I. The film 
ends with Linda running away from school with a friend, with her voiceover telling the 
viewer that she hopes her friend will do well.  
The Tree of Life (2011) is primarily set in 1950s Texas and is told through mainly the 
eyes of Jack. As a 1990s architect (played by Sean Penn) Jack fights an overwhelming 
existential angst, and this struggle with the meaning of life is intercut with key memories from 
his childhood (where he is played by Hunter McCracken) as well as more objective moments 
in the history of the universe and life on Earth.  
 The film starts with a quote from the Book of Job regarding the foundations of the 
Earth before seeing Jack’s mother Mrs. O’Brien reflecting on the choice to pursue either a 
path of nature or a path of grace. In what looks to be the 1960s, Mrs. O’Brien receives a 
telegram informing her of the death of her son, R.L., at the age of nineteen. Mr. O'Brien is 
notified by telephone whilst at work.  
In the 1990s, Jack apologizes on the phone to his father for something he said about 
his brother’s death. Jack begins thinking about his life as wanders around large, modern 
buildings, and then the desert. 
 We see the universe come into existence, whilst the voice-over (which seems to be the 
young Jack) asks existential questions. We see evolution take place on Earth until we come to 
the dinosaurs – and perhaps the first ever act of compassion when a dinosaur decides not to 
kill and eat a vulnerable creature. An asteroid hits the Earth. 
 In what seems to be a typical Texan suburban neighbourhood, the O'Briens welcome 
Jack, their first child and then his two brothers. As an adolescent, Jack struggles with the 
paths of grace and nature, as well as his relationships with each parent. His mother is 
nurturing and calm, his father conflicted and authoritarian, bordering on abusive as he 
regularly loses control of his temper. Mr. O’Brien did not pursue his passion, the life of a 
musician, and is clearly frustrated by the more conventional life he chose, one that is not as 
successful as he would like.  
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 One of Jack's friends drowns at the pool and another is burned and scarred in a house 
fire. He becomes angry with both parents: angry at his father for his bullying and his mother 
for tolerating it. 
 Mr. O'Brien has to spend a long time away on business and the boys enjoy 
uninterrupted time with their mother. Jack explores rebelliousness with his gang of friends 
with minor vandalism, and then trespasses into an attractive neighbour's empty house. He 
steals her nightgown. Confused with his responses, Jack throws it into the river. Mr. O'Brien 
returns home, not long before the plant where he works closes down and the family is forced 
to relocate to another town. Mr. O’Brien has his own epiphany and openly questions his own 
life choices in front of the boys and whether or not he has been a good enough person. He 
asks Jack for forgiveness for his behaviour. 
 In the 1990s, as adult Jack rides up a lift he has a vision. In it, he follows a young girl 
across a vast, desolate landscape. There is a wooden doorframe. Jack carefully walks through 
it. In what might be the end of the universe, the sun expands and then shrinks. Jack follows 
the girl and a young version of himself across the landscape, until on a beach he is reunited 
with his family and potentially everyone he has ever met or valued. Everyone is happy. Jack 
meets his dead brother R.L., bringing him to his mother and father. His parents say goodbye 
to R.L. Mrs. O'Brien looks to the sky and whispers that she is giving ‘him’ her son. After 
Jack's vision ends, a slight smile is just discernible as he makes his way out of the building.  
 Although not explained in the film itself, Knight of Cups (2015) takes its name from a 
Latin-suited tarot card, part of a group that tarot card readers term the ‘Minor Arcana’. The 
Major Arcana are more significant in divination, with the Minor Arcana providing the 
subtleties. The Knight of Cups is an individual who is a bringer of ideas but one who is also 
constantly bored and needing constant stimulation. If the card is right-way-up, it represents 
change and the new (often romantic in nature), if upside-down it represents unreliability, 
fraud and false promises.  
 The film tells the contemporary story of Rick, a wildly successful screenwriter living 
in Los Angeles who seems to personify the Knight of Cups – creative but suffering from 
ennui, almost wholly disconnected. The film follows his odyssey around the familiar, 
decadent trappings of Los Angeles and Las Vegas (sumptuous but literally empty houses, 
beautiful female actors and models) as Rick attempts to find connection – with lovers past and 
present, with his father, his brother, his mother and his place in the world. He had another 
brother who has died, the cause unclear but it is the source of great tension in the family. 
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The film begins with a quote from (in fact the full title of) John Bunyan’s The 
Pilgrim’s Progress (1678): “The Pilgrim's Progress. From this World to That Which is to 
Come, Delivered Under the Similitude of a Dream”. After the prologue, the film is divided 
into eight sections, each (apart from the final section) taking the name of a tarot card: The 
Moon, The Hanged Man, The Hermit, Judgment, The Tower, The High Priestess, Death and 
Freedom. Each section concerns one particular individual in Rick’s life: in The Moon it’s 
Della, an insightful if flaky young woman; in The Hanged Man it’s Rick’s destitute brother 
and broken father; in The Hermit, it’s a rich playboy; in Judgment it’s his Doctor ex-wife 
where the lack of a child seems to be a main contributing factor to the split; The Tower 
concerns an immaculate model, The High Priestess a knowing stripper and Death a married 
woman who may be carrying Rick’s child. Freedom contains Isabel, a mystic innocent.  
There is no narrative closure to Rick’s journey. The final image of the film is the POV 
of a car as it travels fast down a deserted desert highway.  
It is critical to examine the films in chronological order if the study is to assess the 
presence of the six virtues of the practitioner, as virtues are not static, and may develop or 
atrophy over time. The question thus needs a temporal element: Do Malick’s films 
demonstrate that he either holds or held those virtues practically necessary but not sufficient 
to make a worthwhile argument in a worthwhile way?  
We also cannot separate context from text when it comes to an examination of virtues. 
An artist creating work around the importance of sexual freedom in Australia is far less 
courageous than one creating the same work in Saudi Arabia.  
Beginning with Badlands, an examination of the most popular films released in the 
USA in 1973 will give a good, if unavoidably general, sense of what Malick’s contemporaries 
were working on, and what was palatable to the audiences of the time. According to the 
Internet Movie Database (IMDb), the top grossing film of the year was The Exorcist, followed 
by Westworld, American Graffiti, The Sting, Enter the Dragon, Paper Moon, The Holy 
Mountain, Papillon, Sssssss, The Wicker Man, Soylent Green, Serpico and Mean Streets. 
With the exception of the overtly experimental The Holy Mountain, each of these films have 
very clearly delineated heroes and villains. Mean Streets, Paper Moon, The Sting and 
Papillon all have ‘criminals’ as their heroes but without exceptions each live by a strict code 
of ethics: the main characters may not be lawful but they are universally moral.  
This sets Badlands apart. Both Kit and Holly are objectively amoral, their own 
personal code of ethics is both unlawful and confronting to those who live by conventional 
codes of Judeo-Christian social conduct (do not murder, do not steal, be compassionate etc.). 
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If this were a traditional tale, Kit and Holly would be punished by the events of the film, and 
the narrative is certainly shaped in a way familiar to audiences of the time. It has a Bonnie-
and-Clyde shape: murderous-couple-on-the-run can’t-run-fast-enough-and-get-their-bloody-
comeuppance. The film Bonnie and Clyde was released five years earlier in 1968, and was 
such a success that, according to Peter Biskind (1998), it ushered in the first great independent 
film era. 
Badlands confronts its audience by not providing the easy resolution of Bonnie and 
Clyde. It provides a non-violent but more disturbing end when Kit charms his captors and 
becomes at the very least a local celebrity held with begrudging respect. It is clear that the 
only time Kit looks genuinely happy is when he is captured, a person of note.  He appears to 
take himself to have won; he has got what he wanted no matter how misguided his desire. 
 Malick gives the audience no easy answers or explanations as to why that desire 
exists, nothing that would provide audience with impression that they understand the 
character and motivations of either Kit or Holly. Neither character has an obvious reason for 
their actions, and even if they are dismissed as psychopaths, it is not the only thing that 
defines them, which again confronts likely audiences of the film. But is this merely audience-
baiting?  
  Consider the virtues one by one. Does Badlands exhibit Malick’s courage? Is it 
courageous of him to tell this particular story? As the study will examine in the next chapter, 
audience-baiting is an element of art but not obviously applicable here. Audience-baiting 
shocks for shock’s sake, but here it appears that Badlands is attempting to tell a difficult truth 
rather than a comforting lie: that sometimes there is no satisfactory explanation for extreme 
amoral human behaviour, and furthermore, that extreme amoral behaviour may inspire not 
just notoriety but popularity. 
 Does the film demonstrate narrative honesty? David Mamet, in his discussions of 
endings, claims that it doesn’t matter whether or not the ending is good or bad, happy or sad, 
it just must be the right ending. This right ending is defined by what Mamet refers to as the 
‘grain’ of the creative piece. Every story has a natural ‘grain’, and as with planing a piece of 
wood, the artist has a choice of either planing with or against the grain. If you go against the 
grain, the wood is destroyed (Mamet, 1992, p. 66). While this is a rather under-theorised 
proposal and relies on a well-framed metaphor rather than philosophical explication, it is a 
useful starting point for considering the ending of Badlands. For Mamet, part of the skill of 
being an artist is to recognize the grain and to go with it. In Badlands, it is clear that this is 
achieved. Even though the film is superficially shaped like Bonnie and Clyde, it is no simple 
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couple-on-the-run story. The eerie voice-over, the hanging shots on nature and the 
dispassionate representation of the violence are all signifiers of this. If it closed with a 
conventional ending, it may make conservative elements of the audience happy, but would be, 
in Mamet’s terminology, wrong. The film sets itself up to be challenging, to challenge 
conventional understanding of human motivation and evil, and to close with comforting 
ending – in which the moral order is satisfyingly reasserted – would be to go against the grain.  
On this evidence, can Malick be judged to be just in his telling of the story? The 
concept of narrative justice goes beyond narrative honesty, in the same way that an individual 
is able to be honest but not fair. This can be illustrated in two ways. The first is to use 
selection, a tool most often attributed to the editor. A practitioner can be honest in that they 
show the truth of an event ‘woman steals money’ but by leaving out the event ‘woman needs 
to pay for child’s food’ they are knowingly creating an unfair representation of her. Does 
Malick do this in Badlands? There seems to be much effort in telling the story in an 
uninflected way, that is to say less stylized guidance that would be allowable for the genre, 
allowing the viewer to make up their own mind on how to read the events in the film. Any 
selection process is not perfect, and criticism can always be levelled as you can never show 
everything, but the intention to give fair representation to all creative elements appears 
sincere. Context has to stop at some point (there are always further surrounding events and 
histories to any moment in time) but it is interesting that as his further work demonstrates, 
most notably Tree of Life, Malick attempts to put the highly personal into the widest of 
universal contexts. The second illustration of narrative fairness is not simply to refrain from 
misleading audiences about characters, but to not merely use them as a narrative tool; an 
obvious cipher or source of conflict. A character must feel authentic, guided by internal 
emotion and logic consistent with the character as established over the course of the narrative. 
In the above example, ‘woman steals money’ will be fair if this is consistent with the 
character, not simply a necessary plot point in a poorly designed story, or involves exposition 
that clearly is coming from the screenwriter or director which the character would never 
articulate. In this way, as much as the characters in Badlands may act counter-intuitively, they 
are always emotionally and logically consistent with their established traits.  
 To examine the other definitions of justice, being just to oneself and to one’s 
colleagues, it is necessary to take examine the discourses surrounding the film. As Malick 
does not speak about his work, there is no evidence to contradict the former, but with regard 
to the latter, it appears that Malick had a problematic relationship with his crew. There was a 
high turnover of crew as most could not abide his working methods that included frequent 
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spontaneous decisions and changes-of-mind that were at odds with the methodical tradition of 
filmmaking and put the shoot far behind schedule. “People who've worked with Terry either 
love him or hate him,” said Spacek. "I love him.”” (Gilbey, 2008). To tangentially upset your 
crew is one thing, but is this a question of fairness? If you take the view that everyone is there 
to make the best film possible, and this means going behind schedule, then it is more a matter 
of convenience that fairness. A deliberate withholding of information, and a spontaneous 
adventitious working style, could be construed as unfair but not an insincere working method, 
no matter how antagonizing that may be to those used to conventional workflows.  
 With respect to the motivational virtues of curiosity and creative compassion, the 
subject matter and its atypical treatment seem to indicate an innate curiosity with human 
behaviour, and the way Malick presents Kit’s only true joyous moment without judgment, and 
even giving nuance to all minor characters, including the young couple unfortunate to have 
run into them, as well as the maid the mansion demonstrate an empathy for all characters.  
 Creative generosity is the final virtue: the desire to share a story one judges as worth 
sharing. An assessment of this desire is quite straightforward. At a Pixar masterclass I 
attended in Sydney in 2013, Matthew Luhn, former Lead Storyteller, explained that Pixar 
view the audience to any piece of art as a pyramid: the more conventional the storytelling, the 
wider the audience as everyone has the ability to interpret the work. As the work becomes less 
conventional, rarefied and obscure, the pyramid narrows, until at the top of pyramid is the 
smallest possible audience. By Pixar’s determination, an artist that makes artworks for the top 
of the pyramid is an artist making artworks for other artists. Badlands, by taking the shape of 
a genre film (in this case the crime drama) makes the film accessible to wide audience, which 
indicates strongly that his creative generosity is strong.  
 This quick analysis allows the study to answer the question in the affirmative: Yes, 
Badlands does exhibit those virtues practically necessary but not sufficient to make a 
worthwhile argument in a worthwhile way. It should be noted that this analysis is not of the 
argument of the film, merely the virtues that allow for a potentially successful argument. But 
Badlands was made in 1973. Has Malick continued to possess and exhibit these virtues?  
 Days of Heaven (1978) has many surface similarities with Badlands. A period story 
about a couple on the run after a murder (but now with a sister in tow who provides the 
‘naive’ voiceover, the function Holly played in Badlands). Although present but undeveloped 
in Badlands, here there is much more foregrounding of nature in the design of the film, and 
how the characters are seemingly unable to see the beauty of nature around them. Days of 
Heaven is perhaps most famous for the fact that most of the exteriors were shot only during 
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the ‘magic hour’ – that time before the sun fully rises or fully sets where there is light but no 
source, giving an ethereal feel. This meant that the production could only shoot about two 
hours a day. Unlike with Badlands, this unconventional methodology was not met with 
resistance, but enthusiastic acceptance (after the success of Badlands it appears irritation with 
Malick’s workflow patterns had ceased). Film critic Roger Ebert comments that: “It is the 
wondering narrative voice that lingers beneath all of Terrence Malick’s films, sometimes 
unspoken: Human lives diminish beneath the overarching majesty of the world,” (Ebert, 
2011). 
 Days of Heaven is a more obscure tale than Badlands. The genre conventions are 
upheld more strongly (Bill meets a bloody end) but the film does not settle on a main 
character and most scenes are particularly sparse, with unrealistically minimal dialogue, if any 
at all, and are quite short, which tends to undermine emotional connection of audiences with 
the characters. All the characters of Days of Heaven remain strangers to their audience. 
 It is clear that Malick is attempting to express a fundamental truth as he sees it about 
the connection between people and between people and nature. The idyllic landscape and the 
allusion to Heaven in the title strongly indicate this. However, his thematic ideas are harder to 
access and engage in than they were in Badlands.  
 Days of Heaven was released in 1978. Other popular films in the US in 1978 were The 
Deer Hunter (Cimino) and Midnight Express (Parker), both thematically confronting films. 
Does this context affect Malick’s creative courage? The answer can only be indeterminate: a 
soldier does not become less courageous because he has returned from war, but certainly has 
less opportunity to demonstrate it. With respect to honesty and justice, both seem to be 
present in Days of Heaven as the characters appear emotionally and logically consistent to 
their traits and no critical contexts are maliciously withheld. With regard to curiosity and 
creative compassion, Malick’s interest in the intersection of humanity and nature is again 
present and his empathy for all characters is clear.  
 From this the study can conclude that as of Days of Heaven, Malick filmmaking 
virtues are on ample display. Both Badlands and Days of Heaven were made in what could be 
called ‘Phase 1’ of Malick’s career. He did not make another film for 20 years. (‘Phase 2’ 
would be the films from The Thin Red Line (1998) and The New World (2005), both quite 
large in production scale and historical context (World War II in the former and the European 
colonial invasion of North America in the latter). ‘Phase 3’ begins with The Tree of Life 
(2011) and appears to end with Song to Song (2017). A Hidden Life (2019) is a return to the 
war canvas of The Thin Red Line, so may well start a move into ‘Phase 4’.  
	 67	
 The question now posed is this: Did Malick maintain his filmmaking virtues when he 
entered into the third phase of his career? 
 The Tree of Life again shares similarities with both Badlands and Days of Heaven. 
Voice-over infuses the film (starting with a female voice-over but now shared amongst other 
characters). It shares many visual cues with Badlands (it could almost be set on the same 
street as Kitty’s house) and much of it is reflective of Malick’s time growing up in 1950’s 
Texas. This clear autobiographical imprint is also present in the plotting of the film. Malick 
had a brother who played the guitar and killed himself at a young age. In one very real sense 
this is a personal autobiographical story about a man with a crisis of faith, Malick-as-artist 
working out his own eschatological concerns. However, as it is cross-cut with the origins of 
the universe, and perhaps the first ever moment of natural compassion (the dinosaur choosing 
not to kill the other vulnerable dinosaur) as well as a voice-over debate on the idea of grace 
versus nature, it attempts to become an exploration of not just faith and humanity but of 
evolution and empathy across all species. Unlike with Badlands, it does seem that here 
Malick really is attempting to provide the vastest of contexts, be it metaphysical rather than 
narrative context. There can be no doubt that this is hugely ambitious thematically 
(encompassing the destiny of humankind and its intrinsic connection to nature); structurally 
(non-linear); and narratively (juxtaposing a period personal story and dinosaurs/origins of the 
universe/internal character visions). 
 To think about the film in terms of the virtues, there is little indication that courage is 
lacking (by taking on such wide-ranging thematic ideas), nor honesty, justice or creative 
compassion. Malick’s curiosity also appears intact (by attempting insight into so many areas) 
but it is his creative generosity that shows signs of faltering. 
 Taking the Pixar scale, Malick is progressing from telling stories near the bottom of 
the pyramid to the middle. The Tree of Life is may be far more thematically ambitious than 
Badlands, but it is also far less accessible. A practitioner who concentrates on unpopular 
topics knowing that this will limit the audience is not ungenerous if they are trying to 
genuinely attempting to communicate with that audience. However, placing The Tree of Life 
in the context of Malick’s earlier work does betray an increasing proclivity for self-
indulgence and obscurantism.  
 This brings us to a discussion of the ‘worthwhile’. The study has been focusing on the 
virtues a practitioner needs (but is not sufficient to) move the audience to a worthwhile 
conclusion in a worthwhile way. But what is meant by worthwhile in each context? 
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 The Tree of Life can be said to have a worthwhile conclusion (that ‘the way of grace is 
our only hope for living a good (connected/unalienated) life’), but is not necessarily making it 
in a worthwhile way. The obscurity with which Malick tells his story, the diminishing of 
creative generosity as he does not appear to care if his ideas are being efficiently 
communicated, makes the construction of his argument less worthwhile. There can be many 
reasons for this approach, from the oblivious to the impatient to the exploitative (a film that 
manipulatively pulls on sentimental heartstrings to get its point across) but nevertheless each 
is equally problematic and works against the internal good of the practice.  
 The Tree of Life divided audiences and critics alike, but Knight of Cups (2015) 
reunited them but not in the way Malick perhaps would have wished. Almost universally 
derided, comments ranged from “Joyless, uninspired,” (Bradshaw, 2015) to “Lamely 
prosaic,” (Nayman, 2016). One of the most significant good reviews came from Matt Zoller 
Seitz from rogerebert.com (2016), who nevertheless did also have to admit that: “many 
viewers will find it impenetrable and intolerable”.  
 Knight of Cups suffers both from text and context. Textually, the stream-of-
consciousness narrative with no resolution is both confusing and unsatisfying and it would 
appear to the uncharitable viewer that Malick has become a self-parody. All cinematic 
techniques on display here appear to have become tropes to be used in a make-your-own-
Malick-film-kit toolbox: the floating camera; the man in a desolate landscape looking lost; the 
voice-over asking spiritual/philosophical questions to no one in particular; the invitation to be 
in awe of nature; the ‘dead third brother’ narrative strand; the clearly autobiographical 
references (successful screenwriter in a crisis of faith). This lack of coherence and appearance 
of self-indulgence means that with Knight of Cups Malick has fallen foul of the internal goods 
of the practice; not only has he has not argued in a worthwhile way, the conclusion is opaque.    
 To frame this failure in terms of the virtues, in Knight of Cups Malick demonstrates 
little courage nor creative generosity: he is on well-worn story territory and tells it in an 
obscure way that will only appeal to a very select viewership; he may be attempting to 
explore an idea of a phenomenological cinema, an exclusively stream-of-consciousness 
cinema concerned primarily with first-person experience. In Pixar parlance, it is a film for 
those at the top of the pyramid. In fact, all indications imply that the film may not even be 
targeted at other artists, but merely at Malick himself. 
 In terms of justice, there also seems to be an issue with Malick being fair to his cast. 
As Thomas Lennon, a well-known comic actor cast in Knight of Cups reported:  
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…[H]e only found out about the scene a few days before it was shot, and was given no 
information other than to dress as if he were going to a party in the Hollywood 
Hills. “We’re all standing there and Malick hands out these pieces of paper to all of 
us,” Lennon said. “And the one he gave me said, ‘There’s no such thing as a fireproof 
wall.’ And I ask, ‘Is this something I’m supposed to say in the scene?’ and he said, ‘I 
don’t know.'” Lennon learned, after talking to the director, that there was no script, 
just a phrase that might inspire him when cameras started rolling. “And then Malick 
goes, ‘Would you like some more? Because I have a whole stack of these.’ And I was 
like, ‘I think I’m good,” Lennon said.” 
(Adams, 2016) 
 
This is far from respectful to the actors’ process and craft. It is one thing to encourage 
improvisation, another to not allow an actor to prepare.  
 Malick held the virtues courage, honesty, justice, curiosity, creative compassion and 
creative generosity necessary but not sufficient to achieve the internal goods of the practice, 
but these have eroded over time, causing his latest work to fail. This is not a failure as defined 
by critical or audience reception nor financial profits, but purely in terms of the internal goods 
of the practice: Malick’s later films begin to fail when they do not move the audience to a 
worthwhile conclusion in a worthwhile way, primarily through a failure to express creative 
generosity. The critical response of Malick’s films has been used to give historical context, 
and a critic should be a good barometer of the accessibility of the argument presented by the 
film. As the furore surrounding the release of Joker (Phillips, 2019) reveals, critics evenly 
engage in debate both on the technical prowess of the film and the impact of the argument 
(Zacharek, 2019). Yet there is no necessary overlap between a narrative feature film’s success 
with critics and in the marketplace, and success as defined by the internal goods of the 
practice. As the study will examine in Chapter 6, alternative conceptions of success rely on 
very different variables. 
 The virtues of the film practitioner and the internal goods of the film-as-social-practice 
have a natural complementary nature, one logically allows for the other. However, the 
relationship between the internal and external goods of film-as-social-practice interrelate in 
much more complex and, at times, problematic way.   
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3.4 External Goods 
 
This is MacIntyre’s definition of external goods: 
 
…[W]hen achieved [external goods]… are always some individual’s property and 
possession… External goods are therefore characteristically objects of competition in which 
there must be losers as well as winners. Internal goods are indeed the outcome of competition 
to excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for the whole 
community who participate in the practice.   
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 190) 
 
MacIntyre is not saying that external goods are necessarily negative, he is simply delineating 
the difference between internal and external goods. A practitioner who is fixated on external 
goods is likely to – but will not necessarily – fall foul of the internal goods of the practice. For 
instance, a mainstream narrative film director may be wholly fixated on the external goods of 
fame and money – but if they are aware of the internal goods of the practice and believe that 
the way to achieve the external goods is by fulfilling the internal goods, then the two are not 
in conflict.  
 However, MacIntyre is less concerned with individual practitioners than with the 
institutions that make the practices possible. Here again is his outline of the inter-relationship 
between the two: 
 
Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with what I have called 
external goods…  they distribute money, power and status as reward… Indeed so 
intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions…  that institutions and practices 
characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of 
the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the 
cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the 
competitiveness of the institution. In this context, the essential function of the virtues 
is clear. Without them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not 
resist the corrupting power of institutions…  




It is worth noting that this is the way that MacIntyre justifies his choice of virtues necessary to 
achieve the internal goods for any social practice, as by his definition all social practices are 
enabled by some form of institution.  
 The relationship of a social practice to those institutions that both empower and 
obstruct it is a complex and problematic one. It is one thing to say that institutions have 
‘corrupting power’ and wholly another to claim that they apply this power with any 
regularity. MacIntyre states that the creativity of the practice is always vulnerable to the 
institution but again, vulnerability does not necessarily imply automatic exploitation, however 
likely it may be. 
 In Chapter 1, the study laid out the basic structure of the institutions concerned with 
mainstream feature film production. Below is the exhaustive list of typical production entities 
(Bordwell, Thompson and Smith 2018, pp. 16-53, and Moore, 2019).  
 
• The Production Company or Companies 
The company that oversees the physical production of a mainstream narrative feature 
film. Sometimes owned and run by a key producer and sometimes has its overhead 
bankrolled by a larger studio who has no official stake in the company.  
• The Financing Company or Companies 
The company that supplies the finance for the film. On a typical mainstream feature 
film that is not wholly funded by a studio, this is usually a patchwork of half-a-dozen 
companies, some purely financial investors, others state television broadcasters or 
government agencies providing subsidies. 
• The Bond Company 
Also known as a Completion Guarantor, an insurance company that for a significant 
premium guarantees to the Financing Company that the film will be completed on 
time and on budget. In order to guarantee this, they insist on approval for all key cast 
and crew. If the project goes over time or budget the company has the power to fire 
and replace everyone on set, including key cast, director and producers.  
• The Distribution Company or Companies 
The company in each national territory that buys the film from the production 
company and sells the film to the audience via all exhibition platforms (such as 
cinema, streaming, DVD, free-to-air or subscription television, web, in-flight 
entertainment). 
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• The Marketing and Public Relations Agency or Agencies 
These companies work directly for the distributors in each territory to market and 
promote the film. 
• The Exhibition Company or Companies 
Owners of the platform that ultimately shows the film to the audience (cinema chains, 
DVD rental stores, TV broadcasters, VoD (Video-on-Demand) services, download 
websites). Often each institution is different in each territory, but some, such as 
Netflix, are becoming one global institution.    
 
With the exception of government agencies and bond companies, it must be noted that many 
of these companies can be owned by the same institution. If this institution produces 
significant amounts of content, it is usually referred to as a ‘Studio’.  
 This is a significant number of institutions, but it is fair to ask how many are likely to 
function as a MacIntyrean ‘corrupting influence’ on the actual practice of making a 
mainstream narrative feature film. For instance, is the Marketing Agency, an institution far 
removed from the process of film production able to ‘corrupt’ the social practice of the 
mainstream narrative feature film?  
 Before concluding that fixation on external goods leads institutions automatically to 
corrupt the social practice, it is important to reconstruct how a film institution may typically 
influence the content of a mainstream narrative feature film. To look at this influence in 
approximate order of production: 
 The Production Company or Companies are responsible for getting films made, which 
typically means raising finance, putting together the creative production team, selling to the 
distributors and making sure the film is delivered. The Production Company typically owns 
the copyright in the film and only sells a licence to distribute to the distributors. They can 
have very direct influence on the creative direction of the film by their selection of 
screenwriter, director and other key creative elements. They are able to replace these key 
creatives or influence them as their direct employer. During the development stage, if the 
Production Company cannot raise finance due to, for example, a contentious plot point, they 
will ultimately ask for it to be changed. If the Company cannot sell the film due to elements 
present in the delivery cut, they can insist on reshoots. A high-profile example of this is 
Disney financing extensive reshoots on Rogue One: A Star Wars Story (Edwards, 2016) due 
to problems with the ending (Kit, 2016).  
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 The Financing Company or Companies have varying degrees of power depending on 
the percentage of the budget they are supplying. Usually there is a lead financier (be it a 
studio or otherwise) and this gives them (usually contractually) ultimate creative control of 
the project. The other Companies contributing finance to the film will have what is referred to 
as ‘consultation’ rights: the facility to offer feedback without any facility to enforce those 
changes. Due to the arms-length nature of the connection between The Financing Company 
and the physical production, most of the influence is at either end of production: at the script, 
casting or delivery stage. Influence is likely (especially in discussions about key cast) as a 
return in investment is key and the higher profile the actors the more likely the film is 
guaranteed to see a return. Even if the Production Company does not wish for any changes the 
Financing Company will typically have the final say.  
 The Bond Company is very influential in terms of casting and crewing choices but if 
all goes well, they will have no further contact with the film or practitioners. The Bond 
Company, sometimes called a Completion Guarantor, has no interest in the quality of the 
production or how much money the film might make. They are paid a fee to provide a service, 
but their decisions can have far-reaching creative consequences. They are able to reject a 
director for being too inexperienced or insist on more experienced crew to support them. If 
the film is running behind schedule, they have the facility to fire everyone and re-cast and re-
crew; however this is a rare circumstance. 
 The Distribution Company or Companies hold significant power over the practice. In 
many instances they are also a key financier of the project, and usually function as a de facto 
financier of a mainstream narrative feature film as the money they promise to pay on delivery 
of the film (referred to as a minimum guarantee or M.G.) is used to underwrite production 
loans. Even if the Distribution Company has had no involvement until the film is completed 
and presented to them for purchase, the institution can hold great power and creative 
influence (Lobato and Ryan, 2011). Ultimately, the Company can refuse delivery of the film, 
and therefore payment, unless changes they deem necessary to the film are made. A 
particularly illustrative example of this is the horror film The Descent (Marshall, 2005). The 
original cut of the film, and one that was shown to most audiences, involves a twist where 
initially it seems that the final living character has ultimately made it out of the cave, only for 
it to be revealed that she is still inside and will not survive (Emerson, 2006). The American 
distributor, Lionsgate, wanted a more optimistic ending, and with the director’s blessing, 
removed the final minute of the film. The effect was successful in providing a ‘happy’ ending, 
but obviously had a significant impact on the argument the film was making.  
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 The Marketing and Public Relations Agency or Agencies work for the distributors so 
their ability to effect a change to the social practice is minimal in the independent sector 
(where the Agencies are third party suppliers brought in on a project by project basis). 
However, in the cases where the Agency is a department of a studio that also financed and is 
distributing the film the influence is far greater, and in fact would be the department that leads 
the thinking as to not only what changes might need to be made (as in the Disney example) to 
a finished film, but also how a script should be developed (as in the Disney live-action 
remakes of its own classics such as Cinderella (Branagh, 2015) The Lion King  (Favreau, 
2019) and Beauty and the Beast (Condon, 2017). They may even contribute a view as to what 
underlying rights should be acquired allowing the production of mainstream narrative feature 
films (such as Time Warner and The Harry Potter franchise).  
 Finally, The Exhibition Company or Companies have the final say on what they are 
prepared to show to the audience. In terms of cinema, all cinema chains have bookers whose 
job it is to decide what films to show and on how many screens. If they do not think a film 
will sell tickets, the film will have no choice (no matter what the distributors wish to do) than 
to find another platform on which to screen. Each of the platforms operate in the same 
gatekeeping way, which also gives them significant indirect editorial power over the social 
practice. If all platforms reject a film, then the Production Company or Distributor would 
have no choice but to abandon, re-cut or become their own exhibitor (usually on the internet). 
 A subsection of the exhibition system that functions in a significantly different way is 
the film festival. Film festivals are not technically a platform in their own right, even though 
some film festivals now own channels or brands within other platforms (such as the Fantasia 
Film Festival on iTunes). Film festivals will typically only show a narrative feature film once 
or twice during the festival period, so their influence on the content is negligible. There are 
records of films being re-cut after bad audience reactions at a film festival screening (Wise, 
2017) and before general release, but not in order to initially qualify for a film festival. Film 
festivals function as gatekeepers of official taste, not of audience access or potential financial 
return to the financiers. Typically, most film festival screenings cost the production money 
and are regarded as a marketing exercise to build interest in the film. That said, most film 
festivals have a ‘type’ of film they naturally prefer to program, especially those that are aimed 
at a specific niche (usually based on a genre of film, topic or community group) which can 
have an indirect effect on how a project is developed even if there is no direct communication 
between the ‘film’ and the festival. 
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 As the above demonstrates, this represents a significant gauntlet of institutions for the 
mainstream-narrative-feature-film-as-social-practice to navigate, all of which carry significant 
power over the practice. The odds of a mainstream narrative feature film surviving this 
gauntlet untouched and intact are not all that high, which may be a contributing factor as to 
why so many films that reach exhibition ultimately fail to achieve the internal goods of the 
practice. It is also why for the purposes of this study that the examination ends at the point of 
first delivery to distributor. The thesis is not primarily concerned with how mainstream 
narrative feature films navigate the gauntlet of institutions, but what the internal goods of the 
social practice are as it concerns the two key practitioners of the social practice: screenwriter 
and director. At the point of first delivery, both screenwriter and director have completed their 
work and any further endeavours will be reactions to the (possibly corrupting) influence of the 
institutions which support the practice.  
 This separation between practitioner and institution is mostly clean, but not entirely 
so. The Production Company itself is an institution that potentially could be a corrupting 
influence, and requires further delineation, especially as to the producer’s role in the 
construction of mainstream narrative feature film. This introduces the question of why 
producers are excluded from the class of ‘filmmaking practitioner’ for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
 
3.5 Agency in Mainstream-film-as-social-practice 
 
In Chapter 1, the study disqualified the role of ‘producer’ as a key practitioner of a 
mainstream narrative feature film as their skills base is quite different from that of either the 
screenwriter or director of a mainstream narrative feature film. However, the role of the 
producer is a fluid one, and it is important to re-examine this choice in light of the discussion 
of internal and external goods and institutions that enable the practice of filmmaking.   
 The key skills of a mainstream narrative feature film producer are based on their 
ability to (in rough production chronological order) recognize talent, structure and close a 
finance deal and navigate various stakeholders’ often conflicting interests (which often, but 
not always, requires tact, diplomacy and highly strategic thinking). It is a useful bonus to have 
a strong sense of cinematic storytelling, but not a pre-requisite: having taste that is in line with 
the general film-consuming public will suffice equally, if not better, for the producer’s role in 
film production.   
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 In the typical employment structure of a mainstream narrative feature film (Bordwell, 
Thompson and Smith 2018, p. 17), even if the producer is ‘independent’ and developed the 
project with little or no film industry interference before raising the finance to make the film, 
they inevitably become the link between the production (director, cast and crew) and the 
financial interests (either their own or third party Production Company and/or the Financiers). 
This is much like an accounts manager in an advertising agency. In this way, the role of 
producer, although it is located physically alongside the practitioners of a mainstream 
narrative feature film, is culturally located within that of the institution(s) and therefore shares 
the priorities of these institutions.  
 This can problematic as, typically, the practitioners are primarily concerned with the 
internal goods of the practice (making a film worth watching, an argument worth making) and 
institutions are primarily concerned with realizing the external goods, which in terms of 
mainstream narrative feature films are money and prestige.  
 To take an example of a film studio that incorporates many of the other institutions 
heretofore discussed, film studios are typically publicly listed companies owned by other 
publicly listed companies and as such the CEO is under pressure to maximize profits and keep 
paying dividends to shareholders (Dick, 2001). It is also worth noting that, if ‘running a film 
studio’ qualified as a social practice (and this is in no way guaranteed) then the internal good 
of the social practice of ‘studio-running’ could also be in some concerned with generating 
finance, as the internal good of ‘studio-running’ would be very different from that of making 
a mainstream narrative feature film, and therein lies the problem that concerns MacIntyre. 
When it comes to cinema exhibitors, they are even further removed from the internal goods of 
the practice, regarding themselves in almost a different industry entirely, as ‘sweet shops with 
screens’ (Tuttle, 2009). 
 It is not that producers typically do not wish to make a film that expresses the internal 
goods of the practice (however they define them) but that the role necessarily entails a 
prioritization of external goods and requires little or no understanding or even conception of 
internal goods. Some producers may find themselves heavily internally conflicted about their 
role and their priorities, others will not. It is for these reasons that the producer is not 
considered a functioning practitioner for the purposes of this thesis.  
 Making a mainstream narrative feature film is a necessarily collaborate process, but 
how precisely does agency function, especially when the creative head (director) may have 
priorities in conflict with the business head (producer)? 
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 The structure of a typical film production is a relatively simple one. The three roles 
that have the responsibility to deliver a film of ‘quality’ are the ‘Creative Trinity’ of producer, 
director and screenwriter. This may sound slightly odd but all other departments are primarily 
responsible not for the quality of the film overall, but only for their departments: the actor is 
responsible for their performance, the production designer on the sets, the focus-puller on 
keeping things in focus. These crewmembers may class themselves as storytellers, but they 
are operating at the micro-level and have no responsibility for the overall quality of the 
project. They are there to empower the director to tell the story. 
 In the same way, both the producer and the screenwriter, even though they are 
operating at the macro-level and are in a very real sense creative leaders, are also there to 
empower the director. The screenwriter, once the screenplay has been acquired by the 
producer, typically has no rights nor leverage in the production but can be consulted on their 
opinion, whether or not they have been engaged to complete rewrites. (The rewrite role 
requires a different skillset – such as writing to tight deadlines – that the original screenwriter 
may not possess and if so, is given to a different writer. As with the other head of 
departments, this ‘rewrite’ screenwriter then operates at the micro-level). However, like the 
institutions that have consultation rights, the screenwriter has no power to effect any change 
unless the director or the producer are in agreement with it.  
 As long as the producer and director define ‘quality’ in the same way as each other, 
and by extension, match institutional expectations, then the production runs smoothly. When 
the internal good of the practice (making a sincere meaningful argument) contradict the 
priorities of the producer/institutions (making money) significant compromises are made to 
the argument. The most common example of this, as previously discussed, is the ‘happy 
ending’. A sad ending might be right for the argument, but if the institutions believe this mean 
less grosses, the coherency of the argument will likely be sacrificed for a happy ending.  
 It is worth noting that although this is the era of mainstream feature film as a ‘director-
led’ medium, from its origins, film and feature film was considered a producer-led medium 
until Cahiers du Cinema championed the director-as-auteur in the 1950’s (Truffaut, 1954). 
David O. Selznick, producer of Gone With The Wind (Fleming, 1939) considered himself the 
key creative of the work, and as he controlled and represented the finance of the film, his 
creative power was dominant. In fact, the film had a total of three directors, with George 
Cukor and Sam Wood joining Fleming (Andrew, 2019), demonstrating just how replaceable 
directors were in that era. Even today, the writer/producer model is commonplace, which is 
the only robust way a writer can maintain power over their material. In this model, the 
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director becomes, at best, the shared creative head of the production, very much working 
under the patronage of the writer/producer.  
 From these descriptions it could be argued that the producer is the true creative head 
of the production, as they control/represent the financiers and therefore could, if necessary, 
replace the director. However, the nature of the power of the producer as it relates to the 
power of the director is essentially a de jure power. Directors possess the relevant de facto 
power when it comes to translating a script to the screen. By the letter of the law (or, in this 
case, the contract) it may be true that the producer is the creative head, but in practice the 
director (thus empowered by the producer) has the relevant creative power. The director has 
been hired due to both their talent and efficiency, and to make the seemingly endless, large 
and small, creative decisions required on set and in post-production. The producer is a little 
more at arms-length to this process (sometimes producing more than one film 
simultaneously), so to get involved creatively is generally seen to be a failure on their part in 
their choice of director. The same logic applies to all other institutions. They can get involved 
creatively, but to do so demonstrates a failure on their part to choose the right personnel and 
involves them getting involved in process that is not a natural partner of their skills base. A 
current example of a producer and executive producer who has formalized the arms-length 
approach to mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is Megan Ellison. Ellison formed 
Annapurna Pictures to take a ‘silicon valley’ approach to filmmaking by investing in, or fully 
financing, original films by already prestigious directors (The Coen Brothers, Kathryn 
Bigelow, Paul Thomas Anderson), freeing them from the creative compromise often 
necessitated at the financing stage and allowing them creative flexibility during production 
(Grigoriadis, 2013). 
 In this way, it is possible to be a financially successful producer (and potentially 
successful in terms of the internal goods of the practice) with having no creative talent, input, 
agency or virtues associated with achieving the internal goods of the practice. It is possible to 
be a producer driven only by financial ambition (and not honesty, courage, justice, curiosity, 
creative compassion or creative generosity), only requiring the insight to realize the best way 






This chapter has outlined the concept of internal goods: a concept of MacIntyre’s teleological 
definition of social practice independent of the exercise of the virtues but made possible by 
them. It has shown that although necessary, virtues are traits that are not definitional of what 
it is to excel at a social practice, nor are they sufficient to achieve it. Through a case study of a 
current film ‘auteur’, Terrence Malick, the study makes the case for six virtues (three 
regulatory non-media specific and three motivational media specific) and demonstrated how 
both virtues and internal goods are applied in practice and the associated professional 
implications. ‘Success’ of a mainstream narrative feature film has been further defined in 
terms of the internal goods of the practice, including what it means to be a ‘worthwhile’ film 
in terms of argument.  
The chapter has also sought to demonstrate that external and internal goods do not 
necessarily have to be in a perpetual state of conflict, although the pressures of the institutions 
to focus on external goods (usually financial) in practice mean the institution becomes both a 
corrupting and enabling factor in the creation of mainstream narrative feature films. Finally, 
the chapter has defined more precisely why the role of ‘producer’ has been excluded from the 
definition of ‘practitioner’ as defined by this study: that although they may have high creative 
and story skill, that they may even be the de jure creative head of any particular mainstream 
narrative feature film, that as their power and influence of the work is always at arms length, 
knowledge and understanding of story is not necessary for a producer in the same way it is for 
a screenwriter or director. By definition, a producer also has to be, at least in part, focused on 
the external goods – so financial acumen is the fundamental element of their expertise. 
Yet even if at this initial stage of the study it is accepted that mainstream narrative 
feature film is a social practice as MacIntyre defines it, capable of functional argument and 
governed by the notion of internal goods, the case has not yet been made as to why ‘moving 
the audience in a worthwhile way to a worthwhile conclusion’ is the most valid conception of 
those internal goods. In order to test the legitimacy of the thesis, the next stage therefore is to 
interrogate other competing, and in all cases far more prevalent, theories of the internal goods 





Alternate Conceptions of Internal Goods 
 
4.1 Popular conceptions 
 
Even though they are unlikely to be specifically named or conceptualized as such, the internal 
and external goods of the practice of making mainstream narrative feature films are regularly 
referenced by both mainstream industry practitioners and commentators. Be it a film 
journalist, critic, academic, screenwriter, director or producer, whenever an attempt is made to 
universalize ‘what filmmakers are trying to do’, or the more ontologically-framed ‘what 
filmmaking is’, the discussion is always to some degree an examination of internal and/or 
external goods of the social practice filmmaking. This chapter examines the three most 
prevalent conceptions commonly articulated in discussions on the nature and goals of 
mainstream narrative filmmaking.  
 
4.2 Just Entertainment 
 
This is perhaps the most dominant and pervasive conception of the social practice of 
mainstream narrative filmmaking. It recalls the quote most famously attributed to Sam 
Goldwyn (via a third party to a journalist) that: “Pictures are for entertainment, messages 
should be delivered by Western Union,” (Westein, 1940). 
The quote is a direct denial of the principal claim of this thesis. To conceptualize it in 
the terms the study has set out, it claims that the internal good of the practice of mainstream 
narrative feature filmmaking is to just entertain; to simply provide amusement and 
enjoyment. This is all that filmmakers should attempt to do, and when it is achieved, they may 
deem themselves successful. No matter if the subject matter is dishonest, divisive and 
destructive, as long as the audience is diverted in a pleasurable way, the internal good of the 
practice has been satisfied.  
To interrogate this claim further, it is critical to first clarify precisely what is meant by 
‘entertainment’. Most industry practitioners are likely to have in mind the conventional 
dictionary definition of the word ‘entertainment,’ according to which a piece of entertainment 
is something designed to provoke delight or amusement. The Macmillan Dictionary defines 
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‘Entertainment’ simply as “performances that people enjoy,” (Macmillan Dictionary, 2019). 
Richard Dyer, in his book Only Entertainment (1992), attempts to define ‘entertainment’ 
more precisely. He defines it as: 
 
…a type of performance produced for profit, performed before a generalized audience 
(the ‘public’), by a trained, paid group who do nothing else but produce performances 
which have the sole (conscious) aim of providing pleasure. 
           (Dyer, 1992, p. 19) 
 
This definition aims to be more specific by bringing in ideas of business, audience, training, 
exclusivity and intention (but leaving out all non-performance modes of entertainment such as 
the written word). Perhaps a more intuitively satisfactory definition of entertainment is one 
that accommodates the immediacy of the reaction it inspires. Thus: ‘entertainment is a type of 
performance or artwork that triggers amusement or joy that the audience is aware of at the 
time of experiencing the performance or artwork’. Where an audience is entirely unaware of 
their enjoyment, they have not been entertained. Even if, on reflection, they realise the 
performance or artwork viewed has merit or benefit, they ought not to claim they were 
‘entertained’. They may have been interested or absorbed, or conversely resistant and 
distressed at the time of viewing only to come to a different conclusion once other internal 
processes have taken place – but ultimately the viewing was not an entertaining experience.  
 Both Dyer’s definition (a prevalent view) and Goldwyn’s maxim contain an implicit 
construction of the idea of entertainment that attempts to diminish both its significance and its 
influence: the idea that entertainment is solely about pleasure-giving. 
The prevalence of the conception of mainstream narrative feature film as merely 
entertainment can in part be attributed to the fact that it serves both the purposes of the 
promoters and the detractors of film. For the promoters of film (such as the practitioners and 
institutions themselves) it is a useful articulation of the practice as it absolves the industry of 
social or cultural responsibility. This line of argument is most explicitly spelled out when the 
industry comes under attack by various media and cultural commentators for its potential 
influence on real-world violence. In the early 1980s this occurred with the rise of ‘video-
nasty’ VHS rentals, and then a decade later with Child’s Play 3 (Bender, 1991), with the film 
being quoted in court by the child defendants in a child murder case in the UK (Morrison, 
2003).  
	 82	
In these cases, the defence of film as ‘just entertainment’ has real-world stakes and 
consequences. Currently in the US, UK and Australia the film industry is self-regulating. This 
means the industry bodies responsible for classifying films are funded by the industry itself, 
with little or no government involvement. If more weight were given to the influence of film, 
more regulation would likely follow. 
The detractors of mainstream narrative feature film consist of individuals and 
institutions that believe film is an inferior art form compared to other modes of creative 
expression. Again, this belief does not exist purely in the space of theoretical thought and has 
significant real-world implications. In Australia and the UK, film industries are heavily 
supported by pubic arts funding, as are most other conventional performing arts. It is unlikely 
that any meaningful arts industries would survive without such governmental support, yet arts 
funding is finite and industries compete for their respective share. This creates an inevitable 
political situation where each art form must justify its relevance and significance to the 
culture at the direct fiscal expense of the other forms. Feature film is undeniably mass 
entertainment, so the ‘just entertainment’ narrative suits other art forms that can position 
themselves, despite their smaller audiences, as providers of a more significant cultural 
experience. These tend to be battles between what has been traditionally regarded as high and 
low culture, and since both proponents and detractors of mainstream narrative film tend to 
push the same low-cultural conception of the practice, the conception has widespread 
currency. However, it is a highly flawed conception for a variety of reasons. 
This is not to deny the significance of entertainment in mainstream filmmaking 
practice. It would be false to state that films have nothing to do with entertainment, in the 
same way it would be false to state that chess-playing has nothing to do with entertainment. 
Entertainment is a key element in the practice of mainstream narrative filmmaking, but it is 
not foundational, and therefore not the internal good of the practice. 
To demonstrate this requires a re-examination the central thesis: that the internal good 
of making mainstream narrative feature films is to move the audience to a worthwhile 
conclusion in a worthwhile way. ‘Worthwhile’ is the crucial concept in this context. As 
pointed out in the discussion of Terrence Malick in Chapter 3, a worthwhile argument is one 
worth making – an edifying argument. Making an argument in a worthwhile way invokes the 
virtues of honesty, courage, justice, creative generosity and compassion. It invokes a 
methodology whereby a screenwriter and director would not choose to manipulate an 
audience dishonestly, even if it brings them to a conclusion that they believe to be just. Now, 
could the concept of entertainment be included the thesis’ conception of the worthwhile?  
	 83	
Robert McKee, a best-selling industry screenwriting ‘guru’ whose ideas the study will 
interrogate in further detail in the following chapter, certainly believes so, “…all fine films, 
novels and plays, through all the shades of the comic and tragic, entertain when they give the 
audience a fresh model of life empowered with an affective meaning,” (McKee, 1998, p. 12). 
The idea also has support from a less likely source: producer of action film blockbusters such 
as Lethal Weapon (Donner, 1987) and Die Hard (McTiernan, 1988), Joel Silver. Quoted in 
Cinema Entertainment: Essays on Audiences, Films and Film Makers (Lovell & Sergi, 2009), 
Silver comments: 
 
Why do you perceive Lethal Weapon as a lesser movie? Why is it lesser than 
something else – because it doesn’t have a message? The message is entertainment, 
that’s what our movies are about, entertainment. But they are also socially conscious 
films… 
(Lovell & Sergi, 2009, p. 95) 
 
The answer is that it is certainly possible to view entertainment as a worthwhile endeavour, 
even part of worthwhile filmic storytelling – even a desired part of filmic storytelling – yet it 
is ultimately not a necessary part.   
This is shown by various well-known mainstream narrative feature films that have 
been embraced by academics, critics and audiences and have had a strong cultural impact, but 
are not ‘entertaining’. One of the biggest successes of 1993 was Schindlers List (Spielberg, 
1993), the story an industrialist and war profiteer, Oskar Schindler, who had a change of heart 
and used his profits to rescue Jews destined for the death camps. It is an undeniably 
confronting and brutal film. Its aim is not to generate pleasure in an audience, but to move 
and edify them. It is an absorbing, engaging and interesting film certainly; but not one that 
seeks to delight its audience. Using the definition above, it is a film that can be appreciated, 
revered and understood to have had a positive impact on the viewer overall, but not one that is 
designed to bring joy at the time of viewing. Amour (Haneke, 2012) is another such film, an 
anti-sentimental drama about age, suffering commitment and involuntary euthanasia.  
On the other end of the filmmaking spectrum, to demonstrate the second reason the 
‘just entertainment’ narrative is disingenuous, it is useful to bring in two genres of narrative 
feature film: one that sits on the fringes of the scope of this study, another that is outright 
excluded by the ‘deemed releasable’ section of the definition of a mainstream narrative 
feature film: exploitation and pornographic films.  
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The full definition of a mainstream narrative feature film for this study is one that is a 
fictional story that runs between 65-300 minutes where a series of events unfold usually with 
obvious causal connections and typically with the same group of characters, intended to be 
seen in one sitting requiring continuous attention from the audience and deemed releasable to 
the general public by current established feature film distribution companies (both multiplex 
and art-house).   
This is deliberately a very wide definition of mainstream narrative feature films, but 
puts exploitation on the borderline of the definition and pornography beyond its scope as 
pornographic films are usually not releasable to the general public by current established 
multiplex and art-house feature film distribution companies.  
The definition of both genres is somewhat fluid but Rolling Stone magazine provides a 
good working general definition of exploitation films as ones that are “tawdry exercises in 
catering to audiences’ primal urges,” (Fear, Geist, Grierson, Grow & Hynes, 2015). Famous 
examples of this genre, which had it’s heyday in the 1970’s pre-VHS era, were films such as 
the women-in-prison film Big Bird Cage (Hill, 1972) and violent crime thriller Sweet 
Sweetback’s Baadasssss Song (Peebles, 1971), the latter of which belongs to the subcategory 
of Blaxploitation, exploitation films featuring mainly African-American casts. Exploitation 
films clearly prioritize sensationalist and extreme renditions of sex, violence and often sexual 
violence over all other artistic considerations. This is of course a highly subjective area, but 
often the title and marketing of the films themselves give a strong indicator as to creative 
priority. A film entitled ‘Big Bird Cage’ with half-naked females on the poster is likely to be 
an exploitation picture, although this is by no means a conclusive test as the typical film 
practitioner has no control over how a film is marketed.   
Contemporary filmmakers such as Quentin Tarantino were so influenced by what they 
termed ‘Grindhouse’ films (‘Grindhouse’ was the term used to describe a cinema that showed 
mostly exploitation films) that he, along with fellow Miramax filmmaker Robert Rodriguez, 
made two pastiche exploitation films in 2007 to be released as a double-feature under the joint 
name of ‘Grindhouse’, although they were also released separately as Death Proof (Tarantino, 
2007) and Planet Terror (Rodriguez, 2007). These ‘modern’ exploitation films should not be 
confused with the traditional exploitation films as they are postmodern, self-referential works 
that in no way are as extreme in their treatment of sex and violence as their original referents, 
and therefore meet the ‘deemed releasable’ clause in the definition of mainstream narrative 
feature films. 
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An official, global definition of pornographic narrative feature films does not exist, 
and in fact the definition of what is pornographic in any media is delegated to the courts under 
obscenity laws. The Australian Classification Board (ACB) has a specific X18+ classification 
that is “a special and legally restricted category which contains only sexually explicit content. 
That is, material which shows actual sexual intercourse and other sexual activity between 
consenting adults,” (Australian Classification Board, 2019). Like exploitation films, 
pornographic narrative feature films can be defined as prioritizing scenes of actual sexual 
intercourse over all other artistic considerations. These films are only deemed releasable by 
specialist, non-mainstream film distributors.  
Exploitation and pornographic films are relevant here as they are both narrative 
feature films that place the concept of ‘entertainment’ of the audience front-and-centre of the 
cinematic experience. Both genres aim to bring amusement and joy to the viewer, be it 
fetishistic or more conventionally sexual. However, the terms ‘pornographer’ and 
‘exploitation filmmaker’ are pejorative terms. It would be highly unlikely that anyone 
inspired by the magic of cinema to become a practitioner aspires, one day, to be a 
pornographer.  
If the internal good of mainstream narrative feature films was simply to entertain, then 
pornographers and exploitation filmmakers would not be seen as separate to the mainstream 
film culture. This indicates that something else is at work within the tradition, which is more 
than simply bringing delight to an audience.  
This leads to a third rebuttal to the ‘just entertainment’ conception: put simply, there 
are far easier ways to entertain than making often hugely expensive and complex narrative 
feature films. If an individual wishes to entertain an audience they can tell a joke. They can be 
a magician, an illusionist an equestrian in a circus. They can write a short story, a novella or a 
novel that just requires themselves and perhaps an editor. In the world of moving pictures, 
they don’t have to go so far as exploitation or pornography, instead making cat videos which 
routinely get millions of hits on video sharing sites, although perhaps admittedly, not for 
ninety uninterrupted minutes. These are all more straightforward ways to entertain, so if the 
attraction, the desire, the vocation is to be a mainstream narrative feature film storyteller, then 
there is something else at work. 
Finally, film industry lobbyists undermine the ‘just entertainment’ conception as a 
matter of policy. National screen bodies such as Screen Australia or the British Film Institute 
give the global ‘film industry’ something of a split-personality: as the study has noted, when 
it comes to the impact specifically of violence on screen on the public, the influence of 
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narrative feature film is argued to be negligible by all stakeholders; when it comes to public 
funding the cultural impact of the form is demonstrated to be substantial. In fact, a 2011 
Screen Australia report highlights the fact that 79 percent of the Australian public agreed that 
Australian screen stories are vital for contributing to their sense of Australian national identity 
(Screen Australia, 2011). 
 
4.3 Just telling stories 
 
A second popular conception of the internal good of the practice, is what on the surface seems 
to be another attempt to minimize the cultural impact of the practice by reducing the 
complexity of not simply narrative filmic practice, but the practice of all storytellers in all 
media. This can be called the “we’re storytellers: we just tell stories” approach.  
“We just tell stories” is a particularly common phrase amongst narrative feature film 
practitioners and is used in a variety of contexts. It is not always used defensively to close 
down further thought or investigation. Sometimes, as in the case of Oscar-winning 
screenwriter and director Robert Zemekis (Forrest Gump, 1994), it is used to conflate the 
writer/director roles. As Zemekis puts it: “this idea of a director and a writer is only created 
by the unions and the guilds, because we’re both just storytellers and we’re making this film 
as a collaborative thing,” (Mellor, 2015). Other times, such as in the case of screenwriter and 
director Darren Aronofsky, it is used to highlight the visual element of the medium. 
Aronofsky says “we’re not just storytellers, we’re visual storytellers,” (Aronofsky, 2015). The 
claim is also made in a reductive sense. For example, the Australian actor, screenwriter and 
director Mel Gibson claims “we’re all just storytellers, right?” (Belloni and Galloway, 2016). 
Taken at face value, the claim that ‘storytellers just tell stories’ is so reductive it does 
not appear to even qualify as an alternative conception of the internal good of the practice. It 
reads simply as a tautology. Nonetheless, the claim can be brought into conflict with the film 
as argument thesis the study defends. Discussing this issue will allow the study to position the 
central thesis within wider theories of narratology, theories that are not necessarily restricted 
to mainstream narrative feature films. 
First these terms need qualifying: namely what do mean by ‘stories’ and 
‘storytelling’? ‘Story’ is a particularly fluid term. As with much terminology used in the 
creative industries (industries that have only limited technical jargon inaccessible to the 
general public) there are ordinary language, industrial and academic usages that diverge 
significantly. The Oxford English Dictionary gives two relevant definitions for ‘story’. The 
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first is ‘an account of imaginary or real people and events told for entertainment,’ the second, 
‘a plot or storyline’. So, to the common observer, the terms ‘story’, ‘plot’ and ‘storyline’ are 
all synonymous (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989).  
The academic discipline of narratology offers much more precise definitions for these 
terms, but they sometimes conflict with their ordinary language usage, especially when it 
comes to the distinction between ‘story’ and ‘plot.’ Jonathan Culler (2001) goes so far to state 
that narratology is: 
 
[U]nited in the recognition that narrative theory requires a distinction between "story," 
a sequence of actions or events conceived as independent of their manifestation in 
discourse, and "discourse," the discursive presentation or narration of events. 
       (Culler, 2001, p. 189)  
 
As with many theories concerned with story and performance, the origins of narratology can 
be traced back to Aristotle’s Poetics (Halliwell and Aristotle, 1998). A collection of early 
twentieth-century Russian theorists known collectively as the Russian formalists created the 
discipline. Vladimir Propp is perhaps the most prominent member of the group. It must be 
noted that Russian formalists never came to a consensus other than over that fact that poetic 
and practical language were distinct entities worthy of theorisation.  
Narratology is founded on the distinctions between ‘story’ and ‘storytelling’. In fact, 
Narrative, the official journal of the International Society for the Study of Narrative, is 
specifically interested in the powers and limits of story-discourse distinction (Narrative, 
2019). Two key concepts in narratology are those of the fabula and the syuzhet. These terms 
are also somewhat fluid, so for clarity this study will use Bordwell’s definitions: 
 
These two terms have been used in several ways, but the most plausible way, it 
seemed to me then and seems still, is to see fabula as the chronological-causal string 
of events that may be presented by the syuzhet, the configuration of events in the 
narrative text as we have it.  
                                                                                                              (Bordwell, 2011) 
 
Therefore for narratologists ‘story’ is fabula and ‘storytelling’ is syuzhet. Another synonym 
narratologists use for storytelling is ‘narrative’ although this is also used by the casual user to 
mean ‘story’, ‘storytelling’ and ‘plot.’ (And note that it is again a different and more specific 
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definition of the term ‘narrative’ than is used in this thesis when it is used to define 
‘mainstream narrative feature films’).  
In an important sense, a ‘story’ is something that can never be reached. Once there is 
an attempt to specify it, it is not story but storytelling, syuzhet and narrative. Story is an 
abstract object in logical space; only a representation of the story can be given, not the story 
itself, communicated via the encoding process of the storytelling. However, as Bordwell 
points out (2011), the reconstituting of the story in the head of the audience member 
during/after the telling is highly imperfect.  
To return momentarily to the alternative conception of the practice of filmmaking as 
simply a matter of telling stories – it is now possible to distinguish two versions, depending 
on the agent making the claim. A practitioner, professional or otherwise, with no knowledge 
of narrative theory will still be able to claim the general ‘we’re storytellers, we just tell 
stories,’ whereas the narratologist would be claiming the more specific ‘we are fabula-tellers, 
we just present narrative”.   
However, having its origins in linguistic study, narratology is by no means the only 
approach to an investigation of ‘story’. Another branch of investigation and analysis is that of 
comparative mythology exemplified by Joseph Campbell. In his major work Hero of a 
Thousand Faces (2004), Campbell compares myths from various cultures and historical 
periods in order to assess similarities or points of difference. Unlike the more limited scope of 
narratology, comparative mythology allows for an attempt to understand why human beings 
tell stories (or to use the narratological terms, why human beings narrate fabulas). 
In his book, Into the Woods: A Five Act Journey into Story (2015) John Yorke takes 
both a narratological and comparative approach to storytelling across most popular forms 
although, being the former head of Channel Four Drama and Controller of BBC Drama 
Production in the UK, he defaults mainly to film and television. He posits seven different and 
distinct reasons as to why human beings tell stories:  
 
1. The Societal Reason: storytelling is at some level about learning and thus the story is a 
blueprint for human survival. If societies survive by adaptation, rejecting orthodoxy and 
embracing change then by use of archetype stories are a codification of this process: “a map 




2. The Rehearsal Reason: “Stories allow us to understand and navigate a strange and alien 
world… By rehearsing situations… in fictional form we grow more adept at understanding, 
coping with and resolving them in real life too,” (Yorke, 2015, p. 206). 
 
3. The Healing Reason: “It’s possible to feed any flaw into the archetype and resolve it during 
the course of a story, so clearly at some level stories offer a model for overcoming faults – a 
paradigm, if you like, for healing,” (Yorke, 2015, p. 206). 
 
4. The Information Retrieval Reason: Here Yorke quotes Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a scholar 
who specializes in randomness and risk analysis, “The more orderly, less random, patterned 
and narratized a series of words or symbols, the easier it is to store that series in one’s mind”. 
Essentially, the story becomes an epistemic database (cited in Yorke, 2015, p. 207). 
 
5.  The Panacea Reason: Stories to provide hope. Yorke states that “Such an addition is an 
extreme form of making order out of chaos… It makes reality palatable and digestible – it 
gives it meaning”. (Yorke, 2015, p. 207) 
 
6. The Procreation Reason: Yorke sites the sheer prevalence of stories that “end in sexual 
union and/or its symbolic manifestation in marriage,” indicate a function to “provide a 
template for healthy procreation,” (Yorke, 2015, p. 207).  
 
7. The Psychological Reason: Based more specifically on Jungian psychology, this reason is 
yet another ‘how to’ guide for the human condition. This states that humans have to be 
psychologically balanced in order to achieve fulfilment: “Certainly the conflict between ego-
driven desire and the deeper flaw-ridden id or need is at the heart of the archetype, and it is 
this that suggests Jung may offer us one of the best explanations for story… To Jung, mental 
health lay in balancing the contradictory elements within… an individual integrating wisdom 
from a mentor, femininity/masculinity from a love interest and missing flaws from an 
antagonist,” (Yorke, 2015, p. 209).  
 
It must be stated that Yorke’s primary focus is to defend his thesis that five-act structure is the 
‘true’ structure of storytelling – not the dominant three-act paradigm – and he examines the 
‘why’ of storytelling in order to expose an explanation for this dominant shape. Although he 
uses the caveat that “Anyone who pronounces with certainty one concrete reason for 
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storytelling faces obloquy”, he does eventually settle (if not with certainty) on one 
overarching reason that incorporates the others. It is based on the psychological reason and 
can be stated as: we tell stories to impose order on the world.  
In this way, all storytelling (filmic or otherwise) is an exercise of existential control. 
The horror of meaningless existence is to too difficult to bear, so we use stories to find 
patterns, order and meaning in our existence. Yorke talks about the “need to confer shape” 
from book to bathroom towel arranging (p. 213).  
This again invokes the concepts of fabula (story) and syuzhet (narrative): “Ordering is 
an act of perception, and it is this action that gives us narrative, rhetoric, drama… 
Storytelling, then is the dramatization of the process of knowledge assimilation”. In fact, 
Yorke goes much further to claim that “Drama, therefore, mimics the way the brain 
assimilates knowledge, which is why it’s identical to both legal argument and the basic essay 
structure we’re taught at school… It is why theme is essential and why it arises unbidden 
from any work. Consciously or unconsciously, all drama is an argument with reality in which 
a conclusion is drawn and reality tamed,” (Yorke, 2015, pp. 214-215).  
Yorke is using a slightly different conception of ‘argument’ to this particular study. 
Argument with reality implies very specifically that the truths, subjective or otherwise, within 
the story are at odds with reality as experienced and is not the same as ‘an assertion and 
reasons to believe such assertion.’ However, elsewhere he does reference a closer conception 
of argument in that “All dramas are arguments about the nature of the world,” (Yorke, 2015, 
p. 194).  
Yorke throws yet another both common and specialist lexis into the mix – ‘drama’ – 
and defines it in terms of storytelling (narrative/syuzhet) and knowledge (story/fabula). Yorke 
is making an ontological claim here, so it is necessary to convert it into a thesis of a norm that 
categorizes the practice. To align the terminology within the ‘storytellers just tell stories’ 
structure, Yorke is stating that ‘we’re knowledge dramatizers: we just dramatize knowledge 
assimilation.”   
This makes Yorke’s point-of-view is closely aligned with the film-as-worthwhile-
argument central thesis of this study, although it must be stated that he is not claiming that the 
internal good of the practice is worthwhile argument. In fact, it is a side observation used to 
justify his championing of a five-act structure in drama. It does not have to be as all-
encompassing as all drama in all forms, but could ‘knowledge-assimilation dramatization’ be 
a viable alternative conception of the internal good of the practice of mainstream narrative 
feature filmmaking? It is certainly feasible, but as was explored in Chapter 2, there is an issue 
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with knowledge as the fundamental target of filmmaking practice. The aspiration is simply 
not a realistic target within the confines of mainstream narrative feature film. A mainstream 
narrative feature film argument is concerned with reasoned opinion of ideas plausible and 
significant, something the definition of knowledge does not accommodate. It is not outside 
the realms of probability that some of the plausible and significant assertions may at some 
point qualify as knowledge, but that is not under the epistemic control of the practitioner(s). 
To be fair, Yorke does not clarify precisely what he means by ‘knowledge’. But an argument 
to convince others of an opinion (which may not be held as certainly true, even by the author) 
need not be aimed at knowledge, given any reasonable conception of knowledge. In this way, 
Yorke’s thesis departs dramatically from the central thesis here. Arguments are in the 
business of reasonable persuasion; they neither need to constitute, nor aspire to knowledge 
production. The conception of ‘worthwhile’ argument in this thesis does not hold itself to the 
high standard of producing knowledge as such.  
Another objection is to Yorke’s ontological claim that all drama can be reduced to 
simple general principles. This reductivism negates the idea that different forms have critical 
nuances with different traditions and internal good(s) that may not be compatible with any 
central unifying claim. The thesis is not making claims about all drama, but a very specific 
form of narrative. This specificity is crucial as there are many ways of telling stories that are 
not suited to mainstream narrative feature film. One example is The Odyssey (Homer, 1997). 
Noted as a classic of literature, it should be highly surprising that there have been no 
significant film adaptations of the complete work in the history of mainstream narrative 
feature filmmaking. The most significant attempt was a 1930’s set reinterpretation by the 
Coen Brothers entitled O Brother, Where Art Thou (Coen, 2000), but it was the structure that 
was subsumed, with other elements only very loosely inspired by the original text. The central 
thesis of this study does not make the claim that the internal good of the television soap opera 
is ‘worthwhile argument in a worthwhile way’. This form, due to its endless nature and the 
inevitable constant turnover of practitioners during the life of the production means that the 
idea of these shows being formed as any kind of argument is nonsensical, in precisely the 
same way that an endless argument that never reaches a conclusion is nonsensical: it is not 
rational to form a tradition around a self-defeating principle.  
The ‘we’re storytellers: we just tell stories’ alternative conception, even if the study 
takes the most challenging interpretation possible, does not constitute a successful objection 
to the central thesis. Filmmakers tell stories, but not any stories. What distinguishes the stories 
central to mainstream narrative filmmaking, from other stories? Since entertainment doesn't 
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distinguish the class, and knowledge production aims too high for the class, the most 
plausible alternative seems to be argument. Stories must have a point, not just a structure. A 
point to a story, is a conclusion. And a worthwhile way to establish a conclusion is to argue 
for it. However, there is one remaining alternative way of distinguishing the stories of 
mainstream narrative filmmaking. It is emotional manipulation: filmmaking aims to tell 
stories that move people.  
 
4.4 Emotional Manipulation 
 
“It’s a punch. It’s a total punch”. This quote is from an interview from screenwriter/director 
Darren Aronofsky in defence of his film mother! (2017), which had become only one of 11 
films in the history of western cinema to receive an ‘F’ rating by Cinemascore, a review 
aggregator in existence since 1978 which polls cinemagoers on the first night of release 
(Shanley, 2017).  
 
We wanted to make a punk movie and come at you. And the reason I wanted to come 
is because I was very sad and I had a lot of anguish and I wanted to express it… So I 
wanted to howl. And this was my howl. And some people are not going to want to 
listen to it. That’s cool. 
      (Aronofsky, cited in Hooton, 2017)  
 
This point of view was front-and-centre in the reviews of the film. Owen Gleiberman, Chief 
Film Critics of Variety commented:  
 
If the only thing we wanted, or expected, a horror film to do was to get a rise out of 
you – to make your eyes widen and your jaw drop, to leave you in breathless chortling 
spasms of WTF disbelief – then Darren Aronofsky’s “mother!” would have to be 
reckoned with as some sort of masterpiece. As it is, the movie… is far from a 
masterpiece. It’s more like a dazzlingly skilful machine of virtual reality designed to 
get nothing but a rise out of you. It’s a baroque nightmare that’s about nothing but 





Embedded within this quote are the implicit cultural opinions that (a) horror films are about 
more than getting a rise out of you, (b) virtual reality is just about getting a rise out of you and 
(c) films need to be about more than just themselves, even if a section of the audience may 
not believe they require it.  
But is Gleiberman correct? If he concedes that a significant section of the audience are 
happy to be (to use Aronofsky’s parlance) merely ‘punched’, could that not be conceived to 
be a potential internal good of the practice? To develop the idea further, is it a viable 
conception that rather than attempting worthwhile argument, what practitioners are actually 
trying to do is to simply tell emotionally charged and moving stories? 
	
Emotional Charge 
An academic who works in this area is French film theorist, Martine Beugnet. In her book 
Cinema and Sensation: French Film and the Art of Transgression (2007) Beugnet coined the 
term ‘cinema of sensation’ when looking the release of a successive series of French 
mainstream narrative feature films that clearly prioritize the form’s capability to impact the 
emotions and the senses, namely (English title in parentheses) Baise Moi (Rape Me) 
(Despentes & Trinh Thi, 2000), Demonlover (Assayas, 2002), Lady Chatterley (Ferran, 
2006), Romance (Breillat, 1999) and Venredi Soir (Friday Night) (Denis, 2002), amongst 
others. Beugnet prioritized the visceral element of the films but the investigation still 
examined the works as intersections between the intellectual and the somatic. (In fact, 
Beugnet considers film as ‘embodied thought’ (2008), a concept compatible with the film-as-
argument central thesis). Obviously Beugnet is making ontological rather than 
methodological claims, but her work still opens the way to an academic defence of an 
emotionally charged sensation-led cinema.  
Some objections to this conception of internal goods are identical to those rebutting 
the idea of cinema as purely entertainment. If simple emotional manipulation is the internal 
good of the practice there are many easier ways to perform the same function, all of which are 
less time consuming, expensive or difficult to control as the creation of mainstream narrative 
feature film. This returns us to in no particular order, exploitation film, pornography and cat 
videos.  
In addition, to use the surrounding discourses as indications of internal goods, the fact 
that Aronofsky is having to strenuously defend and justify his conception of his film to critics 
and audiences alike can be taken as a strong signifier that untethered emotional impact is not 
the tradition of the practice. 
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We will return to further objections at the close of the chapter, yet this is not to say 
that there is no merit to the underlying concept. Emotional engagement is a key strength of 
cinematic storytelling, so is there any other conceivable scenario where this functions as the 
internal good?  
 
Desire Satisfaction 
Taking a cue from John Yorke, who takes a fractal approach to storytelling analysis by 
arguing that scene structure mirrors overall film structure (2015, chapter 6), can the internal 
good of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking be viewed as nothing more than desire-
satisfaction? There is a critical difference between being moved and having a desire satisfied, 
but is this distinction decisive? 
As further chapters will explore, it is received wisdom that most individual scenes 
within a film set up a desire or desires-to-be-satisfied, be they significant or trivial (Bordwell, 
Thompson and Smith, 2018, p. 59). This relates back to common concepts of all film scenes 
requiring if not conflict, then constant tension (Mackendrick, 2004, p. 11). Films are often 
referred to as fantasy, in fact the oft-used term ‘Hollywoodization’ refers explicitly to the 
glamorization of any subject matter, so can the wish-fulfilment element not be the point of 
mainstream cinematic storytelling? Can the internal good of mainstream narrative feature 
films be the practice of setting up and then satisfying desire?  
This conception carries weight and brings with it all the work of the psychoanalytic 
film theory. As this study is not explicitly concerned with the construction of the viewer 
within the practice (and, by definition, the viewer is not a practitioner), it is beyond the scope 
of this study to give a full assessment as to the validity of such a significant area of film study, 
but the most influential ideas will be noted to give weight to the theory of internal goods. 
Many of Freud’s concepts were used in the construction of psychoanalytic film theory, 
namely the id, ego, superego, Oedipal complex, narcissism, the unconscious, hysteria and 
castration (Falzon, 2002, p. 56). For purposes of this study, it is not relevant whether the 
audience desire is perceived as conscious or unconscious, merely that the internal good of the 
practice is to satisfy it. There are many variations in such a wide field of study, but most film 
psychoanalytic theories are based around the idea of the ‘incomplete’ audience becoming 
symbolically complete through the experience of watching the film, be it through a process of 
identification (Metz, 1982, pp. 42-56), or by positioning all viewers as male and creating the 
female as the object of desire (Mulvey, 1975). Mulvey brought the Freudian term 
‘scopophilia’ (pleasure from looking) into the academic mainstream and with it the very 
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specific sexual connotations of erotic pleasure from looking at the cinematic image. In this 
way, the film does not even have to set up the desire in order to satisfy it – if there is the 
desire to look, it is a pre-existing desire that the looking-at-film satisfies simply by the act of 
display.  
These conscious/unconscious desires can be frivolous or significant and can function 
as simple wish-fulfilment or psychological need. An audience member will pick a given film 
for its palette of desires: to live life as a pilot; to get the girl/boy; or to have power over 
anyone – the list is quite literally endless. Genre can be viewed in this way, the 
social/financial contract that certain desires will be fulfilled by the close of the narrative. In a 
romantic comedy, the couple will be formed, in a conventional action thriller good will 
overcome evil.  
This latter idea of a thematic goal to be satisfied lies at the heart of why the idea of 
desire-satisfaction cannot be the internal good of the practice. Desire-satisfaction may be a 
key storytelling method, but unlike Yorke and act structure, it cannot be extended to include 
the practice as a whole. If the internal good was simply about desire-satisfaction, then the 
practice would have evolved into essentially an anti-art practice – the training not so much 
about a practitioner ‘finding their voice’ as about finding ways to pander to the audience. 
Those lionized in the practice would not be directors such as Terrence Malick, but directors 
such as Michael Bay, director of high-budget action films such as Transformers (2007) and 
Pearl Harbor (2001). Discourses surrounding screenwriter and director Jordan Peele and his 
horror film Get Out (2017) demonstrate quite clearly that he has not become one of the hottest 
properties in Hollywood because his film simply delivered genre expectations, but also 
successfully and elegantly delivered a difficult truth regarding race relations in America 
(Keegan, 2017).  
Using a more extended case study, perhaps the most ‘pure’ genre as relates to desire-
satisfaction is the ‘whodunnit’: the crime (usually a murder) is set up at the start, creating with 
it a desire to know who committed it. This desire must sustain the complete running time of 
the film, when at the end the identity of the criminal or criminals are revealed and their 
motivations laid bare. Few, if any, whodunnits in cinematic history fail to reveal the 
perpetrators at the close. That is not the say that all loose ends are tied up, The Big Sleep 
(Hawks, 1946) is a famous example of this (Wigley, 2016) but the solving of the puzzle in the 
key joy of the experience – be it in literary or cinematic form. 
The whodunnit is the most successful literary genre of all time. Agatha Christie (1890-
1976) worked almost exclusively in this genre and is the best-selling author who ever lived 
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with an estimated minimum of 2 billion books sold (de Bruxelles, 2005), a figure only 
potentially matched or surpassed by Shakespeare and the Bible.  
So, if (a) the internal good of the practice is desire-satisfaction, (b) the whodunnit by 
the nature of the genre has to create a particularly strong single desire to sustain a feature-
length running time, (c) the literary whodunnits are the best-selling genre of all time and (d) 
Agatha Christie is the best-selling whodunnit author of all time, then this introduces the 
question as to why most practitioners are not attempting to make whodunnits, why are 
whodunnit practitioners not canonized by the discourses surrounding mainstream narrative 
feature film, and by extension, why are not most financially successful films whodunnits? 
The answer is that desire-satisfaction is not enough. As of writing, the most successful 
whodunnit of all time Murder on the Orient Express (Branagh, 2017) has made just under 
US$352 million at the international box office, from a $55 million budget. The highest 
grossing film of all time is Avengers: Endgame (Russo & Russo, 2019) with nearly US$2.8 
billion (Boxofficemojo.com, 2019). There is not a whodunnit in the top 50 grossing films as 
of 2019. A reasonable objection to this would be that whodunnits simply satisfy the wrong 
desire, that mainstream narrative feature films set up various specific desires and finding out 
‘who did it’ is not one with widespread appeal. This might explain the lack of grosses, but 
does not fully account for the discourses surrounding the genre. Whodunnits are not seen as 
‘prestige pictures’; they do not win significant awards for direction or screenwriting, have 
never won a best picture American Academy Award (Murray, 2017) and are viewed at the 
low end in the hierarchy of genre.  
There seems to be a public admission as to the problem of adapting Agatha Christie to 
the screen in how the films are cast. Murder on the Orient Express is arguably the most 
famous work by the bestselling author of all time. With underlying intellectual property of 
this strength, this should make any resulting film non-cast dependent, in that the film should 
‘work’ with any cast as the heavy marketing weight is being done by the author and the genre. 
Spielberg films are good examples of this. For most of his career his name alone did the 
heavy lifting, and he didn’t work with ‘A’ list stars until Catch Me if You Can (2002). Ready 
Player One (2018) is cast with relative unknowns. Yet in both feature film versions of the 
book (Lumet, 1974 and Branagh, 2017) the cast has been quite literally packed full of stars: 
Albert Finney, Richard Widmark, Sean Connery, Lauren Bacall, Anthony Perkins, John 
Gielgud, Michael York, Vanessa Redgrave and Ingrid Bergman in the former and Johnny 
Depp, Penelope Cruz, Daisy Ridley, Dame Judi Dench, Sir Derek Jacobi and Willem Defoe in 
the latter. This inevitably betrays a lack of confidence in the source material. Stars are 
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expensive and are only used when absolutely required – and it is also worthy of note that 
Knives Out (2019), an Agatha Christie pastiche is cast similarly, this time with Daniel Craig, 
Chris Evans, Jamie Lee Curtis, Toni Collette, Christopher Plummer, Lakeith Stanfield and 
Don Johnson filling out the ensemble. This use of stars as a form of ‘insurance’ is something 
that will be examined in more detail in Chapter 6. 
Finally, to illustrate further why desire-satisfaction is not the internal good of the 
form, imagine that, as a viewer, once you have seen the set-up of the crime and the suspects 
have been laid out in front of you, you skipped directly to the ‘reveal’ part at the end of the 
film. Your desire would be sated without having to watch most of the middle of the film. (It 
must be noted that most Sherlock Holmes short stories are structured like this (Conan Doyle, 
1930). In the first half of the narrative, the mystery is laid out in front of Holmes and the 
second half comprises Holmes telling Watson how he solved it). In this way, it is highly 
unlikely that the internal good of mainstream narrative feature film would be based around a 
concept that allows for removal of most of the narrative yet still remain a satisfying 
experience.  
To conclude, desire-satisfaction is certainly a key technique when constructing a 
mainstream narrative feature film, but it should not be mistaken for the internal good. 
However, emotional manipulation provides one final challenge to the thesis, as it is possible 
to combine both emotional punch and desire-satisfaction. Does this fusion provide a more 
valid alternate conception?  
Films that typify ‘emotionally-charged desire’ are those that are able to provoke an 
audience to really care about something (usually the fate of a character), then continually 
build the desire through obstacles before finding an emotionally fitting way of satisfying that 
desire. Successful examples of this are pure revenge films such as both volumes of Kill Bill 
(Tarantino, 2003 & 2004). However, there is a reason revenge films are also a staple sub-
genre of exploitation films (of which Meir Zarchi’s 1978 I Spit on Your Grave is a prime 
example) as although they might satisfy an emotionally-charged desire they are thematically 
shallow, instead prioritizing the mechanics of the reprisal.  
A film such as the aforementioned Schindler’s List also conforms to the emotionally-
charged desire-satisfaction model, and is far removed any hint of exploitation. Yet although 
the film creates a powerful emotional desire – for Schindler’s workers to be protected and 
rescued – that is duly satisfied, the value of the film is not purely in the rescue. A scenario 
where the workers were buried in a mudslide and Schindler successfully supervised their 
extraction, would likely result in a lesser film.  
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The final category of films that undermine emotionally-charged desire-satisfaction as 
a viable internal good are those lauded cases of mainstream narrative feature films that 
provide neither significant emotional charge, nor desire-satisfaction. These examples are less 
common, but films such as Martin Scorsese’s, Raging Bull (1980), Taxi Driver (1976) and 
The Irishman (2019), operate as Sinnerbrink (2018) outlined, by invoking ambivalence and 
moral cognitive dissonance. The films do not provide any characters the audience are invited 
to root for, instead choosing to focus on compelling situations, minimizing any desires as to 
individual fates. Yet these films are certainly mainstream, embraced by audiences and critics 
alike, and are capable of making coherent arguments. Badlands (Malick, 1973), analysed in 
depth in Chapter 3, is another such example. 
As with all the alternative conceptions that have been examined here, desire-
satisfaction, whether or not tethered to emotional charge, is susceptible to the ‘why’ question. 
Why tell emotionally charged and moving stories? Why set up desires to be satisfied? For 
what purpose? Whether it is to entertain or help dramatize knowledge-assimilation, it does not 
categorise the practice as a whole – a film that attempt only to do this would be by definition 
an empty experience. To return to Darren Aronofsky, his film “howl” may have satisfied his 
own desire, but the story did not impact in any significant or meaningful sense. The audience 
may have been provoked emotionally, but not in the service of anything larger than the 
sensation itself. It demonstrates that it is not enough to simply move the audience, it is 
necessary to move them somewhere worthwhile. Emotional manipulation in both its forms is 
also susceptible to the usual objections outlined in this chapter, in that it is an internal good 
far simpler achieved using a myriad of other forms storytelling or otherwise; essentially there 




This chapter has provided an account of the most prevalent conceptions of the internal goods 
of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking, as articulated by industry practitioners and 
commentators. These conceptions all challenged the central thesis, and have been 
demonstrated to be, although in some cases highly desirable, inadequate or unnecessary and 
therefore not definitive of the practice overall. 
 This leaves a final pertinent question: Why just one internal good? In the same way 
that different genres clearly pursue different goods (comedies to make us laugh, horrors to 
scare), could there not be a series of goods, all equally valid that combine to define the 
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traditions of the practice? The answer involves recourse to dominant industry thought, which 




Dominant Theories of Professional 
Screenwriting and Directing 
 
Chapter 2 was comprised largely of a non-traditional literature review examining the major 
academic debates concerning film as philosophical argument in order to build a case for 
mainstream narrative feature film’s ability to argue by a less stringent definition of the 
concept. This chapter is a more traditional literature review in that it will give a sense of the 
field of incumbent professional thinking as a whole before focusing key dominant texts, 
synthesising the key ideas relevant to this study and noting the significant gap in knowledge 
that further builds the case for the film-as-argument thesis. 
 
5.1 The Writing Gurus: Incumbent Thinking for Industry Screenwriters 
 
There are two distinct parts to constructing a feature film: the construction of the screenplay 
and the construction of the film itself. Whilst there is much overlap, the skills base required to 
complete these tasks are quite different and require very different methodologies. Like any 
construction, a blueprint is required, and the screenplay can be most pragmatically thought of 
as simply “a map to a story” (Fisher, 2005).  
Due to the high odds against any given screenplay reaching production in the 
mainstream sector, the screenwriting profession is predominantly a freelance one and, “a 
support industry of manual-writing – the ‘how to become a successful screenwriter’ book – 
has grown up,” (Macdonald, 2013, p. 18). These books can be highly influential in 
articulating the orthodoxies of the screenwriting process, indicating the overall doxa – the 
received wisdom of screenwriting – that informs individual micro-judgements on technique. 
However, between 2007-2012 there were more than 100 new books on screenwriting alone 
accessioned into the US Library of Congress (Brenes, 2014), so it is critical a way is found to 
isolate the most influential texts. 
In her 2014 paper, Gurus and Oscar Winners: How-To Screenwriting Manuals in the 
New Cultural Economy, Bridget Conor lists “a representative sample of popular and classic 
manuals”, namely screenwriting manuals. The list is compiled as part of a “broader 
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qualitative research project involving labor market analysis, interviews and observations of 
screenwriting as labor, practice, and pedagogy,” (Conor, 2014, p. 125). Conor splits her list 
into two-tiers of guru, first-tier for canonical individuals/texts, second-tier for significant but 
less widespread influencers.  
The top five, as defined by the sales figures of their most famous works, are: 
 
1. Story (1998) by Robert McKee 
2. The Writer’s Journey (1998) by Christopher Vogler 
3. How to Make a Good Script Great (1994) by Linda Seger 
4. Screenwriting Updated (2000) by Linda Aronson 
5. Screenplay (2005) by Syd Field 
 
These five books form the foundation of the critical examination of the literature produced by 
the industry to inform, educate and induct members into the profession. Some of these texts 
have been in circulation for over twenty years, others represent the cutting edge of current 
professional thinking. All represent the dominant accounts of practice in their respective 
fields, as demonstrated by their book sales and their employment in film schools (Conor, 
2014, p. 125).  
Analysis of these texts should establish what are considered the current traditions of 
the screenwriting element of the practice as well as giving strong indications of what are 
likely to be the current internal goods of the practice overall. As Macdonald notes based on 
his analysis of popular screenwriting manuals in 2002 and 2012, “Most manuals present the 
industrial orthodoxy; the dominant conventions of the doxa,” and further that, “the extent of 
the consensus of the manuals on offer reveals the coherence of their orthodoxy,” (2013, p. 39 
and p. 46). 
 This is not to say that there is no validity to more conventional research in this area. 
Screenwriting as creative practice is an emerging academic field worthy of note, despite it 
having struggled to justify its existence within the academy due to ‘dirty’ connotations “to an 
industry some see far removed from the academy,” (Batty, 2015). Journals such as Media 
Practice and Education (formerly Journal of Media Practice), New Writing and The Journal 
of Screenwriting significantly develop the discipline of screenwriting as creative practice, 
with Macdonald (2003, 2004, 2013) and Batty (2015) particularly doing excellent work with a 
focus on professional application. Macdonald’s notion of ‘the screen idea’, “a term for what 
people think they are trying to create,” is a conception that due to its fluidity enables 
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screenwriting to be studied from a variety of perspectives and “allows us to talk of what lies 
behind what is on screen – beliefs as well as practice,” (2013, p. 6) and Batty’s work on 
championing theme as a core development approach is very complementary to this thesis, 
even if it relates theme to emotion rather than argument (2015, p. 116). However, the reason 
these works are not examined in detail in this study is that there is currently no evidence of 
the impact of this work on industry (namely professional working or emerging screenwriters) 
and as such a significant case cannot be made for it to represent dominant thinking. 
 Before the analysis begins, it is imperative to note that part of this thesis is defending 
the notion that the practice of mainstream narrative feature films is at least to some extent 
incognizant, that the practitioners and the ‘canonical’ educators of the practitioners tend to 
either conceptualize the practice in a somewhat opaque way, or don’t conceptualize the 
practice in depth at all. Therefore, the critical hermeneutical analysis of these texts is both an 
investigation into what the books and gurus say and, decisively and problematically, do not 
say.  
 
Screenplay, Syd Field  
It is worth approaching the analysis in rough chronological order, in order to get a sense of 
how reflection on screenwriting practice has evolved and how it has been finessed by a 
succession of modern story analysts. 
With its first edition published in 1979, Screenplay was one of the first books to 
formalize practical screenwriting theory for a wide audience. To put this into context, 
although the Moscow Film School was founded in 1919, it was very much a technical school 
based on cinematography (between 1934-1991 it was actually named the All-Union Institute 
of Cinematography), and the idea of film education to degree level only took root in the west 
in the 1960s. Columbia University School of the Arts and the New York University Tisch 
School of the Arts were both founded in 1965. This means there had only been 10 graduating 
film school classes by the time Field’s book was first published. 
Like most books dedicated to professional practice, it is primarily concerned with 
improving how practitioners practice, not why they practice. To use the analogy of a car, they 
are want to help the reader drive better, no delve into why they drive. It is perhaps likely that 
this is viewed as a superfluous question, that the presumption is that it is clearly self-evident 
why feature film narrative storytellers tell feature film narrative stories or drivers drive cars, 
and not something that has to be dealt with on a book about technique. But obviously this is a 
significant ellipsis, especially as the why has considerable impact on the how. 
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 Field goes into detail on all key areas of screenplay storytelling technique, with 
chapters on creation of subject, character, structure, plotting, scenes, sequences, form, 
adaptation and collaboration. However, the three most relevant concepts he outlines are the 
idea, subject and dramatic premise.   
  Field comments that a “…screenplay is a story told with pictures, in dialogue and 
description, and placed within the context of dramatic structure. That’s what it is; that is its 
nature. It is the art of visual storytelling,” (Field, 2005, p. 2). His basic conception of story is 
that: 
 
…[Y]ou have to set up your characters, introduce the dramatic premise (what the story 
is about) and the dramatic situation (the circumstances surrounding the action), create 
obstacles for your characters to confront and overcome, then resolve the story.  
 (Field, 2005, p. 3) 
 
This introduces the idea and context of dramatic premise, but it should also be noted that 
Field’s basic conception of storytelling so far includes no mention any deeper underlying 
element to the story, such as theme. This is indicative of Field’s priority in setting out the 
elements of storytelling. This priority is echoed further in his use of chess as a metaphor for 
the relationships between the various storytelling elements.  
 
If you take the game of chess, for example, the game itself is a whole composed of 
four parts… Those four parts – the pieces, the player(s), the board, and the rules – are 
integrated into the whole, and the result is a game of chess. It is the relationship 
between these parts and the whole that determines the game. The same relationship 
holds true in a story. A story is the whole, and the elements that make up that story – 
the action, characters, conflicts, scenes, sequences, dialogue, action, Act I, II and III, 
incidents, episodes, events, music, locations, etc. – are the parts, and this relationship 
between the parts and the whole make up the story.  
                       (Field, 2005, p. 20) 
 
It is clear that Field is attempting to be exhaustive here, even going so far as to list ‘incidents’ 
as distinct to ‘events’, but he makes no mention of theme or any other unifying concept to 
these elements.  
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 On closer examination, although Field almost never mentions the word ‘theme’, he 
approaches what could be considered thematic concepts with his thoughts on the ‘idea’ for a 
screenplay. He writes: “What do you need to write a screenplay? An idea… An idea, while 
essential, is nothing more than a vague notion. It also has no detail, no depth, no dimension,” 
(Field, 2005, p. 32). 
 Field develops this further with his definition of the ‘subject’ of a screenplay. Initially, 
Field’s conception is remarkably superficial. He writes: “You need a subject to embody and 
dramatize the idea. A subject is defined as an action and a character. An action is what the 
story is about, and a character is who the story is about.” He continues his exposition of the 
idea without adding approaching anything that could be considered thematic: 
 
If we remember that a screenplay is like a noun, about a person in a place, doing 
his/her “thing,” we can see that the person is the main character and doing his/her 
“thing” is the action. So, when we talk about the subject of a screenplay, we’re talking 
about an action and a character or characters. 
          (Field, 2005, p. 32). 
 
Nonetheless, in Field’s discussion of The Last Samurai (Zwick, 2003) he does begin to 
indicate more sub-textual elements.  
 
And make no mistake, every screenplay has a subject. The Last Samurai  (John 
Logan) is about an embittered Civil War mercenary (Tom Cruise) who travels to 
Japan and is ultimately transformed by the people who were originally his enemy, a 
band of samurai warriors. The character is the Civil War mercenary, and the action is 
how he is transformed in thought, word, and action, allowing him to regain a sense of 
self he had lost after the war ended. But that’s only what the film is about on the 
surface. On a deeper level, what it’s really about is how the American military adviser 
learns to embody the virtues of honor and loyalty.  
     (Field, 2005, p. 33-34). 
 
Notwithstanding this allusion to a deeper level of analysis, Field offers no development of the 
idea, and the example remains confined to the character’s learning of the virtues, not the 
virtues (or the learning) as a wider thematic point of view.  
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 Field’s idea of a dramatic premise does seem at first glance to be a discussion of 
theme, yet his conception is both problematic, inconsistent and ultimately remains confined to 
the level of the individual character going on a journey. “The dramatic premise is what the 
screenplay is about; it provides the dramatic thrust that drives the story to its conclusion,” 
(Field, 2005, p. 24). 
Field here is not talking about theme, but what is often referred to the ‘hook’ of the 
film, the surface plot set-up, for example, ‘boy from 1985 stuck in 1955’ (Back to the Future, 
Zemekis, 1985) or ‘woman falls in love with trapped water creature’ (The Shape of Water, del 
Toro, 2017). As Field later states, using his own case study of an improvised thriller plot, 
“Perhaps she discovers through an investigation that a particular nuclear plant is unsafe. 
Politics being what they are, maybe a politician supports the plant despite the fact that it is 
unsafe. This becomes our story’s hook, or dramatic premise,” (Field, 2005, p. 83). 
 It is when Field attempts to use the case study to expand the idea of dramatic premise 
that it becomes inconsistent as he equates it directly with one of his few mentions of theme:  
 
From now on, through a process of trial and error, we’re going to be searching for a 
theme, or dramatic premise: something that will move Sarah in a particular direction 
to generate a dramatic action. The subject of screenplay, remember, is an action and a 
character.  
          (Field, 2005, p. 81). 
 
Field’s concepts become tangled together and the result is opaque. Dramatic premise, as Field 
defines it, is ‘hook’ not ‘theme’, and these are mutually exclusive concepts. Nor is theme 
‘subject’, even though in his definition of subject he uses the question usually reserved to 
discuss theme, namely ‘what is the film about?’ His two main examples, American Beauty 
(Mendes, 1999) and Thelma and Louise (Scott, 1991), both again remain steadfastly on the 
surface level of character experience:  
 
And that lets us know what the story is all about: Lester regaining the life he has lost 
or given up, and becoming whole and complete again as a person… If you want to 
write a screenplay, what is it about?... Do you for example, want to tell the story of 
two women going on a crime spree?  
    (Field, 2005, pp. 22-23) 
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In summary, the book excels when the focus is on the minutiae of screenwriting, delineating 
the separate elements (character, dialogue, events etc.) and advising how best the screenwriter 
can approach them. However, Field appears to take for granted the internal good of the 
practice – leaving it unstated – and it is this, combined with the inconsistent and sometimes 
wholly contradictory use of terminology concerning such foundational elements as theme, 
premise and subtext, that mean the book fails to provide a satisfactory account of the 
screenwriting process as a whole.  
 
Making a Good Script Great, Linda Seger  
In Making a Good Script Great (1994), Linda Seger advances a definition of ‘idea’ that 
differs markedly from Field’s. Nonetheless, she also uses the term inconsistently, sometimes 
using it as a synonym of her conception of theme, sometimes encompassing much more than 
theme. It worth noting here that this is an ongoing issue across the literature; an analysis of 12 
prominent manuals available in 2004 identified 17 common terms in over half the texts 
examined but disparity between 397 other terms (Macdonald, 2004).  
Initially Seger states that “This idea causes audiences to identify with the characters 
and situations, usually because the theme tells us something about our human condition. Ideas 
convey the meaning of events – what the writer believes about why things happen, what we 
can learn from them, about cause and effect, and the meaning of life,” (Seger, 1994, p. 120). 
This conception of a film’s ‘idea’ clearly includes not just theme, but the entire viewpoint of 
the film. Seger’s examples provide further define ‘idea’ in this way: 
 
The idea might be about the meaning of something we’ve experienced (if you’re 
reckless in sex, you can jeopardize your family [Fatal Attraction], or violence has far-
reaching effects on the lives of those who practice it [Unforgiven], or about an 
underlying message that the writer wants to communicate through a story rather than 
through an essay (perhaps that common decency combined with opportunity can lead 
to an “Absolute Good” as in Schindler’s List).   
                     (Seger, 1994, p. 120) 
 
It is very relevant for this thesis that Seger here compares a narrative feature film with an 
essay, but the concept is not further developed. It is presented as a distinct type of filmic 
message, separate from the first two examples – Unforgiven (Eastwood, 1992) and Fatal 
Attraction (Lyne, 1987) – without furnishing a reason for the distinction. When Seger 
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discusses theme, the term is used inconsistently. Initially she uses it to refer to the singular 
central abstract concept on which the film will hold a point-of-view, “”Revenge” is another 
theme that has universal significance”, but then almost immediately she uses the term to refer 
to both the singular abstract concept and the point-of-view. She writes: “Another common 
theme that helps us identify with the story is “triumph of the human spirit,” (Seger, 1994, p. 
120). 
 Thus, when Seger talks about communicating the ‘theme’, it is unclear precisely what 
is meant, although it is likely that she is referring to the latter concept plus point-of-view 
definition. Seger comments about how best to communicate theme without any further 
conceptualization about the idea of an ‘essay’ film. As with other gurus examined in this 
chapter, Seger is simply (and perhaps understandably for her target audience) guiding the 
reader on how to maximize drama, rather than understand the practice itself. As Seger points 
out:  
 
Once you know what to say, you also need to know how to say it. Theme is the least 
interesting when it’s communicated through talky dialogue, when it’s said rather than 
expressed through more dramatic means. Although lines of dialogue here and there 
can express the theme (re-watch Room With A View to see how dialogue can express 
the theme of identity without getting talky), the theme will be far better expressed by 
concentrating on other more cinematic choices. 
        (Seger, 1994, p. 129)  
 
These cinematic choices are primarily events and character decisions. “Theme can be 
communicated through decisions that your characters make within the story… Themes of 
corruption, greed, cowardice and disillusionment can easily be expressed dramatically 
through character actions,” (Seger, 1994, p. 130).  
Here the idea of film-as-argument (or at least ‘essay’ in Seger’s terms) would be 
useful, but is not explored. If aspiring writers understand that it is argumentation that is being 
presented, not just an inconsistent definition of ‘theme’, their understanding of how to 
communicate through story choices may well increase too.  
As the study examines other gurus, it will become a common theme that there is a 
resistance, conscious or otherwise, to conceptualizing film-as-argument and the terminology 
that accompanies it despite the building blocks of the view being present in their ideas. A 
theme plus a point-of-view is an assertion that the film hopes to establish. Using the 
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terminology of this thesis, such a thing is an argument. The questions Seger suggests aspiring 
writers ask themselves when constructing ‘the message’ of a screenplay is consistent with 
forming a consistent argument. She writes:  
 
Is my theme expressed through character and through action, rather than just through 
dialogue? Do my images help expand my theme? Have I stayed away from having a 
character “give a message” to the audience? Have I been willing to give up a smaller 
theme if it conflicts with the main theme of the story? 
           (Seger, 1994, pp. 133-134) 
 
It is also worth noting that the concern not to ‘give a message’ is not to avoid the film giving a 
message, but to avoid having that message explicitly spelled out by a character. As Seger is 
primarily concerned with execution than conceptualization, this is a reasonable priority. 
 
Story, Robert McKee  
Robert McKee is undoubtedly the most well-known of the gurus. His 1997 book Story: 
Substance, Structure, Style, and the Principles of Screenwriting, is considered the ‘mother-
text’ of all screenwriting books. Currently in its nineteenth edition, it has been translated into 
20 languages (Conor, 2014, p. 127). Director Spike Jonze represented McKee (played by 
Brian Cox) in his film about a screenwriter struggling to adapt a novel for the screen, in 
Adaptation (2002).  
In Chapter 4, the study looked at common inconsistencies in the conceptualization of 
the term ‘story.’ Adding to the general confusion, in this key text entitled Story, McKee 
writes: “A story is not only what you say but how you say it,” (McKee, 1998, p. 8). The book 
is split into four unequal parts: The Writer and the Art of Story, The Elements of Story, The 
Principles of Story Design and The Writer at Work. 
McKee describes the drive to tell stories in terms of a search for answers a 
philosophical question. He writes:  
 
Day after day we seek an answer to the ageless question Aristotle posed in Ethics: 
How should a human being lead his life?... Traditionally humankind has sought the 
answer to Aristotle’s question from the four wisdoms – philosophy, science, religion, 
art – taking insight from each… 
       (McKee, 1998, p. 11) 
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McKee pushes the importance of stories even further. “As our faith in traditional ideologies 
diminishes, we turn to the source we still believe in: the art of story,” (McKee, 1998, p. 12). 
As the study noted in Chapter 2, he weighs-in on the ‘entertainment’ debate:  
 
But what, after all, is entertainment? To be entertained is to be immersed in the 
ceremony of story to an intellectually and emotionally satisfying end. To the film 
audience, entertainment is the ritual of sitting in the dark, concentrating on a screen in 
order to experience the story’s meaning and, with that insight, the arousal of strong, at 
times even painful emotions, and as the meaning deepens, to be carried to the ultimate 
satisfaction of those emotions. 
                            (McKee, 1998, p. 12) 
 
Here he stresses the importance of meaning and insight to the story experience, and later in 
the book he adds to the idea of entertainment that “…lasting entertainment is found only in 
the charged human truths beneath the image,” (McKee, 1998, p. 25) and that, “All coherent 
tales express an idea veiled inside an emotional spell,” (McKee, 1998, p. 129). 
As the study explored in Chapter 2 (and will interrogate further in Chapters 7 and 8) 
this idea of the ‘emotional spell’ is very reminiscent of Aristotle’s ideas in Rhetoric on the art 
of persuasion; that is it comprised of three elements: Ethos (credible source of argument), 
Logos (the argument is internally logical) and Pathos, (that the argument invokes the 
emotions and senses). However, McKee does not rely on Aristotle’s theories in this way, 
instead he focuses on what he refers to as ‘aesthetic emotion.’ He states that, “…in life, idea 
and emotion come separately… But whereas life separates meaning from emotion, art unites 
them. Story is an instrument by which you create such epiphanies at will, the phenomenon 
known as aesthetic emotion,” (McKee, 1998, pp. 110-111). 
McKee explains that aesthetic emotion is “the simultaneous encounter of thought and 
feeling… In short, a story well told gives you the very thing you cannot get from life: 
meaningful emotional experience,” (McKee, 1998, p. 111). This combination of thought and 
feeling becomes close to Aristotle’s thoughts on persuasion, and as McKee explains further, 
the reasons for his resistance to the idea of film-as-argument begin to emerge: 
 
In this sense, story is, at heart, nonintellectual. It does not express ideas in the dry, 
intellectual arguments [my emphasis] of an essay. But this is not to say that story is 
anti-intellectual. We pray that the writer has ideas of import and insight. Rather the 
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exchange between artist and audience expresses idea directly through the senses and 
perceptions, intuition and emotion. It requires no mediator, no critic to rationalize the 
transaction, to replace the ineffable and the sentient with explanation and abstraction.  
     (McKee, 1998, p. 111)  
 
The idea that story is wholly “nonintellectual” and operates purely at the sensory, intuitive 
and emotional level seems to be hyperbole at best. It is also unclear precisely what McKee 
means by the terms “ineffable” and “sentient” in this context. Again, to be fair to McKee, he 
is not writing an academic study, Story is essentially a self-help book aimed at both amateurs 
and professionals and therefore to make a point clear it may have to rely uncomfortably on 
generalizations. However, McKee does indicate that the concept of an argument or an essay is 
“dry” and this association is not a positive one. McKee continues in this vein: 
 
A well-told story neither expresses the clockwork reasonings of a thesis nor vents 
raging inchoate emotions. It triumphs in the marriage of the rational with the 
irrational. For a work that’s either essentially emotional or essentially intellectual 
cannot have the validity of one that calls upon our subtler faculties of sympathy, 
empathy, premonition, discernment… our innate sensitivity to the truth. 
     (McKee, 1998, p. 111) 
 
There is an attempt here to show that stories (McKee is very much concerned with 
mainstream narrative feature films) need a balance of reason and emotion, but McKee clearly 
dismisses the idea that one can be at the service of the other. As McKee develops the idea, 
stories combine both thought and feeling simultaneously. A combination of thought and 
feeling generates meaningful emotion because it gives feelings cognitive content. In a 
meaningful emotional experience, our feelings are about something; they indicate something 
contentful about the situations humans encounter or appraise. This means that emotions can, 
in the right circumstances, supply reasons for thought. Emotion isn’t merely a mixture of two 
separate things; emotional experience has the power to reveal to us reasons to believe 
propositions. Thus, in stories and elsewhere, arguments are generated through emotional 
experiences. If this is right, then McKee’s contrast between “clockwork reasonings of a 
thesis” and “raging inchoate emotions” is overdrawn. The very experiences McKee thinks are 
generated by stories well-told, are reasons to believe a thesis. 
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It is perhaps most illuminating that although McKee’s stance is that story is 
“nonintellectual” he continues to conceptualize (film) story using very argument-like logic. 
For example, he writes about story structure as follows: “STRUCTURE [his capitalization] is 
a selection of events from the characters’ life stories that is composed into a strategic 
sequence to arouse specific emotions and to express a specific view of life,” (McKee, 1998, p. 
33). Again, when discussing point-of-view, he writes, “If, to some people, a writer’s final 
statement about life appears dogmatic and opinionated, so be it. Bland and pacifying writers 
are a bore. We want unfettered souls with the courage to take a point of view, artists whose 
insights startle and excite,” (McKee, 1998, p. 113).  
Here McKee is describing the assertion of the writer, and the “strategic sequence to 
arouse specific emotions and express a specific view of life”. This is very similar to an 
argument, depending on the precise unpacking of what it means to “express a specific view of 
life”. One may marshal the resources of a story in order to express a point of view; the 
question is whether in doing so, one furnishes reasons to accept the point of view. Mere 
expression of a view does not require the resources of storytelling. Making a view convincing 
or compelling or attractive does. McKee’s underlying commitment to the idea that stories are 
forms of argument is demonstrated in the following passage: 
 
Make no mistake: While a story’s inspiration may be a dream and its final effect 
aesthetic emotion, a work moves from an open premise to a fulfilling climax only 
when the writer is possessed by serious thought. For an artist must have not only ideas 
to express, but ideas to prove. Expressing an idea, in the sense of exposing it, is never 
enough. The audience must not just understand; it must believe. You want the world 
to leave your story convinced that yours is a truthful metaphor for life. And the means 
by which you bring the audience to your point of view resides in the very design you 
give your telling. As you create your story you create your proof; idea and structure 
intertwine in a rhetorical relationship.  
     (McKee, 1998, p. 113) 
 
What McKee has described here, the idea of not just of expressing, but of ‘proving’ the 
writer’s assertion by means of a narrative, is an argument. Yet he resists the idea of film-as-
argument. Instead he uses the term ‘metaphor’. He repeats this conceptualization throughout 
the book, such as “Story is metaphor for life,” (McKee, 1998, p. 25). Whilst films can 
function as metaphor, for example, the aliens as a metaphor for marginal and racially 
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maligned groups in District 9 (Blomkamp, 2009), this account is too reductive as metaphor is 
only one of the means practitioners have to establish an effective argument. This has already 
been noted in Chapter 2, and these methods will be fully examined in the case studies in 
Chapters 7 and 8.   
 The term also suffers for being imprecise, especially if the “metaphor for life” is 
referring to the final statement of a film. Assertion, statement, point-of-view, conclusion are 
all more accurate, but do have much ‘dryer’ connotations. McKee states that, “A storyteller is 
a life poet, an artist who transforms day-to-day living, inner life and outer life, dream and 
actuality into a poem whose rhyme scheme is events rather than words – a two hour metaphor 
that says: Life is like this!” (McKee, 1998, p. 25). However, even this is inconsistent with his 
earlier comments. It is highly likely that McKee is simply being overly loose with his 
terminology here, but this does again somewhat undermine the points he is making about the 
nature of story and storytellers. The Aristotelian concern that McKee stated earlier was not 
the ontological concern of how life is, but how best to live it. The idea that all stories show 
that ‘life is like this’ is a wholly descriptive conception, failing to take into account all 
prescriptive conceptions of story; not those that tell us how life is, but how life should be.  
 Why is McKee resistant to the film-as-argument thesis? One possible explanation is 
the fear of explanation:  
 
Master storytellers never explain. They do the hard, painfully creative thing – they 
dramatize. Audiences are rarely interested, and certainly never convinced, when 
forced to listen to the discussion of ideas… A great story authenticates its ideas solely 
within the dynamics of events; failure to express a view of life through the pure, 
honest consequences of human choice and action is a creative defeat no amount of 
clever language can salvage. 
     (McKee, 1998, p. 114) 
 
This avoidance of explicit explanatory speech may be apt, but this is clearly a concern with 
execution, not conception. This is McKee’s priority. Story is foremost a book about craft: 
“This craft [of story composition] is neither mechanics nor gimmicks. It is a concert of 
techniques by which we create a conspiracy of interest between ourselves and the audience,” 
(McKee, 1998, pp. 21-22). 
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Fear of poor execution should not predicate a less useful conceptualization of the 
practice, but this seems to be the case. And it is further delineated when McKee comes to his 
greatest fear, that of obvious didacticism.  He expounds on this in the following passage: 
 
A note of caution: In creating the dimensions of your story’s “argument,” take great 
care to build the power of both sides… in other words, do not slant your “argument”… 
the danger is this: when your Premise is an idea you feel you must prove to the world, 
and you design your story as an undeniable certification of that idea, you set yourself 
on the road to didacticism. In your zeal to persuade, you will stifle the voice of the 
other side. Misusing and abusing art to preach, your screenplay will become a thesis 
film, a thinly disguised sermon as you strive in a single stroke to convert the whole 
world. Didacticism results from the naïve enthusiasm that fiction can be used like a 
scalpel to cut out the cancers of society.  
     (McKee, 1998, p. 121) 
 
McKee is again concerned with execution, concerned with the “slanting” of the argument 
rather than the argument itself. How would the film function if the writer gave full voice to all 
sides of an issue? This does not seem a good recipe for avoiding didacticism. How is a 
‘thesis’ film different from the film that hopes to prove its metaphor for life (to use McKee’s 
terminology)? What is most illustrative is the use of speech marks for the two times he refers 
to “argument”. It is the only time in the book he refers to stories as such, and it is done so in a 
cautionary way, suggesting it is the wrong way to conceptualize story, and even within that 
context the concept is separated from all other concepts by the speech marks. No other 
concept receives the same treatment and the usual use of these marks, as scare quotes, is to 
indicate that the author does not fully agree with the use of the term.  
McKee makes clear that he fears a plethora of badly written didactic films: “When 
talented people write badly it’s generally for one of two reasons: Either they’re blinded by an 
idea they feel compelled to prove or they’re driven by an emotion they must express,” 
(McKee, 1998, p. 7) but this is perhaps not the only fear. There is arguably a bigger reason 
that relates back to the discussion in Chapter 4 about the power and influence of film, 
particularly the reach and impact of mainstream narrative feature film. McKee writes:  
 
Writers deal with ideas, but not in the open, rational manner of philosophers. Instead, 
they conceal their ideas inside the seductive emotions of art. Yet felt ideas, as Plato 
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pointed out, are ideas nonetheless. Every effective society sends a charged idea out to 
us, in effect compelling the idea into us, so that we must believe. In fact, the 
persuasive power of a story is so great that we may believe its meaning even if we find 
it morally repellent. 
     (McKee, 1998, p. 130) 
 
The persuasive power of a story is beginning to be quantified through academic analysis. The 
work of Green and Brock (2000), investigates not only narrative feature film’s power to 
convince the audience of things that they know to be factually untrue (even if only for a short 
period of time) but also to have an effect on the identity and self-perception of the viewer 
themselves.  
The conception of film-as-argument could perhaps be viewed as the industry’s ‘big 
secret’. In the same way that it is politically expedient for the screen industry that films and 
television generally are viewed as harmless, as just entertainment, if the primary conception 
of a mainstream narrative feature film was as argument, as structured persuasion, then it could 
be viewed as a danger to the industry itself – not just from bad writing, but from other 
institutions. As McKee states:  
 
Authoritative personalities, like Plato, fear the threat that comes not from idea, but 
from emotion. Those in power never want us to feel. Thought can be controlled and 
manipulated, but emotion is willful and unpredictable. Artists threaten authority by 
exposing lies and inspiring passion for change. This is why when tyrants seize power, 
their firing squads aim at the heart of the writer.  
     (McKee, 1998, p. 130) 
 
In contrast to the clumsy didactic writer, McKee pushes his conception of the virtuous writer, 
using not a conception of argument, but of theme, metaphor, premise and what he terms 
‘controlling idea’ (McKee, 1998, p. 115). McKee’s writers’ virtues are quite different from 
McIntyre’s and those outlined in this thesis, but comprise both regulatory and motivational 
modes. McKee’s writer should possess a love of: Story, The Dramatic, Truth, Humanity, 
Sensation, Dreaming, Humour, Language, Duality, Perfection, Uniqueness, Beauty and Self 
(McKee, 1998, p. 21). 
 For McKee, “Theme has become a rather vague term in the writer’s vocabulary. 
“Poverty,” “war,” and “love” for example, are not themes; they relate to setting or genre. A 
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theme is not a word but a sentence – one clear, coherent sentence that expresses a story’s 
irreducible meaning,” (McKee, 1998, p. 115). It is likely deliberate, but it must be noted that 
McKee – in his rejection of theme as a singular idea – here actually deviates from most other 
gurus but then quickly defines a new wider term to describe much the same thing. “I prefer 
the phrase Controlling Idea, for like theme, it names a story’s root or central idea, but it also 
implies function: The Controlling Idea shapes the writer’s strategic choices,” (McKee, 1998, 
p. 115). 
 McKee describes a film’s premise as “the idea that inspires the writer’s desire to 
create a story”, and controlling idea as “the story’s ultimate meaning expressed through the 
action and aesthetic emotion of the last act’s climax,” (McKee, 1998, p. 112). It is here that 
the ‘controlling idea’ starts to appear to be very much like argument: 
 
The Controlling Idea of a completed story must be expressible in a single sentence… 
the film must be molded around one idea. This is not to say that a story can be reduced 
to a rubric. Far more is captured within the web of a story that can ever be stated in 
words – subtleties, subtexts, conceits, double meanings, richness of all kinds. A story 
becomes a kind of living philosophy that the audience members grasp as a whole, in a 
flash, without conscious thought – a perception married to their life experiences.  
                 (McKee, 1998, p. 115) 
 
The concept of ‘living philosophy’ seems more to be an example of verbal gymnastics in the 
avoidance of film-as-argument than a useful conceptualization of the form. McKee goes into 
considerable detail concerning how the controlling idea works, but as much as he criticized 
the term ‘theme’ as vague, his replacement suffers from a lack of transparency: 
 
The Controlling Idea has two components: Value plus Cause. It identifies the positive 
or negative charge of the story’s critical value at the last act’s climax, and it identifies 
the chief reason that this value has changed to its final state. The sentence composed 
from these two elements, Value plus Cause, expresses the core meaning of the story. 
Value means the primary value in its positive or negative charge that comes into the 
world of life of your character as a result of the final action of the story. For example: 
An up-ending Crime Story (IN THE HEAT OF THE NIGHT) returns an unjust world 
(negative) to justice (positive), suggesting a phrase such as “Justice is restored…”   
          (McKee, 1998, p. 115-116) 
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This is problematic, because instead of clarifying the vague idea of ‘theme’, McKee replaces 
it with his concept of ‘controlling idea’ which is then further split into two further concepts, 
one of which, ‘value’ actually has two elements – abstract concept (essentially the same as the 
traditional concept of ‘theme’) and value judgment. McKee then adds a fourth element, 
‘cause’, because:  
 
A story of substance also expresses why its world or protagonist has ended on its 
specific value. If, for example, you were writing for Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry, 
your full Controlling Idea of Value plus Cause would be: “Justice triumphs because 
the protagonist is more violent than the criminals.”  
     (McKee, 1998, p. 116)  
 
This is not to say that McKee is wrong, just that the framework seems unnecessarily 
obfuscatory. Yet even when applying the new concept of ‘controlling idea’, McKee cannot 
avoid concepts of argument, debate and dialecticism:  
 
You have to build a bridge of story from the opening to the ending, a progression of 
events that spans from Premise to Controlling Idea. These events echo the 
contradictory voices of one theme. Sequence by sequence, often scene by scene, the 
positive Idea and its negative Counter Idea argue, so to speak, back and forth, creating 
a dramatized dialectical debate. At climax one of these two voices wins and becomes 
the story’s Controlling Idea.  
     (McKee, 1998, p. 119) 
 
Ultimately, the way McKee writes (or doesn’t write) about argument, debate and didacticism 
in storytelling is reminiscent of the introduction to Mark Twain’s The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn (1885), in which the narrator tells readers: “Persons attempting to find a 
motive in this narrative will be prosecuted; persons attempting to find a moral in it will be 
banished; persons attempting to find a plot in it will be shot.” The protestation is in equal 






The Writer’s Journey, Christopher Vogler  
The Writer’s Journey (Vogler, 1998) came in the wake of Story and is a shorter, much less 
dense work which mirrors its origins as an internal Hollywood memo that gradually expanded 
into the completed book (Vogler, 1998, p. xxix). As with all the literature examined here, The 
Writer’s Journey is primarily concerned with craft, but unlike McKee, Vogler spends much 
less time discussing precisely what story is and why humanity needs it.  
 Designed on the model of the I Ching, with an introductory overview followed by 
commentaries that expand each stage, Vogler’s work is built on the studies of Joseph 
Campbell in comparative mythology (2004). Vogler’s book essentially outlines Campbell’s 
theories and applies them specifically to feature film (although there is the occasional 
reference to reader’s having used his work in television also (Vogler, 1998, p. 267). Vogler’s 
take on the work is that the hero’s journey, the monomyth that Campbell explores, can be 
used not just to structure, pace and characterize story, but also the life of the writer. As he 
states, “The Hero’s Journey, I discovered, is more than just a description of the hidden 
patterns of mythology. It is a useful guide to life, especially the writer’s life,” (Vogler, 1998, 
p. 5). 
 Vogler claims myths are “…not an untruth but a way of reaching profound truth,” 
(Vogler, 1998, p. 1) and that: 
 
All stories consist of a few common structural elements found universally in myths, 
fairy tales, dreams and movies. They are known collectively as The Hero’s Journey… 
Used wisely, these ancient tolls of the storyteller’s craft still have tremendous power 
to heal our people and make the world a better place. 
          (Vogler, 1998, p. 3) 
 
This assumption that stories make the world a better place does align Vogler with the central 
importance of the practice of telling worthwhile stories, although these ideas are not 
developed as his priority is to show how story manifests itself through character archetype 
and mythic structure. Vogler lays out seven archetypes: Hero; Mentor; Threshold Guardian; 
Herald; Shapeshifter; Shadow; and Trickster (although these forms owe as much to 
comparative mythologist Vladimir Propp (1968) as Campbell). Vogler also outlines twelve 
stages of the Hero’s journey: Ordinary World; Call to Adventure; Refusal of the Call; 
Meeting the Mentor; Crossing the First Threshold; Test, Allies, Enemies; Approach to the 
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Innermost Cave; Supreme Ordeal; Reward; The Road Back; Resurrection; and Return With 
The Elixir.  
For Vogler, this structure and archetypes represent the epitome of effective 
storytelling across all media: 
 
Stories built on the model of the Hero’s Journey have an appeal that can be felt by 
everyone, because they well up from a universal source in the shared consciousness 
and reflect universal concerns. They deal with the child-like universal questions: Who 
am I? Where did I come from? Where will I go when I die? What is good and what is 
evil? What must I do about it? What will tomorrow be like? Where did yesterday go? 
Is there anybody else out there?  
        (Vogler, 1998, p. 15) 
 
These are all obviously questions of theme, and Vogler conceptualizes theme slightly 
differently to McKee:  
 
The Ordinary World is the place to state the theme of your story. What is the story 
really about? If you had to boil down its essence to a single word or phrase, what 
would it be? What single idea or quality is it about? Love? Trust? Betrayal? Vanity? 
Prejudice? Greed? Madness? Ambition? Friendship? What are you trying to say? Is 
your theme “Love conquers all”, “You can’t cheat an honest man”, “We must work 
together to survive”, or “Money is the root of all evil”? 
        (Vogler, 1998, p. 95) 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly for a book highlighting structure, Vogler leads with where theme 
should be stated. His view of what theme is also suffers from some inconsistencies. First, he 
seems to regard theme as a singular abstract concept (“love”), then includes the point-of-view 
(“love conquers all”). Although here it is clear that he assumes that all stories have one 
singular central theme and point-of-view he notably, unlike McKee, does not add the third 
aspect of why (‘love conquers all because…’) It should also be noted that, like Seger and 
McKee, Vogler refers inconsistently to theme as both plural and singular, sometimes talking 
about the ‘theme’ of the film or the ‘themes’ of the film without clarifying whether he 
considers all stories to have one central theme supported by sub-themes or that stories can 
support multiple main themes simultaneously (Vogler, 1998, pp. 99, 248, 258, 266).  
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 Vogler defines theme as “derived from Greek, is close in meaning to the Latin-based 
premise [his emphasis]. Both mean “something set before”, something laid out in advance 
that helps determine a future course. The theme of a story is an underlying statement or 
assumption about an aspect of life,” (Vogler, 1998, p. 111). He adds that “Knowing the theme 
is essential to making the final choices in dialogue, action and set dressing that turn a story 
into a coherent design. In a good story, everything is related somehow to the theme, and the 
Ordinary World is the place to make the first statement of the main idea,” (Vogler, 1998, p. 
112). This represents essentially all Vogler has to say on theme. Yet the influence of theme 
seems to be weakened to the point of inconsistency. If theme helps turns the story into a 
“coherent design”, does it not govern all creative choices, rather than simply be “somehow 
related” to them’? It must be noted that the work on theme comes half-way into the book and 
is presented with less prominence than the character and structural theories, at best giving a 
sense that theme takes no precedence over other craft elements. 
 Aside from theme, Vogler does have a conceptualization of what story is that matches 
McKee: the idea of metaphor: “Then what is a story? A story is also a metaphor, a model of 
some aspect of human behaviour. It is a thought machine, by which we test out our ideas and 
feelings about some human quality and try to learn more about it,” (Vogler, 1998, p. 1). The 
previously outlined issues with metaphor as a conceptualization of an entire story stand, and 
what is consistent with Vogler’s overall thematic stance (and the stance of the screen industry 
in general) is the lukewarm terms used to express what narrative feature films do. Films sound 
quite harmless if all they do is ‘test thoughts and feelings to learn more about them,’ as 
oppose to convince audiences of an assertion. 
 As with McKee, Vogler has his own set of euphemisms that can be used instead of a 
film-as-argument vocabulary; he writes of ‘metaphors or comparisons’: “The mythological 
approach to story boils down to using metaphors or comparisons to get across your 
feelings about life [his emphasis],” (Vogler, 1998, p. 84); he writes of the ‘dramatic point-of-
view’: “Of course, if your dramatic point of view is that life isn’t fair and you feel justice is a 
rare thing in this world, then by all means reflect this in the way rewards and punishments are 
dealt out in the return,” (Vogler, 1998, p. 253); he writes of ‘attitude’ and ‘declarative 
statement’: “The needs of your story and your attitude may dictate ending with the feeling of 
a period, an image or line of dialogue flatly making a declarative statement such as “Life goes 
on,”” (Vogler, 1998, p. 259); and he writes of ‘mood’ and ‘chain of thought’: “Many stories 
fall apart in the final moments. The Return is too abrupt, prolonged, unfocused, unsurprising, 
	 120	
or unsatisfying. The mood or chain of thought the author has created just evaporates and the 
whole effort is wasted,” (Vogler, 1998, p. 257).  
 Whether it is McKee’s ‘metaphor’ or ‘living philosophy’, or Vogler’s ‘attitude’ or 
‘chain of thought’, these terms when taken together describe the shape and function of 
argument without having to commit to the conceptualization of film-as-argument in any 
explicit way.  
 
Scriptwriting Updated, Linda Aronson  
Scriptwriting Updated is perhaps the most practical of the five books examined here and most 
closely echoes the traditional ‘self-help’ book style. There are charts and diagrams and, 
wherever possible, Aronson delves into the specifics of how to apply the various theories 
including exercises for the would-be screenwriter. Like McKee, Aronson is also fearful of the 
execution of theme-led stories:   
 
Concepts and themes – say, poverty, parenthood, loss, ambition, or the insanity of war 
– are often behind the most passionate writing. Unfortunately, scripts based on 
strongly felt themes can be clumsily structured, clichéd, peopled with stereotypes, and 
prone to preachiness. The reason for this is that themes and concepts are intellectual 
entities and as such are governed by vertical thinking, which can very easily take over 
without the writer realizing.  
     (Aronson, 2000, p. 35) 
 
Notwithstanding the inconsistency of Aronson grouping a theme and point-of-view (“insanity 
of war”) with what is otherwise a list of abstract singular concepts (“poverty”, “loss”, and so 
on), and unlike McKee, Aronson provides the writer a way to avoid problems of didacticism. 
Aronson divides human thinking into two categories: Vertical Thinking and Lateral Thinking. 
Using her terminology, Vertical Thinking is good at “keeping it real,” (Aronson, 2000, p.8) 
and she lists nineteen separate things it is good at, including logic, structural instinct, learnt 
knowledge, technique, a socially conditioned world view, objectivity, sound judgment, 
caution, concentration and cliché. Alternatively, Lateral Thinking is good at intuition, 
inspiration, originality, energy, receptiveness to new ideas, writing emotion, associational 
tasks, subjectivity and melodrama (Aronson, 2000, p.8). Therefore, the exercises in the book 
push the writer when thinking about theme towards lateral thinking, not the vague notion of 
the ‘irrational’ that McKee references but does not develop (Mckee, 1998, p. 111).    
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 Elsewhere Aronson conceptualizes screen narratives as fables. “Fables are useful 
models because as well as having compelling plots they possess strongly defined characters. 
Indeed, because the story of a fable is devised to illustrate the foibles of its main players, fable 
is always very powerfully character driven,” (Aronson, 2000, p.29). Interestingly, she doesn’t 
draw out the thematic implications of this, instead focusing on character.  
 Where Aronson branches into new territory not covered by the other gurus is her work 
on the expectation of the audience when it comes to the meaning of a screen narrative. When 
talking of films that fail to weave disparate narrative strands together, Aronson states that:  
 
Most audiences complain that while the films are often extremely good, they fizzle at 
the end and it is hard to know what they were ‘about’ or what ‘the point’ was… 
Another way to see it is that audiences seem to be seeking, effectively, a ‘moral’, even 
if that moral is bizarrely surprising (as in Pulp Fiction), immoral (as in Crimes and 
Misdemeanors), or depressing (as in City of Hope).  
    (Aronson, 2000, p.187) 
 
It is here that Aronson implicitly criticizes the narrowness of the form of both modern screen 
storytelling and art overall, perhaps laying blame at the feet of the modern audience:  
 
Some would say that audiences need to be re-educated in their expectations so that 
they do not expect a moral or closure, but instead believe that travelling the journey of 
the film is enough… But at present (and this could change) most audiences come to 
film, as to all art, for a parable or conclusion of some kind, and feel disappointed when 
none is given to them. 
    (Aronson, 2000, p.187) 
 
This admission that there is an expectation for a moral or a conclusion of some kind lends 
weight to the film-as-argument thesis, even if again Aronson does not define it by name. 
 
Honourable Mention: Dramatica, Melanie Anne Phillips & Chris Huntley  
Although Melanie Anne Phillips and Chris Huntley cannot be considered first-tier gurus, and 
Dramatica (2004) originated as a piece of software whose associated glossary of terms grew 
into a textbook, it is the only significant industry-facing book on screenwriting craft that  
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explicitly discusses the idea of film-as-argument. Phillips and Huntley class stories into two 
versions of argument. The first version of argument is classed as: 
 
…the progression of logistic and emotional meanings that combine to prove a story's 
message. A story's message is proven by a progression of logistic (dispassionate) and 
emotional (passionate) meanings which are created by the interactions of Character, 
Plot, Theme, and Genre. The dispassionate argument is the story's contention that a 
particular approach is the most appropriate one to solve a particular problem or 
achieve a goal in a given context. The passionate argument is the story's contention 
that one world view is better than another in terms of leading to personal fulfillment. 
An author can use his story's argument to convey his message directly, indirectly by 
inference, or by making an exaggerated argument supporting what he is against.  
                   (Phillips and Huntley, 2001, p. 6) 
 
They contrast this with the particularly complex form they entitle Grand Argument Story 
(GAS): 
 
A story that illustrates all four throughlines (Overall Story, Relationship Story, Main 
Character, and Impact Character) and their every story point so that no holes are left in 
either the passionate or dispassionate arguments of that story. A Grand Argument 
Story covers all the bases so that it cannot be disproved. From the perspective that it 
creates, it is right. There are four views in a complete story which look at all the 
possible ways the story could be resolved from all the possible perspectives allowed; 
these are represented by the perspectives created by matching the four Throughlines 
with the four Classes (the Overall Story, Relationship Story, Main Character, and 
Impact Character Throughlines matched up with the Classes of Situation (Universe), 
Activities (Physics), Manipulation (Psychology), and Fixed Attitudes (Mind) to create 
the four perspectives of the particular story they are operating in). Every complete 
storyform explores each of these perspectives entirely so that their views of the story's 
problem are consistent and that they arrive at the only solution that could possibly 
work, allowing the givens built into the story from the start. When this is done, a 
Grand Argument has been made and there is no disproving it on its own terms. You 
may disagree with the story's givens, but as an argument it has no holes.  
   (Phillips and Huntley, 2001, pp. 20-21) 
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Phillips and Huntley offer a third principal conceptualization of story. It is that of ‘following 
the muse’, which they describe as follows: 
 
A number of authors write with no intent at all. They apply themselves to recording 
their journey through a topic or subject or simply wander, musing. The resulting work 
is almost always open to all kinds of interpretation, yet may elicit strong emotions and 
conclusions in virtually everyone who observes the work.  
         (Phillips and Huntley, 2001a, p. 18) 
 
Obviously they are talking about stories in general (although the intent is to talk to the 
screenwriter) but both the opaque definitions and triple conception of story prevents the book 
from fully supporting the conception of social practice that this thesis is defending. The idea 
that a mainstream narrative feature film is the sort of thing that should aim at an inconsistent 
argument or simply represent a stream-of-consciousness inspired by one particular initiating 
idea is not fully compatible for the internal good of the practitioner being to move people in a 
worthwhile way to a conclusion worth having.  
 
Conclusion 
Be it due to commercial pressures or sincere focus, whatever ‘angle’ each book takes 
(respectively, first of its kind, practical guide, practical exercise guide, structure or mythic 
structure), each guru understandably has a strong emphasis on craft. If a would-be or even 
established screenwriter picks up one of their books, they have made the choice to tell stories 
and wants to know how to tell them better. It follows that they are unlikely to be interested in 
the deeper conceptualizations of the process. Like a mechanic who wants to fix a car, if they 
want to know how to fix the fan belt, it is not necessary (or required) for them conceptualize 
that they are really doing when they fix a car, or even how the fan belt interrelates to the rest 
of the machine.  
However, the interrogation of the professional literature performed in this chapter 
demonstrates that the concept of film-as-argument is articulated in all but name, described by 
each guru (with the exception of Field) with different levels of priority and intensity, whether 
or not it is cognizant. The analysis has further demonstrated that in many cases the social 
practice this thesis is defending is likely to be cognizant by these gurus, but a full 
acknowledgment of film-as-argument is blocked by various concerns and anxieties, most 
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notably the avoidance of didacticism. The lack of acknowledgment is problematic, and 
significantly contributes to the tradition being largely incognizant overall.  
 
5.2 Essential Directing Methodology: Key Texts 
 
With regard to story (as opposed to other skills such as helping actors achieve believable 
performances) the director’s job as head creative could be considered a remarkably 
straightforward one. It would in no way be intellectually or professionally contentious to 
regard this creative responsibility as essentially a process of interpretation and adaptation; 
directors interpret the script and then adapt the writing to the visual and audio form. The 
novelist and screenwriter Roald Dahl said of film director Lewis Gilbert, “What I admired so 
much about Lewis Gilbert was that he just took the screenplay and shot it. That’s the way to 
direct: You either trust your writer or you don’t,” (Pulver, 2018). Playwright, screenwriter and 
director David Mamet is even more direct about the art of directing, that the director is the 
Dionysian extension of the screenwriter (1992, p. xv) and further, as somewhat of Kuleshov-
effect fundamentalist, that directors tell the story through “a juxtaposition of images that are 
basically uninflected,” (1992, p. 2).  
  In his paper Directing for Cinematic Virtual Reality: how the traditional film 
director’s craft applies to immersive environments and notions of presence (2017), John 
Mateer provides a useful primary conceptualization of the director’s role: that of 
‘transportation’. Originally designed to analyse written stories, transportation is a theory that 
is defined by Green and Brock (2000, p. 701) in their study The Role of Transportation 
Theory in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives (which, in turn, takes Gerrig’s description 
(1993, pp. 10-11) as a base). Green and Block describe transportation as “…the extent that 
individuals are absorbed into a story or transported into a narrative world”. They 
conceptualize transportation into a narrative world “as a distinct mental process, an 
integrative melding of attention, imagery and feelings”, and also believe that audiences “may 
show effects of the story on their real world beliefs,” (Green and Brock, p. 701), a view which 
is complementary to the central thesis of this study. 
 In another example of how imprecise and flexible academic and professional story 
jargon can be, Mateer defines transportation as “…classically defined as ‘suspension of 
disbelief’ in film and ‘presence’ in VR” (Mateer, 2017, p. 17). However, French New Wave 
critic and co-founder of Cahiers du Cinema Andre Bazin used ‘presence’ to describe the idea 
that the viewer feels placed within the time/place as the cinematic narrative (Bazin, 1976). 
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However, whichever term is used, Mateer believes that “In both media, [conventional screen 
and VR] transportation is the primary responsibility of the director,” (Mateer, 2017, p. 17). 
 ‘Suspension of disbelief’, or the acceptance of fiction as reality, is perhaps the most 
common term used in a cinematic context, even though it was it originally invented by 
Coleridge to describe reading epic poetry (Coleridge, 2014, Chapter 14). It is also worth 
noting that Coleridge called believed it a ‘willing’ suspension, whereas more recently the 
view that it is ‘unwilling’ (Kivy, 2011, Chapter 7) has been suggested. Whether willing or 
unwilling, the consensus is that the director’s role is a three-stage process: interpretation, 
adaptation and transportation. To formalize this further, in his goal to transfer the skills of a 
conventional screen director to a virtual reality (V.R.) director, Mateer also provides a useful 
summary of how this three-stage process is broken down:  
 
As discussed by Richards (1992), Weston (2003), Proferes (2013) and others, this 
starts with the director undertaking a detailed analysis of the script to: 
• Formulate a specific interpretation of the story 
• Define the overall theme and message based on the interpretation 
• Define how information will be revealed – does audience learn as the 
characters (or subjects, if documentary) do? Does the audience know more 
than the characters/subjects? Less? Etc.  
• Define the overall objectives of core characters/subjects and the dynamics 
between them – whose story is it? What do they want? What do they need? 
Who are the allies? Enemies? Etc. 
• Extract story elements to inform realization and creative production choices 
(i.e. the director’s vision)  
                    (Mateer, 2017, p. 18) 
 
Therefore, with transportation as the goal, the director interprets and adapts. Mateer adds that, 
“Creation of ‘mood’ or ‘tone’ is readily accomplished through strategic choices in setting, 
production design, costume, lighting, sound and other presentational attributes as well as 
through blocking, pacing and delivery of performances or portrayal of activity,” (Mateer, 
2017, p. 18). 
Mateer credits verisimilitude as the key techniques necessary for transportation to be 
achieved (Mateer, 2017, pp. 18-21). This is “the enabling of viewers to mentally construct 
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compelling realities irrespective of the fidelity of pictorial or aural representations of story 
events”), continuity (“continuity of viewpoint’ continuity of motion; continuity of setting: 
continuity of sound”), and the concept of organic direction (“whereby production choices 
made are motivated based on a consistent interpretation of story elements, setting and 
character that are logically supported by script analysis. Each aspect of the production needs 
to reinforce others to create a coherent virtual world with clear ‘rules’”). 
 In terms of specific camera/sound techniques providing specific results with 
audiences, these will be discussed in depth in the case studies chapters of this study. Below is 
simply a brief summary of the key techniques a director has at their disposal to tell their story. 
Such a list is possible because although many feature film directors have their own variation 
or style when it comes to either behaviour on set or shot design, and even though the 
techniques steadily evolve, the fundamentals of mainstream film grammar are uniform. These 
fundamentals are based on a century of empirical analysis by industry with the global 
audience as the sample group. As Daniel Arijon states in his book Grammar of the Film 
Language, “If any value is to be found in their rules, it is that they are the production of 
experimentation, an accumulation of solutions found by everyday practice of the craft,” 
(Arijon, 1991, p. 2). The film director Frank Capra regarded film as “…one of three universal 
languages, the other two: mathematics and music” (Edgar-Hunt, Marland and Rawle, 2010, p. 
7). 
The summary is not a sociological, cultural or economic investigation of filmmaking 
practices, as those approaches are beyond the scope of this study. It is essentially a review of 
film linguistics, a short uncontroversial précis of the director’s ‘toolkit’ in order to provide a 
foundation for the defence of the film-as-argument thesis. It is based on the books that 
represent the most well-referenced and therefore professionally influential industry-facing 
summaries. These are: Film directing Shot by Shot: Visualizing from concept to screen (Katz, 
1991); Grammar of the Film Language (Arijon, 1976); Directing: Film Techniques & 
Aesthetics (Rabiger, 2008); On Filmmaking (Mackendrick, 2004) and Film Art: An 
Introduction (Bordwell, Thompson and Smith, 2018). It must be noted that although the 
director ultimately is concerned with the intangible (story, theme, tone, audience response), 






The Director’s Toolkit 
Shot Size 
Shot Size refers to how large an object appears in the frame. As Katz mentions, “the universal 
units of composition are the long shot, the medium shot, and the close-up,” (Katz, 1991, p. 
121). There are various other in-between sizes (medium close-up, for instance) and Katz 
admits that the precise definitions of each size is variable: A close-up is usually from the neck 
up, the medium shot about waist up and a long shot is the whole body.  
A long shot is usually used to show context. This can be for purely informational 
reasons, but can also be used effectively to convey emotions such as loneliness.  
A close-up is used to help the audience connect emotionally with the character, the 
bigger the eyes the more they are likely to connect and get a sense of an internal life (Katz, 
1991, p. 123): a front-on angle has the most impact, providing the whole face and two eyes, as 
the face turns away from the camera into profile, the impact is diminished. A profile shot 
invites the face to be examined as an object rather than related to as a subject, (Mackendrick, 
2004, p. 225). 
A medium shot provides more intimacy than a long shot and more contextual 
information than a close-up: it is a useful jack-of-all-trades shot that has functioned as the 
‘workhorse’ for dialogue scenes throughout the sound period (Katz, 1991, p. 127). It is also a 
dominant shot size in comedy, as comedic performances require less emotion and a sense of 
bodily movement.  
 
Camera Height 
The camera can be positioned at a neutral height (usually approximately the eye-height of the 
characters). However, if the camera is positioned significantly lower than the eye-height, this 
can result in the actor be presented in an unflattering way (most people do not look good from 
below, usually this gives an individual a double chin) but when used in a Medium or Long 
Shot is used to make a character look stronger or heroic. Shooting an actor from above is 
usually used to make them look weaker. 
 
Composition 
It must also be noted that the precise framing of each shot size is usually determined by the 
conventions of post-Renaissance art, defined by what the human eye considers ‘pleasing’ in 
the frame (Katz, 1991, p. 123).  
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 The guide the viewer’s eyes around the frame, Mateer (2017) summarises the 
following widely-used tools of differentiation: Differences in grouping; Differences in colour; 
Differences in scale; Differences in shape; Differences in visibility; and Differences in 
motion. He also offers the example of Spielberg directing the Normandy landing scene in 
Saving Private Ryan (1998):  
 
Spielberg made the choice that Miller would not be wearing his helmet, thus visually 
offsetting him… Second, Spielberg blocked the scene so that Miller was the only 
person approaching camera and the camera also moved to him… These choices are 
wholly consistent with the ‘reality’ Spielberg sought to portray yet also facilitated his 
control of viewer perspective, empathy and attention. 
                    (Mateer, 2017, p. 22) 
 
How characters, objects and backgrounds are laid out in the frame is a strong tool for the 
director, and the post-Renaissance rule of thirds for comfortable composition can be used or 
subverted for various effects. Frames can be cramped to make the audience feel 
claustrophobic, bare to make them feel emotionally barren or overly symmetrical to imply a 
sense of formal theatrical design and the hand of the filmmaker. Wes Anderson is an excellent 
example of the latter approach (for example, in The Grand Budapest Hotel, 2014). 
Composition can be used to make us like or dislike a character in the most subliminal of ways 
(whenever we see them on screen, the framing is dissatisfying), or believe a couple should or 
shouldn’t be together (always in the frame together).  
 
Lenses 
All lenses distort the image to a greater or lesser degree and in addition to focal lengths, can 
capture laser-sharp or slightly softer images, depending on the age and construction of the 
glass used.   
Long lenses are regarded as ‘flattering’ the human face, as they compress space front-
to-back to make noses shorter and eyes less deep-set. Wide lenses expand space front to back, 
resulting in ‘unflattering’ images. In this way, the director can again temper the audiences’ 
desire or connection to a character simply by way of the lens used (Rabiger, 2008, p.359).  
Most mainstream romantic-comedies shoot mainly on long lenses and much dystopian 
science-fiction priorities use of wide angles. Terry Gilliam (Brazil, 1985, Twelve Monkeys, 
1995) is a prominent proponent of the wide-angle close-up to help create dystopian worlds. 
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Camera movement  
Arijon (1976) has twenty basic rules for camera movement, as “the moving camera… can so 
easily destroy illusion”, (Arijon, 1991, p. 380) and therefore transportation. Cameras can now 
move on any plane, smoothly (on tracks, jibs, cranes or steadicam) or less smoothly (hand-
held). The movement can be subtle and disguised, as per standard ‘invisible’ classical 
Hollywood continuity rules (Bordwell, Thompson and Smith, 2018) or obvious and 
confronting. The Hunger Games (Ross, 2012) was critically derided for using overly extreme 
handheld techniques to dizzying effect. Though not a physical movement, the use of 
‘zooming’ (magnifying the image during a shot) is another technique possible.  
However the director chooses to move the camera, the decision is based on whether to 
engage the audience intellectually (panning to reveal elements of a location needed for plot 
purposes), emotionally (tracking in to connect us to a certain character’s epiphany) or 
sexually (the jib shot up the female body in order to sexually objectify her (Mulvey, 1975)).  
In each film the camera has a personality, which although intangible is revealed 
through tangible camera technique. Rabiger (2008, p. 461) succinctly outlines the concept that 
the camera is a ‘concerned observer’: sometimes smart, sometimes stupid but always an 
intelligence making decisions about what the audience should see. This is perhaps best 
demonstrated in the Mel Brooks satire of Hitchcock films, High Anxiety (1977): the camera 
films two plotting villains from underneath a glass coffee table. As they lay down their cups 
and saucers the camera has to subtly reposition to maintain the shot. As it becomes clear that 
the characters are aware of the presence of the camera and lay down unrealistic amounts of 
crockery to spoil the shot, the camera is forced to nervously then manically reposition.  
 
Lighting 
Lighting is highly influential in the setting of mood and (along with composition, where a 
character is looking and movement) to direct the eye of the viewer. In Suspicion (1941), 
Hitchcock famously put a light in the cup of milk Cary Grant was carrying up the stairs to 
subliminally draw the audience’s attention (Truffaut, 1985).  
The dominant form of lighting in mainstream film is chiaroscuro lighting (Dalle 
Vacche, 2009). Originally the term was used to describe the use of extreme contrasts between 
light and shade for dramatic effect, but the modern usage – now often synonymous with the 
term chiaroscuro modelling, is the use of light and shade to make two dimensional artworks 
feel three-dimensional.  Different genres have different lighting techniques that highlight the 
form: gritty crime thrillers or neo-noir films tend to use traditional chiaroscuro techniques of 
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stylized high contrast taken from German Expressionism whereas comedy will go for much 
‘flatter’-style lighting that draws little attention to itself. Lighting can be used to unify the 




It must be noted that there is no ‘mise-en-scene’ (literally “placing on stage”), department on 
a professional set. Mise-en-scene traditionally refers to the combination of the organisation of 
everything before the camera: sets, cast, costumes, composition and lighting, which exists as 
discrete departments in the professional world.  
Production Design refers to the entire art department that includes, set design, dressing 
and props. Each element is key to the storytelling. Take the example of a simple office: is it a 
pleasant or oppressive location? Fundamental design and architecture techniques (production 
designers typically have an architectural background, such as Ken Adam, production designer 
of many of the Bond films) will be used to define the emotional character of the filmed space. 
For instance, ‘pleasant’ could equate to a sense of space and colour, ‘oppressive’ to low 
ceilings and use of monotone (Rabiger, 2008, pp. 304-310). 
 
Palette  
Palette is not to be confused with the overall ‘tone’ of the film. Tone is a key intangible with 
which the director works, and if inconsistent or simply wrongly judged, can irrevocably 
undermine a film. Often directors are known for a consistent tone across their entire oeuvre, 
such as Wes Anderson (arguably a playful theatricality with a melancholy edge) or Guillermo 
del Toro (beautiful, brutal and magical). 
 Palette is certainly a key element of overall tone, but also part of the visual strategy of 
the film that includes the choice of camera, lens, film stock/digital format, grade (colour 
change/correction during post-production), production design, costume and lighting 
departments. Each colour and combination of colours has a specific emotional and 
psychological effect: reds and browns signify warmth, blues and whites are cold, deep colours 
indicate vibrancy and pastels calmness. Some films pick just one or two colours to dominate a 
film. For example Lock, Stock and Two Smoking Barrels (Ritchie, 1998) chose a strong sepia-
tan-tint to all images (mostly added in the post-production grading process) to signify a 1970s 
‘retro’ tone to a modern day story and Payback (Helgeland, 1999) used mostly blues and 
blacks to give a film noir feel to a colour palette. 
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Film Stock, Codecs & the Camera  
The director’s visual strategy also extends to the choice of either film stock (still used by 
many top filmmakers today such a Christopher Nolan and Quentin Tarantino) or digital 
format. How a picture is encoded is technically done via a ‘codec’ and there are many choices 
to be made as each manufacturer has their own proprietary codecs that claim superior image 
capture. In the days when film was dominant, Fuji film stock was famous for its vibrant 
greens and Kodak for its vibrant reds (Trachtman, 2012, p. 97).   
There is a similar, if more complex relationship between codecs and it comes down to 
creative choice by the director in conjunction with the Director of Photography. This 
discussion is part of the discussion that includes the choice of camera and overall resolution 
of image. For reference, as of 2019, the typical cinema screen displays at what is referred to 
as ‘2k,’ or an equivalency of 2000 lines of resolution. Most professional format cameras will 
shoot at between 1k and 4k, but now up to 8k is available. How each individual camera 
marries the optical elements (the physical light and the lens) with the digital process of 
encoding is subtly different and each camera can be programmed differently. All these 
choices are critical, as they affect how a film ‘feels’ the audience.  
 
Editing & Transitions 
How images are juxtaposed is a key part to cinematic storytelling. “Let the cut tell the story… 
You always want to tell the story in cuts. Otherwise you have not got dramatic action, you’ve 
got narration,” (Mamet, 1992, p. 2). The dominant form of editing is ‘continuity editing,’ 
giving the audience the impression that the action on screen is consistent in time and space 
and hiding the technique of editing from the viewer. Daniel Arijon’s book Grammar of the 
Film Language (1991) seeks to exhaustively categorise and outline every possible technique 
that can be applied to this style. One key technique of continuity editing is the ‘cut on action,’ 
whereby the edit is made during a movement, so the eye is distracted and the edit not noticed. 
Another standard technique is the use of transitions (referred to as ‘film punctuation’ by 
Arijon (1991, p. 579) and ‘ellipses’ by academics) such as the dissolve and fade to imply a 
change of time and/or space. However, any recent watcher of modern western mainstream 
film will see that the use of transitional effects are on the decline and used more in films that 
want to evoke a traditional feel (such as J. J. Abrams’ Star Wars, Episode VII: The Force 
Awakens, 2015). 
We are now living in the time of what David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson (2007) 
refer to as Intensified Continuity, essentially classical technique intensified by use of quicker 
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cutting, juxtaposition of different lens lengths, closer framings and an overly mobile camera. 
Director Michael Bay (the Transformers films, from 2007) and Spike Jonze (Her, 2014) are 
both consistently use this technique.   
Montage has long been held up as a technique unique to cinema, but as Katz (1991) 
notes, montage is a problematic term. “To the Europeans all editing is montage; to the early 
Soviet filmmakers, Kuleshov, Pudovkin, and Eisenstein, it meant their special brand of 
associative editing,” (Katz, 1991, p. 325). At its most basic, montage is a film sequence that 
juxtaposes usually short shots to convey an overall meaning (often compressing time and 
convey a lot of information quickly).  Katz conceptualizes it as a condensed narrative in and 
of itself. The filmmaker most famous for using montage was Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948). 
Eisenstein believed there were five types of montage (metric, rhythmic, tonal, associational 
and intellectual). He is most remembered for the latter, intellectual montage, where he saw it 
as “an idea that arises from the collision of independent shots,” (Metz, 1974, p. 133) where 
the function of the montage was to evoke intellectual concepts and opinions. The 
effectiveness of the intellectual montage has been debated ever since. In his paper October 
and the Question of Cinematic Thinking (2013), Damian Cox argues that the value of 
intellectual montage “does not reside in the insertion of ideas into the minds of an audience, 
but in the experiential opportunity it affords an audience to enter the space of reasons 
alongside the filmmaker”. In mainstream film the ambition of montage is far more modest, 
where montage is used often to truncate time with a clear overall cohesive (if simple) 
intended effect. Straightforward examples are those such as the ‘falling in love montage,’ the 
‘now I’m alone montage’ (for both see When Harry Met Sally, (Reiner, 1988) or the Rocky 
training ‘getting fitter’ montage from any of the Rocky films (1976-). Most are usually set to 
non-diegetic score.  
 
Sound Design 
Sound Design encompasses the entire aural strategy for the film, which includes music in the 
same way the production design includes costume but does not actively create them (Rabiger, 
2008, p. 204, Bordwell, Thompson and Smith, 2018, p. 270). Sound Design is typically split 
in to five areas: dialogue, foley, spot effects, atmosphere and music. Foley is often referred to 
as ‘footsteps’ as the foley artist primarily re-records footsteps and clothes rustles. Spot effects 
are discrete sound effects such as gunshots and door slams. In a typical mainstream feature 
film with a budget of over $1million US dollars, most of the sound the audience hears in a 
film is not recorded at source. Every sound will be replaced, including dialogue (called 
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‘looping’) so the sound designer has complete flexibility with regard to how to mix those 
sounds together for effect. The sound designer will treat all sounds in the film much like the 
composer treats instruments in an orchestra, to be used to affect mood and tone (Bordwell, 
Thompson and Smith, 2018, p. 270).  
A very famous example of this is in The Godfather (Coppola, 1972) where Michael is 
about the make his first ‘hit’. The noise of the train above the restaurant is used as a 
subconscious proxy for his own beating heart, the repetitive ‘da-dum’ sound of the train on 
the tracks getting louder and faster as Michael’s moment of truth nears. 
 Sound is classed in two ways, and these terms whilst primarily academic are used in 
practical tuition books: Diegetic (existing in the world of the film) and Non-diegetic (sound 
that only the audience can hear). As with music, sound is an effective (and relatively low-
cost) tool for the director to subliminally influence the viewer. As French film director Robert 
Bresson commented, “The eye sees, but the ear imagines” (Rabiger, 2008, p. 203). Sound is 
also the only aspect of the film that exists in true three-dimensions, physically surrounding the 
audience and quite literally bouncing off the walls. 
  
Music 
Bordwell, Thompson and Smith comment that, “Sound is often treated as an accompaniment 
to the images, but we need to recognize that it can actively shape how we understand them,” 
(2018, p. 270). This is true of all sound, but especially of music which represents a distinct 
universal language of emotional information. If pathos is a key element to persuasion then 
film music (both diegetic and non-diegetic) is perhaps one of the most powerful of all the 
cinematic tools.   
Music is typically used in a film to tell the audience how to interpret a scene 
emotionally (if someone falls over, is it supposed to be funny or tragic?) and referring back to 
the Rocky training montage sequences, these are very reliant on the music to tell the necessary 
story, as do most modern montage sequences. The sense of progression and triumph is being 
carried musically and to a lesser extent the edit, over and above the performance and visual 
design. To demonstrate the power of music, the viewer only has to substitute the music of the 
Rocky training montage with a score that is melancholy or tragic, for the images to begin to 
take on a poignant, rather than inspirational edge.  
Film directors are well aware of the power of music on their films, perhaps the most 
extreme example of this being when director Norman Jewison reversed the usual 
methodology of the music being timed to the pictures when he allowed composer Michel 
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Legrand to compose the music first for the famous chess sequence in The Thomas Crown 
Affair (1968), and then cut the scene to time with the music. The score was nominated for an 
American Academy Award for Best Soundtrack (Dawson, 2009, p. 92).   
 
The Actor & The Character 
Choosing the right actor is critical for the film director, especially the lead(s). The lead is not 
only necessary to attract the financing for a film, they also needed to both convince as the 
character and have the necessary intangible charisma to ‘carry’ the film (that is to be moment-
to-moment engaging enough for the entire running length of the story).  
As the screenwriting gurus outline, at the most fundamental level the character is a 
storytelling device like all the others listed here, albeit a very dominant form (this also 
includes the hair, make-up and costume departments). Characters communicate the story by 
their actions and reactions (and appearance) and in the case of the lead, their character arc 
carries most thematic weight of the film. As the study examined with Sinnerbrink in Chapter 
2, the audience derives meaning from the shared cinematic experience of engaging with the 
perspectives of other (fictional characters) depicted in complex situations, moved to reflect on 
what they are seeing through emotional engagement and estrangement, moral sympathy and 
moral-cognitive dissonance (2018, p. 198).    
 
Dialogue 
It is perhaps ironic that dialogue is considered the least effective tool of cinematic persuasion 
(Seger, 1994, p. 129) as it is in the verbal realm where arguments can be made in the 
conventional sense, literally out of the mouths of the characters. Although film specializes in 
‘show, don’t tell’, dialogue is necessary for realism, nuancing of character and theme and 
inevitable exposition. David Mamet, famous for (usually expletive-ridden) dialogue himself 
regards it as simply the “sprinkles on the ice-cream,” (Mamet, 1992, p. 72).  
However, other screenwriters, such as Quentin Tarantino (Pulp Fiction, 1994), Joss 
Whedon (The Avengers, 2012) and Aaron Sorkin (The Social Network, 2010) are considered 
to have elevated dialogue to an art form in itself, with Hollywood screenwriter Scott 
Rosenberg (Jumanji: Welcome to the Jungle, 2017) going so far to claim that “…we’re all just 








Dominant industry thinking does not include an overall conception as film-as-argument for 
either screenwriters or directors. Practical screenwriting literature prioritizes on individual 
craft elements (structure, dialogue, character) rather than focusing on the practice as a whole 
and practical directing literature conceptualizes the director’s job as one of interpretation, 
adaptation and transportation, where the creativity based on translating a pre-existing work.  
 As the first section of this chapter demonstrated, an account of film-as-argument was 
described in all but name in the industry screenwriting literature. The directing literature adds 
very little to any overall conception of the craft as a social practice due to the primarily 
translative nature of the work. The director has far more tools to use than the screenwriter, but 
it is to the same ultimate end. Yet the director is responsible not simply for transportation, but 
for a particular kind of transportation. They are seeking to establish a point of view, and a 
point of view is a necessary accompaniment to an argument; in an argument, they do not 
simply have people doing things before an audience, they have them making a point for the 
appreciation of an audience. This is what the various techniques outlined serve. 
 This can be best illustrated by highlighting the difference between ‘photographing the 
action’ and ‘using the camera to tell a story’. Taking the scene of ‘teacher lecturing to 
students’, photographing the action would be shooting merely the most functional of coverage 
(close-up and medium shot of teacher, wide-shot master of the classroom, wide shot reaction 
of the students, one or two close-ups of key students for more nuanced reactions). Any 
professional director would be able to do this with no further recourse to the script other than 
understanding the physical and spatial relationships between the on-screen players. However, 
all of the dominant texts examined in this chapter stress the need not simply for the physical 
actions to be covered but for the intangible elements to be communicated also, essentially (but 
not limited to) the subtext of each scene. This is ‘using the camera to tell the story’- the way 
the director uses the tools as their disposal (not just the camera) to communicate the key point 
of the scene, usually not clear from physical and spatial relationships alone. But why? 
Transportation would take place whether or not this strategy was used. It would augment the 
drama, certainly, but as the previous chapters have demonstrated, untethered drama – be it as 
entertainment, emotional manipulation or knowledge assimilation does not hold with the 
demonstrable traditions of the practice. The drama serves the transportation, the transportation 
serves the point of view, and the point of view is an integral element of the argument.   
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Rabiger’s concept of the ‘concerned observer’ (2008, p. 461), the intellectual and 
emotional prism through which the audience sees the film, consciously making choices as to 
what is viewed and heard, is perhaps the best example of a tool that lays bare the distinction 
between tangible technique in the service of intangible elements. Whether the concerned 
observer is conceptualised as the ‘camera’, the ‘film’ or the ‘director’, it is a distinct 
consciousness that sits between the audience and the images and sounds, representing, if 
sometimes wholly disguised, an indisputable (as well as quite literal) point of view. As the 
following chapters will detail, the tools of the director’s trade only really make sense in the 
light of film-as-argument; the tools of the argument-maker. 
In Chapter 4, the question was posed as to why the thesis defends an account of a 
singular internal good of the practice, rather than attempting an approach that comprises 
multiple goods? The answer is twofold, both of which are consistent with the critical 
hermeneutic nature of the study. First, as this chapter has demonstrated, the significant 
industry literature as defined by Conor (2014), which represents the orthodoxy as a whole, all 
defends a singular conception of the internal goods of mainstream narrative feature 
filmmaking. Although these conceptions are not articulated as internal goods and often seem 
to compete with the thesis – the authors are wholly convinced that there is one underlying 
purpose to the social practice, be it to answer how a human being should live their life 
(Mckee, 1998, p. 11), make the world a better place (Vogler, 1998, p.3) or to provide a moral 
(Aronson, 2000, p.187). Second, an interrogation of the films themselves lend substantial 
weight to, and is consistent with, this singular conception and will be demonstrated with key 






Why Failures Succeed –  
The Cinema of Compensation 
 
6.1 Definitions of Success 
 
It is a quirk of this thesis that, as it is concerned with narrative film as social practice rather 
the ontological declaration of what narrative feature films are, that the majority of completed 
mainstream narrative feature films can ‘fail’ yet still support the thesis. In the following 
chapters the study will analyse, with recourse to examples and putative counter-examples, 
precisely how film-as-argument functions successfully, but it is equally necessary to outline 
how precisely the failures manifest. This is a pertinent question as failures, as defined by this 
thesis, represent the majority of mainstream narrative feature films produced – yet the 
industry survives. A full account of this apparent anomaly is necessary if the case for film-as-
argument is to convince.  
 To begin, a more precise definition of failure is required. Currently feature films are 
classed as ‘successful’ in two non-mutually exclusive categories: (1) Critical Success (liked 
by critics, both professional and amateur); and (2) Financial Success (liked by audiences to 
the degree that they are willing to pay for the experience of seeing the film in the cinema or 
on other platforms). However, as regards this thesis a film is only regarded as successful if it 
fulfils the single criteria of (3) Moving an audience to worthwhile conclusion in a worthwhile 
way. Obviously, this conception is compatible with (1) and (2), and a case could be made that 
if a film is successful in (3) then (1) and (2) should follow, but with so many external factors 
involved in (1) and (2) such as marketing strategy, budget and timing of release, this can 
never be assured.  
 The mainstream industry is primarily concerned with (1), for without financial success 
there would be no industry, and to a lesser extent (2). The idea of the ‘prestige picture’ has 
been around since the early studio era (Time, 1937), where a modest financial loss is deemed 
acceptable payment for the perception of an institution that cares about less popular but 
worthy creative voices. Such a perception, amongst other things, helps attract key talent 
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(primarily directors and stars) to that institution and projects that enable (1), and so the cycle 
continues.   
 Furthermore, by the definition of success (3), not only is it possible for some films to 
fail, but inevitably most films will fail to varying degrees, be they attempting to move people 
to a worthwhile conclusion in an inefficient or overly manipulative way (examples of this 
explored later in this chapter), moving people in a worthwhile way to a conclusion that is not 
worthwhile or both.  
 The Cinema of Compensation is new conceptual work I have developed that itemizes 
and systematizes how mainstream narrative feature films can achieve (1) and (2) without 
fulfilling (3). Some films comprise almost completely of compensations and still achieve (1) 
and (2), depending on the depth of the compensations and other contextual factors. To achieve 
(3), to be a film-as-worthwhile argument without flaw, a film would contain no 
compensations whatsoever. Although it would require a new empirical study, a case could be 
made that one of the ways film institutions clash with practitioners is that they apply a system 
of compensations to every production, although they would likely conceptualize the 
methodology as ‘insurances’ against a ‘bad’ film (read: unentertaining or technically poor), as 
opposed to compensations for a flawed argument. With regard to incognizant practitioners 
holding other conceptions (be they highly developed, moderately formed or completely 
instinctive) of the practice as either ‘just entertainment’, ‘just telling stories’ or providing 
desire satisfaction, these conceptions have already been challenged in Chapter 4. When such 
conceptions dominate a project, practitioners are mistaking the sugar coating for the pill, or as 
this chapter describes it, the compensations for the argument. 
 
6.2 Compensations as Insurances 
 
Below is not a summary of tangible techniques and intangible choices that practitioners can 
employ to compensate for a flawed argument. Often the same elements would exist in a 
version of the film that was without flaw, so their application is not simply a matter of 
inclusion (although it can be) but of combination and emphasis.  
 A culinary example is particularly useful. Let us say for example that a mainstream 
narrative feature film is a chicken pizza. And let us say for purposes of simplification, the 
ingredients of a chicken pizza are a pizza base, tomato sauce, cheese, chicken and pepper. It 
was always conceived to be a chicken pizza, and if the qualities of the ingredients are good, it 
will be a flawless chicken pizza. This obviously represents the film-as-worthwhile-argument 
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(or even film-as-entertainment) without flaw. But what if there is a problem with the logic of 
the argument? Perhaps due to the influence from either the institution or a star actor, changes 
are made to the story that is not in the best interests of the production. What are the choices 
for the practitioner? Can the flaw be disguised? Can the audience be distracted? Or if they 
cannot be distracted can other elements work harder to compensate for what is an identifiable 
fault? Using the analogy, if the tomato sauce is bad, can more cheese disguise it? This is 
where emphasis comes into play. In film terms, and specifically taking the comedy genre, this 
could mean that if story logic is lacking, the gags will need to be funnier; not ideal, but 
ultimately a likely satisfying compensation.   
 But what if, going back to our pizza, the extra cheese is not helping, the chicken is not 
making up for it and the pepper is making no impact? Then new ingredients will have to be 
added. Now it becomes a matter of both emphasis and inclusion. Perhaps the chef now adds 
high quality ground beef, pepperoni and bacon to make it a meat feast. The pizza now tastes 
wonderful, and in one way is a successful dish, but as it was never intended to be a meat feast 
it still represents a failure to the chef (and other chefs), namely that the great meat feast is 
really just a failed but artfully disguised chicken pizza. Going back to our comedy, if the story 
logic is lacking and the gags are not compensating (be it at script or shooting stage), this 
might mean adding new cast members that are particularly famous whom were never initially 
intended to be an element in the film – perhaps making it an ensemble comedy. If these new 
high-profile cast members make the necessary impact, it means that even if the film is both 
critically and commercially successful, for the practitioners it really represents a failed non-
ensemble comedy. Annie Hall (1977) is an example of a significant critical and commercial 
hit that was nevertheless a disappointment to the writer and director Woody Allen. The 
original cut didn’t even feature the character Annie Hall as a central character (Faraci, 2012).  
 So how to tell if a compensation is a compensation rather than a bona-fide element of 
sound film-as-worthwhile argument storytelling? This process is rather more straightforward: 
if the element is integral to the storytelling it is not a compensation. Determining whether 
an aspect of a film is a compensation as the study defines it involves answering a series of 
questions: (1) Is the film’s argument significantly flawed? (2) Does the aspect in question 
improve audiences’ experience of the film or improve the film’s marketability? If the answer 
is yes to both (1) and (2), then the aspect is likely a compensation. But there is the possibility 
that, although the film’s argument is weak, the aspect under consideration nonetheless plays a 
crucial role in it. In this case, the aspect isn’t a compensation (in spite of the fact that it 
improves things). It is still a part of the argument. So, consider this follow up question. (3) 
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Would the film’s argument be further weakened or indeed undermined if the aspect of the 
film in question were removed or substituted with a non-compensatory equivalent? If the 
answer to (3) is no, then the aspect in question is a compensation. If the answer is yes, then 
the aspect in question is a part of the argument, whatever its merits, not a compensation for a 
failed argument. Of course, if a film (such as a typical exploitation film) entirely fails to 
present an argument, then this final question is moot; whatever improves the film is a 
compensation for the fact that the film is fundamentally pointless.  
To use the celebrity cameo (sometimes referred to ‘stunt’ casting in the trade) as an 
example of a compensation, the subtraction test (3) above does not mean that the role 
disappears when the element is removed, just the celebrity aspect of the role. For instance, 
veritable superstars Kanye West, Harrison Ford, Liam Neeson, Jim Carrey, Marion Cotillard, 
Kirsten Dunst, Vince Vaughn, Sacha Baron Cohen, Will Smith, Tina Fey and Amy Poehler 
all appeared in the ‘clash of the news anchors’ scene at the end of Anchorman 2: The Legend 
Continues (McKay, 2013). Whilst it was necessary to have other anchor characters in the 
scene, it was not necessary for them to be celebrities, therefore it is an example of a 
compensation by way of emphasis (if the roles themselves were not necessary for purposes of 
argument, then it would be compensation by way of addition). However, if the comedy of the 
film were based around the idea of celebrity cameos (such as the TV shows The Larry 
Sanders Show (1992-1998) or Extras (2005-2007)) then the celebrity element would be 
simply a core part of the storytelling.  
 The compensations are listed and explained in depth below. An attempt has been made 
to be as exhaustive as is reasonably possible, with the various elements determined by 
recourse to reflective practice, industry and academic discourses, and technical and formal 
trends. Essentially the approach was to endeavour to define the meaningful ‘atoms’ of a 
mainstream narrative feature film: the element is included if, however intangible, it can be 
isolated and potentially leveraged to compensate for flawed argument. 
 
1. Happy Endings  
In his book Happy Endings in Hollywood Cinema: Cliché, Convention and the Final Couple, 
James MacDowell comments that, “The Hollywood ‘happy ending’ is among the most over-
utilised and under-analysed concepts in discussions of popular cinema” (2014, p. 1). As 
MacDowell notes, although happy endings are clearly not limited to Hollywood, the term 
‘Hollywood ending’ is primarily used as a pejorative term, implying that the end to the 
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narrative has not merely ended happily but at the expense of realism, even if judged solely 
from within the logic of the story world. 
 Herein lies the difference between a happy ending which is not a compensation, and a 
happy ending that is nothing but a compensation; the former is a fully integrated element, the 
latter an addition that lacks consistency. David Mamet takes an Aristotelian view of endings, 
in that a perfect ending is one that is surprising yet inevitable (Mamet, 2003), which is another 
way of saying that the close of the film works for both the drama and the argument. The 
‘surprise’ supplies the necessary impact that drama requires, the ‘inevitable’ indicating a 
wholly logical argument, which once laid out is deemed logically faultless.   
 Examples of Hollywood institutions interfering in the endings of mainstreams feature 
films are ubiquitous and well catalogued. Previously the study has discussed Tom Cruise’s 
Risky Business (Brickman, 1983), where the original ending sees Cruise’s character Joel 
suffering for his dalliance with a prostitute by not getting into Princeton and being found out 
by his parents. The ending was altered on the studios’ proviso (Warner Brothers): Joel gets 
into Princeton with his parents none the wiser. However, this intervention, perhaps counter-
intuitively, illustrates that it does not necessary follow that a sad or bittersweet ending 
converted ‘eleventh-hour’ into a happy ending, is necessarily a Hollywood ending; it could be 
just the right course correction that gives the film the Mamet/Aristotelian ending. Happy does 
not always mean Hollywood. In this case, the change was successful, perhaps due to its being 
a more conventional choice that is more consistent tonally with the exciting, aspirational story 
that preceded it. The new ending may have in fact given the film a more consistent argument, 
although critically not one the practitioners initially set out to make.  
The more recent film Get Out (Peele, 2017) did precisely the same thing, also 
changing its ‘sad but fair’ ending, this time due to the election of Donald Trump. Framed as a 
horror-satire, instead of Chris, the African-American protagonist defeating the antagonists but 
going to prison (a comment on issues of institutionalised racism within the penal system), he 
now defeats the antagonists before being picked up by his best friend (with no threat of prison 
hanging over him). The thoughts were that the target audience needed a bit more cathartic joy 
(Peele, 2017, director’s commentary), which the new modified happy ending provided, with 
only minimal changes. These ‘compensatory’ endings are of note, as the compensation itself 
destroys the argument in pursuit of wish-fulfilment. It compensates, not for a flawed 
argument, but perhaps a difficult truth, by changing the argument. If the argument that is 
substituted is close enough to the original (thus a consistent argument in line with all previous 
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narrative choices) then the audience will accept it. However, these examples are the exception 
rather than the rule.  
A more typical example of the happy ending as Hollywood ending as compensation-
that-fails is a film like L.A. Confidential (Hanson, 1997) which is also an example of the 
double-ending; literally a film which tries to have both the honest and happy ending one after 
the other. Here, Bud, the anti-hero played by Russell Crowe, is shot multiple times in the 
penultimate sequence. Based on the verisimilitude of the world set up, there is little doubt that 
no human could survive. It is the ultimate act of sacrifice for a character on a redemptive path. 
The villains are all caught and duly punished, and the tone is one that is deliberately 
melancholic and undeniably final. Yet the real final (and surprise) image is of Bud in a car at 
the end, so heavily bandaged up to be almost comedic, but clearly on the mend. It is clearly an 
addition, and unlike the previous examples, one that is inconsistent with story logic. Another, 
quite unique, application of the double ending is that of FW Murnau’s German Expressionism 
masterpiece The Last Laugh (1924). In this case, the hero’s logical yet wholly depressing 
demise is faithfully rendered, only for a title card to appear (at one hour, twelve minutes and 
seven seconds into a film that runs for one hour and twenty-four minutes), stating that “Here 
our story should really end, for in actual life, the forlorn old man would have little to look 
forward to but death. The author took pity on him, however, and provided quite an 
improbable epilogue”. This Brechtian breaking of the fourth wall, the admittance from the 
‘author’ that in real life the character would have a miserable end but that they have the power 
in fiction to give them a happy ending (he wins the lottery) is a very rare cinematic example 
of the honest double ending, albeit one that involves a radical change of storytelling strategy.  
So why the fascination with the happy ending at all costs? In an ultimate piece of 
meta-casting, in Spike Jonze’s Adaptation (2002), about a screenwriter struggling to write and 
adaptation, Jonze casts Brian Cox as Robert McKee who gives the screenwriter some 
mentorly advice (at 1 hour, 8 minutes and 27 seconds on the 2003 Columbia Tri-Star DVD 
edition): “Wow them in the end, and you got a hit. You can have flaws, problems, but wow 
them in the end, and you’ve got a hit. Find an ending, but don’t cheat”. Here, the character of 
McKee is explicitly telling the screenwriter that a ‘wow’ ending can literally compensate for 
everything else. Yet the use of the obscure ‘wow’ betrays the fact that it is not necessarily a 
happy ending but the ‘right’ ending. This right ending is not additive or compensatory but 
hardwired into the DNA of the argument. However, ‘right’ endings are notoriously difficult to 
land, dependent on all that has gone before them, whereas happy endings are quantifiably 
prescriptive – the protagonist(s) get what they want. The widespread use of the happy ending 
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in Hollywood is perhaps the ultimate act of creative pragmatism: if a film is to have an 
unconvincing ending, a happy one is preferable to an unhappy one.  
It must also be noted that the happy ending is just one tool, and it forms part of an 
overall set of genre expectations. In a children’s adventure, an action film or a romance for 
instance, the happy ending is a foundational element of the fiction. However, in a drama, 
especially a tragedy, the happy ending could be considered to be a break with genre 
conventions. This is especially true of practitioners such as Michael Haneke (see Amour, 2012 
and Funny Games, 1997 and 2007) and Bela Tarr (see Werckmeister Harmonies, 2000 and 
Damnation, 1987).  In these cases, the happy ending could not be used as a compensation, and 
other techniques would have to be applied.  
 
2. Franchise  
In same the way that, based on the primary source of income, cinemas can be considered as 
sweet shops with screens (Tuttle, 2009), it would take very little re-orientation to consider the 
traditional Hollywood studios and large global streaming services (Netflix, Amazon, 
Facebook and Apple) as being not in the film industry but the franchise industry (Yeo 2017, 
Arnold 2017). According to Boxofficemojo.com As of January 2020, Titanic (Cameron, 
1997) is one of only two films in the top ten grossing films of all time not to be part of a 
franchise; the other film, Avatar (2009) is poised to become one with a number of sequels 
being prepared.     
The franchise is one of the most effective compensations, because the film in question 
can fail to work on any creative level yet there will always be market interest. Although it 
appears some film franchises do die (The Matrix series, 1999-2003), in reality they are merely 
dormant until ‘rebooted’ a generation or generations later (in late 2019, the fourth Matrix film 
was announced), depending on perceived market forces. Sometimes these reboots, re-
imaginings or belated sequels return quickly to the mire (The Lone Ranger, 2013, Charlie’s 
Angels, 2019), others receive a new lease of life (The Mission: Impossible series, 1996-). And 
if they do fail, another attempt can always be tried in the unspecified future, as the Planet of 
the Apes franchise demonstrates. Based on Pierre Boulle’s book La Planete des singes (1963) 
the first film was released in 1968, with four more sequels released to ever diminishing 
budgets and returns (Kaye, 2014) until 1973. There were two television series screened 
between 1974-1976 but the franchise effectively shuttered at the close of 1976. In 2001 the 
franchise attempted a return with Tim Burton’s ‘reimagining’ or ‘reboot’ (essentially a 
reworking of the source material not consistent with the universe building of the original 
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incarnations) also entitled Planet of the Apes, but with dismal reviews and box-office, again 
the franchise was abandoned. Ten years later in 2011, Rupert Wyatt directed the latest return 
with Rise of the Planet of the Apes, and this time the franchise was resurrected successfully 
and has to date spawned two more sequels, Dawn of the Planet of the Apes (Reeves, 2014), 
and War for the Planet of the Apes (Reeves, 2017).  
Obviously, if the franchise is strong enough, it can compensate for every element of 
the film and therefore represents the ultimate insurance for any film financier. This is clearly 
the rationale behind modern Disney’s aggressive acquisition of the most proven and 
financially successful franchises in modern cinema history: the Star Wars and Marvel 
universes, as well the studios Pixar and Fox, with resulting character, story and merchandising 
sub-franchises too numerous to list.  
 However, to best demonstrate the theorem, the D.C. cinematic franchise provides an 
illustrative case study. Perhaps the most highly anticipated superhero film (a battle between 
arguably the two most iconic comic-book characters of all time) Batman v Superman: Dawn 
of Justice (Snyder, 2016) was universally derided by critics and the public alike. It currently 
rates a 28% rotten score on industry review aggregator site rottentomatoes.com, comparable 
to the 85% that similar scope and scale superhero film Avengers: Infinity War (2018) 
received. However, despite the universal derision, the grosses of the film still totalled 
$873,634,919 (Boxofficemojo.com). This was considered an underachievement in an arena 
where grosses of over $1 billion are viewed as unspectacular, but without the support of the 
franchise (the narratively unnecessary additive element – the story would have been the same 
with two obscure superheroes with similar traits) the reviews may have been the same yet the 
grosses miniscule in comparison. The film does contain other compensations that will be 
explored in this chapter, but none as dominant as the franchise.  
 Can franchise ever exist as a smaller element of a film?  It is rare, but the answer is 
yes. In fact, franchise functions as the twist in the M. Night Shyamalan film Split (2017). 
What is essentially a conventional Psycho-inspired serial-killer film is revealed in the final 
scene to be an origin story of a villain from the Unbreakable (Shyamalan, 2000) universe, 
thus setting up a new franchise from what was previously a standalone film. That this comes 
at the close of the narrative, the twist could function as both a franchise and happy ending 
compensation, depending whether or not analysis concludes that these represent additive 




3. Genre Conventions 
Genre, the ‘type’ of film that is made, is essentially a syntagm, an organizing structure 
containing paradigms (tropes and expectations) that need to be met and/or subverted if the 
film is to qualify for that particular category. To some degree this is a category of what will 
be explored later in this chapter as ‘fan service’, providing what the practitioners predict the 
knowledgeable fan of the genre or franchise wants at the expense of the argument.  
This compensation formula can be stated thus, the more flawed the film, the more the 
need for genre expectations to be met. Genre expectations are usually certain events 
unfolding, but can also mean that certain events are specifically avoided (such as the happy 
ending in an otherwise subversive European art-house film, as discussed above). The more 
genre expectations that are met, and the more these tropes are well-executed (in a horror, that 
the scene-by-scene ‘jump scares’ are genuinely jumpy and scary) the more they will 
compensate for flawed storytelling. If quality of execution of these conventions is not 
possible, then a clever subversion of these conventions is allowable, especially if they provide 
something new or unique to the genre (the horror film Scream (Craven, 1996) is an effective 
example of this, it’s subversion/newness being that the film was actively self-aware of its own 
genre conventions – yet now this has become yet another genre convention). The Bond 
franchise has become almost a slave to those conventions over and above the usual spy-
action-thriller conventions that it helped to establish (imagine a Bond film without the 
meeting with M, the big explosion at the end, the seduction of the ‘Bond girl’ (usually two, 
divided into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ variations) and the exposition of the chief villain) but at the 
budget those films require, safety is a key concern. These elements comprise compensations 
as the argument of these films (usually a variation on ‘natural justice will succeed’) rarely 
require the meeting with M, the seduction of the two Bond girls or the exposition of the chief 
villain.    
 
4. Casting & Performance 
This compensation is split into three closely interrelated categories: the level of star, the level 
of attractiveness and the level of performance. The level of star is perhaps the simplest to 
quantify with recourse to statistics regarding level of media attention and the fees offered for 
their services, but the level of attractiveness and performance can be assessed in a similar 
way: the perception of beauty and talent as defined (rightly or wrongly) by recourse to both 
traditional media and social media commentary.  
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 The star is perhaps the most well-known of the industry insurance techniques, as it is 
the easiest to execute. The equation is simple: as long as the star appears in the film, there will 
be interest (and sales) even if no element in the film works. It is the primary reason the fees 
demanded by stars are so high. On a fundamental level, the star often operates as the genre. 
Usually star and genre work in unison, and depending on the star this can be a necessity, as 
some stars only function as such in certain genres (audiences usually accept Tom Cruise in 
dramas and action-thrillers but Jim Carrey has only sporadically managed to be accepted 
outside of comedies, and these films have attracted far less critical and commercial success). 
As regards specific examples, it could be argued that the use of a star is always a 
compensation, as it is a purely contextual benefit, with nothing within the story world itself 
requiring that particular character to be played by a star. The only exception to this would be 
if the star were playing themselves, such as Bruce Willis in Ocean’s 12 (Soderbergh, 2004) or 
John Malkovich in Being John Malkovich (Jonze, 1999). 
 Alternatively, the compensation can be based purely on the perceived level of 
attractiveness of an actor or star. The study will examine visual pleasure overall as a 
compensation later in this chapter, but all actors’ careers are based on their looks whether they 
are Danny DeVito or Jennifer Lawrence. Actors are traditionally split into two categories, 
leads and character actors (often used as a euphemism for ‘an actor who is not generically 
attractive enough, by whatever cultural standards that dominate the industry, to be considered 
as a lead’). However, it is possible to move categories depending on genre, as an actor such as 
Paul Giamatti demonstrates (lead in independent drama Cold Souls (Barthes, 2009), and 
support player in disaster-action-epic San Andreas (Peyton, 2015).  
Teen comedy is a genre that is not star dependent but does rely largely on the overall 
attractiveness of its cast to appeal to critics and audiences. The epitome of a successful teen 
franchise is the American Pie series of films (1999-2012). Unlike teen comedy franchises of 
the past, such as Porky’s (1981-1986) whose casts consisted of more ‘realistic’ looking 
individuals, the American Pie performers seem to be exclusively (unless the character has to 
have a certain physical attribute for a gag) cast from a pool of fashion models. Clearly the 
story is not predicated on the teenagers in the film being hyper-attractive, so potentially it is a 
clear-cut case of attractiveness-as-compensation. The only way that the extreme 
attractiveness could be viewed as integral to the overall piece is for the attractiveness to be a 
significant genre trope and expectation, therefore the film is merely playing by genre rules. 
However, in this case, an argument could be made that even if a higher level of attractiveness 
was expected in the teen genre, the American Pie series surpasses even this.  
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 It should also be noted that the reverse is true: the lack of attractiveness level can also 
serve as a compensation. The ‘grossness’ of certain characters in horror, such as the iconic 
‘Pinhead’ in the Hellraiser series (1987-) or ‘Freddy’ in the Nightmare on Elm Street (1984-
2010) franchise demonstrates. Perhaps the best example of this is the notorious Tod Browning 
drama Freaks (1932), although this cast should not be regarded as a compensation, as their 
looks are intrinsic to the storytelling.  
 A more modern subset of the attractiveness compensation is the transformative role, 
usually a particularly handsome or beautiful actor genuinely physically altering themselves 
(usually making themselves less attractive) for the part. Robert de Niro is arguably the highest 
profile example of this when for Raging Bull (Scorsese, 1980) he gained large amounts of 
weight (and production was shut down for 5 months) to play boxing legend Jake LaMotta in 
the final years of his life. Former Batman actor Christian Bale lost what would be considered 
dangerous amounts of weight to play the insomniac lead in independent psychological- 
thriller The Machinist (Anderson, 2004), and more recently Matthew McConaughey lost 
similar amounts of weight to play HIV victim Ron Woodroof in Dallas Buyers Club (Vallee, 
2013).  
McConaughey is a useful case study for both the attractiveness and performance sub-
categories as he won the American Academy Award for best actor for the role, but his 
transformation could very well be considered a compensation due to the level of weight that 
was lost. Performance is one of the most established compensations on the list, with 
individual performances commonly detached from the films they appear in for separate 
comment and critique, be it by academics, critics or the various national film institutions. 
However, it is possible for an actor, either through transformation or by performance style to 
exceed the needs of the story, and instead become a distraction, a breaking of the fourth wall, 
a modern version of the star over-performing or ‘hamming’ it up on stage, as they constantly 
demand to be the centre of attention even at the expense of the overall storytelling. In 
McConaughey’s example, the role could have been played equally convincingly if the actor 
appeared very skinny, as opposed to the ‘walking skeleton’ he appeared. If the part were 
played by an actor unfamiliar to the general public it would not have formed a compensation 
as the audience would have no previous image for comparison, but with a star of 






This is a variant of both the franchise and star compensations, but this time applied to the 
practitioners themselves. Usually applied to the director (‘from the director of….’) and/or 
screenwriter (‘from the writer of…’) and sometimes the producer (‘from the producer(s) 
of…’), and in what may be considered desperate times, even the institution (‘from the 
production company that brought you…’) these are all examples of using the practitioner as 
star or franchise. The use of producer or institution can be viewed as desperate as their 
involvement increasingly sophisticated audiences will be aware that their involvement is 
likely to be more ‘arms-length’ and less directly involved than the practitioners (there are of 
course, always exceptions to this, animation studio Pixar and its parent company Disney 
being two of them).  
 The author compensation cannot use the attractiveness quotient of the actor, instead 
relying in the interest due to the track record of success (critical or commercial) of the 
perceived creator of the work, problematic at best in an industry as necessarily collaborative 
as mainstream feature film. It is worthy of note that this concept of the credible source of the 
work (ethos) is also one of the three fundamental pillars in Aristotle’s theory of persuasion 
referenced earlier in this study (along with logos and pathos).  
This makes assessing whether or not the practitioner is being used as a compensation a 
particularly problematic issue. In one sense, the use of the ‘previously critically or 
commercially successful author’ can be always viewed as a compensation as it is not textual 
and does not have a direct influence on the storytelling of that particular feature film in any 
way. The alternative (that alas does not have the same marketing hook) would be to have a 
director or screenwriter that was equally capable in terms of skills base but not renowned in 
any way, such as an early career practitioner. However, the reverse could also be considered 
to be true, that by definition, the practitioner can never be a compensation as they are part of 
the initial DNA of the film, that their track record has a direct bearing on their skills base, that 
in the purest Aristotelian sense, the author – whoever they are – does have a bearing on the 
audience’s engagement of the story or the argument.  
 Again, it is a matter of emphasis, and in this way, even Aristotle’s three pillars of 
persuasion could be used as compensations, depending on their various flaws: if the logos is 
flawed and the pathos inadequate, the author needs to have significant gravitas to convince 
(perhaps be even a God of some kind).  
 Perhaps the test here is to consider emphasis in context. If the practitioner is heavily 
marketed in the promotion of the film to the exclusion of most else, this would indicate 
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compensation. Alternatively, if the storytelling is weak (using the Aristotelian persuasive 
definition of logic and engagement of the emotions and senses) over and above what would 
be considered normal for that practitioner or that the practitioner is not a good ‘fit’ for the 
material or is no longer a fully functioning practitioner due to either illness or age, then this 
could be considered a compensatory use. An example of an awkward fit is Robert Wise, a 
director who achieved his most notable successes as the director of large-scale musicals (West 
Side Story, 1961 and The Sound of Music, 1965), being given the task of directing the first 
big-screen outing of the Star Trek franchise with Star Trek: The Motion Picture (1979). 
Whilst the appointment certainly brought a sense of gravitas to the production, the result was 
tonally at odds with the original series; a slow-paced epic rather than a fun adventure 
(Thomas, 2000). 
  
6. Visual Pleasure  
In her seminal work of provocation, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (1975), Laura 
Mulvey wrote of ‘scopophilia’, the concept of obtaining pleasure from looking. (This overlaps 
but quite separate from voyeurism: the sexual interest or practice of watching private, intimate 
or sexual actions of others). Mulvey considered the gaze of the camera to be inherently male, 
and the visual pleasure based in a sense of sadism and possession of the image. She regarded 
Hollywood’s construction of the image of the female star as “the ultimate spectacle” 
(‘spectacle’ is another compensation that will be examined later in this chapter) and refined 
her ideas (based on the concepts of Freud and Lacan) of the ‘male gaze’ into two modes: the 
voyeuristic (woman as image to be looked at) and the fetishistic (seeing woman as the 
substitute for ‘the lack’/fear of castration).  
 Others, such as feminist critic Gaylyn Studlar (1991) argued the opposite, that visual 
pleasure is essentially a passive experience, and rather than based in sadism is actually driven 
by masochistic desires by an audience wishing to be powerless in the hands of the image.  
 These two academic ideas on the nature of visual pleasure sit on opposite ends of the 
theoretical spectrum and are used to illustrate that whereas the debates about how visual 
pleasure works are likely to be debated ad infinitum, there is general agreement that visual 
pleasure is gained by the audience experiencing cinema (in the theatre or other platforms) and 
is core to the cinematic experience.  
 As, by definition, all audiences are made up of individuals with their own nuanced 
tastes and desires, the definition of visual pleasure is necessarily fragmented; what one finds 
pleasurable another may not. Therefore this visual pleasure can be found in a variety of 
	 150	
categories, be it the pleasure in seeing: cast (the aforementioned teen comedies); locations 
(such as the rural Italian fields in Stealing Beauty (Bertolucci, 1996)); machinery (the 
Transformer series (2007-)); light (Malick’s Days of Heaven, 1978); colour (the vibrant 
greens, yellows and reds in Amelie (Jeunet, 2001)); or design (Wes Anderson’s The Grand 
Budapest Hotel, 2014) to name just a few examples. Even such things as the film stock or 
codec used to process the image can give a greater sense of visual pleasure. Visual pleasure 
can also come from choreography. Movement has long since been held up as a core essence 
of cinema, very much built into the very concept of the form; they are very literally ‘moving 
pictures’. As Hitchcock said, “In many of the films now being made, there is very little 
cinema: they are mostly what I call “photographs of people talking.”… I always try first to 
tell a story in the cinematic way…” (Truffaut, 1985, p. 61). Much joy can be had from the 
way that only moving pictures can juxtapose angle and motion; the Busby Berkeley musicals 
(1930-62) demonstrate this very efficiently – the shows may have come from a musical 
theatre tradition, but the iconic aerial shots of the synchronised dancers were wholly 
cinematic.   
 Again, in evaluating whether or not visual pleasure is being used as compensation is 
wholly down to degree and emphasis. Here, the 50 Shades of Grey film franchise (2015-2018) 
is a useful case study. Originally erotic fan-fiction based on the Twilight book and film 
franchises (2005-2012) the book was released in 2011 and became a publishing phenomenon, 
selling 16.2 million copies (Kelly, 2020). Universal Pictures and Focus Features spent $40 
million (US Dollars) on the first film adaptation (Boxofficemojo.com). The traditional 
actuarial calculations for feature films usually require a film to make back three times its 
budget to break even, which would mean that the film adaptation would have to make back 
$135 million US dollars just to stop the studios from making a loss. This obviously puts great 
pressure on the film and practitioners, especially as the vision of the books was clearly soft-
core pornography but this particular genre of film would never generate the amount of income 
needed. Instead the film was shaped as a romantic drama with nudity (but not explicit sex), 
much like the mid-1990s thrillers written by Joe Eszterhas and often starring Sharon Stone 
Basic Instinct (Verhoeven, 1992) and Sliver (Noyce, 1993). However, thrillers often made 
huge profits, romantic dramas less so, and Fifty Shades of Grey (Taylor-Johnson, 2015) was a 
particularly high budget example of the genre.  
 As the ubiquity of pornography demonstrates, there is considerable visual pleasure to 
be had from showing explicit sex acts, the combination of scopophilia with traditional 
voyeurism being an effective combination. However, not being an option for the conventional 
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studios, it is clear from the resulting film that if the actual sex was to be minimized in a film 
series ostensibly about sex, then every other element needed to be beautified: faces, bodies, 
locations, lighting, production design. The strategy worked, with Fifty Shades of Grey making 
a large profit (as of January 2020, gross receipts stand at approximately $569,651,467 US 
dollars). However, this strategy may have worked financially but, as was noted by the critics, 
to the detriment of the story. As Joanna Weiss remarked in the Boston Globe (2015), “There 
are several kinds of porn in “Fifty Shades of Grey”: house porn, clothes porn, closet porn, 
helicopter porn, all of them more interesting than the sex scenes that have caused so much 
breathless anticipation. Those come across as stiffly academic, a cataloguing of body parts 
and equipment. The passion is largely missing. The real appeal is the stuff.” 
It is clear from Weiss’s quote that the word ‘porn’ is a euphemism for ‘visual 
pleasure’. It is clear that the emphasis on the visual pleasure of every production element 
functions as their beauty is far in excess of the demands of the narrative and in fact they 
actually serve as a distraction from the story.  
 
7. Spectacle 
Again, there is nothing suspect about the use of spectacle in mainstream narrative feature 
films, but as McKee comments, “Flawed and false storytelling is forced to substitute spectacle 
for substance, trickery for truth. Weak stories, desperate to hold audience attention, 
degenerate into multimillion-dollar razzle-dazzle demo reels,” (Mckee, 1998, p. 13). 
 Now how best to define cinematic spectacle? Here, the standard definition of the term 
is sufficient: ‘a large-scale impressive display’ (Dictionary.com, 2020). Obviously, this notion 
of spectacle limits which genres can use the technique effectively as compensation: dramas 
and comedies will find it much more problematic (yet not impossible – see The Blues 
Brothers (Landis, 1980) shopping-mall car chase for a notable example), to compensate-by-
spectacle than action thrillers or historical epics. One useful rule-of-thumb would be to 
separate films into two categories: those where movement is a genre convention (such as 
running, car chases, general pursuits) and all others; the former will be able to leverage 
spectacle-as-compensation with far more consistency and degree of success. Even if used as a 
compensation McKee will likely accuse the writer of “mistaking kinesis for entertainment,” 
(Mckee, 1998, p. 24). 
 Spectacle is not simply visual pleasure, but a sub-section of visual pleasure that relies 
on scale. The aforementioned Fifty Shades of Grey (Taylor-Johnson, 2015) was never 
spectacle, but the Bond series (1962-) employs it as a core genre convention; if the villain’s 
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lair does not blow up in spectacular fashion at the close of the film, the practitioners risk riots 
in the aisles. It could also be argued that with the M.C.U. (the Marvel Cinematic Universe that 
currently comprises over twenty-three interconnected superhero movies) Disney/Marvel have 
used these separate spectacles to create one ever-building gargantuan spectacle. This has 
brought some recent high-profile criticism from Martin Scorsese and Francis Ford Coppola, 
the latter of which noted that in his opinion, the film series no longer resembles cinema: 
“Honestly, the closest I can think of them, as well made as they are, with actors doing the best 
they can under the circumstances, is theme parks. It isn’t the cinema of human beings trying 
to convey emotional, psychological experiences to another human being,” (Shoard, 2019). 
Coppola goes one stage further commenting that, “When Martin Scorsese says that 
the Marvel pictures are not cinema, he’s right because we expect to learn something from 
cinema, we expect to gain something, some enlightenment, some knowledge, some 
inspiration,” (Shoard, 2019a).  
 These comments both give weight to the idea that spectacle can be used as 
compensation, and the central film-as-argument thesis. They also echo McKee’s comments, 
made some twenty years earlier, referencing film spectacle in general: 
 
Spectacles of this kind replace imagination with simulated actuality. They use story as 
an excuse for heretofore unseen effects that carry us into a tornado, the jaws of a 
dinosaur, or futuristic holocausts. And make no mistake, these razzle-dazzle spectacles 
can deliver a circus of excitement. But like amusement park rides, their pleasures are 
short-lived. 
        (Mckee, 1998, p. 24) 
  
In this way these films function as big-budget exploitation films, albeit with A and B-list 
casts. Another example of this kind of cinema is the Transformer series (2007-), which 
pushes the idea of ‘theme park’ cinema even further – into what has been termed ‘chaos 
cinema’.  
Chaos cinema was a term coined by Matthias Stork (2011) that built on David 
Bordwell’s notion of intensified continuity (2002), briefly discussed in the previous chapter. 
Intensified continuity is the intensification of film coverage and editing: over time edits have 
become shorter (less time held in a particular shot) and shots have become more ‘extreme’ 
(either tighter framing or more pronounced angles). Stork notes that: 
 
	 153	
Chaos cinema apes the illiteracy of the modern movie trailer. It consists of a barrage 
of high-voltage scenes. Every single frame runs on adrenaline. Every shot feels like 
the hysterical climax of a scene which an earlier movie might have spent several 
minutes building toward. Chaos cinema is a never-ending crescendo of flair and 
spectacle. It’s a shotgun aesthetic, firing a wide swath of sensationalistic technique 
that tears the old classical filmmaking style to bits. Directors who work in this mode 
aren’t interested in spatial clarity. It doesn’t matter where you are, and it barely 
matters if you know what’s happening onscreen. The new action films are fast, florid, 
volatile audiovisual war zones.  
         (Stork, 2011) 
 
Stork makes the point that the only way the viewer can ascertain what might be going on on-
screen is by paying attention to the sound of the sequence. In this way, the spectacle becomes 
essentially as abstract spectacle, removed from any bounds of narrative storytelling be it 
across the complete running time of the film or the second-by-second of a sequence.  
 Examples of spectacle that is at the service of the storytelling can be found in the 
classic epics like Ben Hur (Wyler, 1959) and Cleopatra (Mankiewicz, 1963). Not only is 
spectacle a genre convention of the epic genre, but scale and awe is needed to communicate 
the power and reach of the respective Emperors and Empresses. The more recent Inception 
(Nolan, 2010) uses its signature ‘spectacle’ scene (the literal folding up of a city street) to 
underlie the malleable nature of even the seemingly most permanent fixtures in a dream; it 




In this context, sensation-as-compensation is the use of extreme sensation to distract from 
film-as-argument flaws. These extreme sensations tend to be used more commonly in horror, 
action and erotic/explicit thrillers and dramas, but are not limited to only these genres. These 
primal sensations can be provoked in the direct visceral sense with use of shots/images that 
are intrinsically physically confronting (such as in the iconic ‘body-shock’ work of John 
Carpenter in The Thing (1982) or Clive Barker in Hellraiser (1987) which trigger, or attempt 
to trigger, guttural feelings of disgust and fear, or in a more contextual sense by a cruelty 
visited upon an innocent, such as the execution of children in Lars von Trier’s The House 
That Jack Built (2018), which inspired walk-outs at Cannes (Setoodeh, 2018). In this way the 
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ultimate sensation-scene would be an intrinsically repulsive creature engaging in horrendous 
violence on an innocent who has just been having explicit sex. If this type of scene sounds 
familiar, it is because it is the staple not of mainstream films, but of exploitation films. As the 
study examined in Chapter 4, exploitation films clearly prioritize sensationalist and extreme 
renditions of sex, violence and often sexual violence over all other artistic considerations and 
the aforementioned Big Bird Cage (Hill, 1972), an exemplar of the genre, is set in a woman’s 
prison and relies almost wholly on scenes with innocents baring flesh whilst engaging in 
violent and sexually charged acts.  
 Again, the test for compensation is emphasis: there is no issue with extreme sensation 
forming part of the genre expectations of the film (notwithstanding exploitation and 
pornography that are outside the scope of this thesis), but whether or not they are used the 
enhance the storytelling as opposed to distracting from the storytelling or to replace the 
storytelling in a particular sequence. The Saw films (2004-) present a useful case study. They 
helped a new genre of mainstream horror called ‘gorenography’ or sometimes ‘torture porn’ 
(Kerner, 2015, p. 39). This genre usually refers to films where an individual or group are tied 
up and tortured in graphic ways by the main antagonist/protagonist. Both terms imply that the 
genre should exist in the exploitation world, but there is no doubting that the Saw franchise 
exists very much in the mainstream (so much so, there is a Saw-themed rollercoaster at the 
Thorpe Park theme park in the UK). These films exist in the mainstream as the horror is 
always present but it is always at the service of the story: if the graphic nature of the violence 
was removed (either the violence happened to the characters but was off-screen for the 
audience) or the violence intrinsically less graphic (someone injected with poison as opposed 
to having their fingers cut off) then the story would still function. Here, the sensation 
augments the drama. The alternative is extreme violence or imagery that becomes an end in 
itself, in the ‘freak show’ can’t-look-away sense, that may be a great talking point or meme 
(and thus may mean financial success), but is not at the service of the overall storytelling of 
the film. In this way, the film functions more as a needy look-at-me child, pushing outrageous 
limits to get attention. A modern example of this is a film series such as The Human 
Centipede (2009-), the whole series of which is fully described by the title. The film chimes in 
with David Mamet claims about modern cinema, “Films have degenerated to their original 





9. Wish Fulfilment 
As the study also examined in Chapter 4, although it is not an internal good in itself, filmic 
storytelling is particularly effective in creating and fulfilling desires. Whether the wish is 
formed by the film itself or the desire is pre-existing in the audience member, the story 
universe the film displays offers a fantasy where dreams can be seen and felt in a quite 
visceral sense to come true. What the desire is, is not important – for instance Mulvey argues 
these are typically ‘perverse’ (Cox & Levine, 2012, p. 37) – only that it is satisfied. These 
desires can be narrative-led (the hero gets what they want/or is punished), character-led (the 
audience member wants to ‘be’ Batman), universe-led (the audience member wants to exist at 
part of the Star Trek world) or sensation-led (the audience member wants the 
voyeuristic/scopophilic pleasure of the image). A modern version of narrative wish-fulfilment 
is demonstrated by the film Knocked Up (Apatow, 2007), credited as launching not only 
writer/producer Judd Apatow’s career (although he had already enjoyed significant success) 
but a whole new mode of American comedy. This modern take is notable in narrative in that, 
untypically, the hero does nothing deserving to ‘get the girl’, yet ‘gets’ her anyway in a plot 
contrivance (or more accurately, plot-ellipsis) that functions as pure wish fulfilment and fit 
neatly into the millennial zeitgeist (Queenan, 2007).   
 An example of wish-fulfilment as compensation would be a film such as Futureworld 
(Richard T. Heffron, 1976), the sequel to writer/director Michael Crichton’s original film 
version of Westworld (1973). Both stories deal with the wish-fulfilment ‘what if’ premise of a 
theme park of robots indistinguishable from humans (where you can live out your wildest 
fantasies) but whereas Westworld dealt with the issues surrounding the use of computers to 
make computers so that humans have little understanding of the technology, the Futureworld 
story did not necessitate the need for robots (the plot, concerning the replacement of 
politicians with robots would have worked equally well with plastic-surgery altered humans). 
The former used the wish-fulfilment as a fundamental thematic story element, the latter as a 
hook to carry a by-the-numbers thriller.  
 
10. Music 
For the purposes of the study, Music refers to all uses of music – be it non-diegetic or 
diegetic, individual tracks or music score. Film blends together many other pre-existing arts, 
and music is a particularly potent tool primarily as it comprises purely emotional information 
(Zbikowski, 2010, p. 37). Although there is much overlap in how music is used in each 
specific film, whilst diegetic music tracks help locate a narrative in time, place, culture, and 
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the give overall film a specific tone and texture, non-diegetic score primarily functions to 
indicate to the audience how to read a scene (dramatic as opposed to comedic, for instance). It 
is worthy of note that the canonical literature on directing focuses almost predominately on 
visuals, as if the art were still silent films and the interrelation of sound, music and picture 
was not a core skill of the director. This may be, as composer Ennio Morricone comments, 
“While good music cannot save a bad film, even bad music cannot ruin a good film,” 
(Alberge, 2015). 
 So how is music used as a compensation? And how does this function when it comes 
the genre of musicals?  
 The musical is a useful case study, as the genre expectations are not just clear but 
stated explicitly. To risk a tautology: a musical without music is not a musical. One further 
key genre expectation is that the cast actually sing songs within the diegesis. However, as 
with the use of cast, it is not a case of removing the music but the emphasis, to see what 
remains. To take the one of the most financially successful live-action musicals of all time, 
Mama Mia (Lloyd, 2008) it is sometimes referred to as a ‘jukebox musical’ (Larson, 2014) in 
that the songs sung in the film consist exclusively from pre-existing chart-friendly tracks, in 
this case the back-catalogue of Swedish ‘supergroup’ Abba. More recent examples of this are 
the film Yesterday (Boyle, 2019) which used the back-catalogue of the Beatles, and the 
biopics Bohemian Rhapsody (Singer, 2018) and Rocketman (Fletcher, 2019) which used the 
songs of Queen and Elton John respectively.  
 The plot of the film itself is remarkably similar to that of Buona Sera, Mrs. Campbell 
(Frank, 1968), where the comedy and drama come from a mother not knowing the father of 
her grown up daughter. The film comprises an all-star cast, including multiple Oscar winner 
Meryl Streep, Colin Firth and Piers Brosnan, although none are notable singers. The film also 
functions as what is referred to as an un-integrated musical, as opposed to an integrated 
musical. Barry Langford, in his book Film Genre: Hollywood and Beyond (2005) defines a 
non-integrated musical as one “in which numbers simply accumulate serially, and are 
effectively stand-alone spectacles connected only loosely, if at all, either to each other or to 
the narrative in which they are embedded,” (Langford, 2005, p. 85). An integrated musical is 
one where the songs (and dances) must advance the plot, so in this way Mama Mia is un-
integrated, whereas the film Grease (Kleiser, 1978) is an equally high-profile example of an 
integrated musical. 
 In Mama Mia, the songs do not advance the plot – which put the songs firmly in the 
sphere of compensations. This is not however to say that all un-integrated musicals are by 
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definition, compensatory. Focusing on whether the songs in Mama Mia (as opposed to the 
score) are functioning as compensations, it is not the songs that have to be removed, but the 
Abba element. In the same way as stars serve as compensation, whether it is regarded as star-
power or franchise-power of the individual songs, does the film need these powers to 
function? Would the film function just as well with music of equal quality and attractiveness 
on the ear, but previously unheard from an unknown source? The answer seems to be, no. 
(Another test could have been purely quantitative – just how many songs were used? The 
more songs used, the more likely they are being used as a compensation). 
 An objection to this may be that it was always the intention to construct a film around 
Abba music, but this only means that the compensation was a deliberate act, not that the film 
functions in a different way. In fact Mama Mia uses both stars and franchise music to 
compensate for flaws in all other areas. It makes perfect institutional sense to insure against 
financial failure – if all other elements of the film fail, the audience are still guaranteed to see 
celebrities singing all the top Abba tracks – which could well compensate completely for a 
lack of fulfilment in other traditionally key areas of the mainstream narrative feature film 
experience (fulfilment through story).  
 In this way, an argument could be made that compensatory non-integrated musicals 
(and perhaps, in a parallel way, compensatory non-integrated martial-arts films) could be 
considered a sub-category of exploitation films that are tolerated by the mainstream due to the 
experiences evoked being less extreme and base than their conventional stable-mates.  
In terms of musical score, this is certainly more difficult to use as a compensation 
overall, although it can certainly (and quite commonly) be used compensate for momentary 
flaws. Perhaps the most famous example of this is Jaws (Spielberg, 1975), where the shark 
failed to work on set. This resulted in much less than the intended screen time and more use 
of John Williams’ iconic two-note suspenseful score to compensate. 
 
11. Puzzle Solving 
In S/Z: An Essay (1974), linguist Roland Barthes outlines his five codes of meaning that 
weave through every narrative: Proairetic, Semantic, Symbolic, Cultural and Hermeneutic 
(Barthes, 1974, p. 18), and it is the domination of this last code to which the puzzle-solving 
compensation relates. The Hermeneutic Code is essentially storytelling through a series of 
enigmas, both major and minor. This is more substantial than Noel Carroll’s erotetic model, 
which views the micro question-and-answer model as “the most characteristic narrative 
approach in movies,” (Carroll, 1985, p. 97) as the implication is that the film will answer a 
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major enigma at the close, through the answering of the minor enigmas throughout the 
narrative. Barthes breaks down the revelation of truth into the following stages: Thematisation 
(what in the narrative is a mystery?); Positioning (further confirmations of the mystery); 
Formulation of the mystery; Promise of an answer; Fraud; Equivocation (mixture of fraud and 
truth); Blocking (the mystery cannot be solved); Suspended answer (interruption of the 
answer); Partial answer (some truth is revealed); and Disclosure of the truth (Barthes, 1974, p. 
30).  
 In his article, The Mind Game Film (2009) Thomas Elsaesser notes a new sub-genre, 
which he refers to as ‘The Mind Game Film’, named for a term used by director Lars von 
Trier in referring to his film The Boss of It All (2006) where he placed a series of objects that 
were out of place (called Lookeys) for the audience to spot; he referred to it as “a basic mind 
game, played with movies,” (Elsaesser, 2009, p. 13). Elsaesser (2009, p. 14) defines the mind 
game film as comprising  
 
…movies that are “playing games,” and this at two levels: there are films in which a 
character is being played games with, without knowing it or without knowing who it is 
that is playing these (often very cruel and even deadly) games with him (or her)… 
Then, there are films where it is the audience that is played games with, because 
certain crucial information is withheld or ambiguously presented.  
 
Elsaesser puts Jonathan Demme’s Silence of the Lambs (1991), David Fincher’s Seven (1995) 
and The Game (1997) and Peter Weir’s The Truman Show (1998) into the former category 
and Bryan Singer’s The Usual Suspects (1995), Fincher’s Fight Club (1999) and Christopher 
Nolan’s Memento (2000) into the latter. He notes that sometimes “information may be 
withheld from both characters and audience”, as in M. Night Shyamalan’s The Sixth Sense 
(1999) and that “sometimes, the “masters” of the game reveal themselves… but mostly they 
do not, and at other times, a puppet master is caught up in his own game, as in Spike 
Jonze/Charlie Kaufman’s Being John Malkovich (1999), the hypochondriac writer in the same 
team’s Adaptation (2002), or the two magicians in Nolan’s The Prestige (2006),” (Elsaesser, 
2009, p. 14). Elsaesser (2009, p. 14) also notes that some films have the mind-game tendency 
to  
… put the emphasis on “mind”: they feature central characters whose mental condition 
is extreme, unstable, or pathological; yet instead of being examples of case studies, 
their ways of seeing, interaction with other characters, and their “being in the world” 
	 159	
are presented as normal. The films thus once more “play games” with the audience’s 
(and the characters’) perception of reality: they oblige one to choose between 
seemingly equally valid, but ultimately incompatible “realities” or “multiverses”.  
 
Here, he cites such films as Ron Howard’s A Beautiful Mind (2001), David Cronenberg’s 
Spider (2002), Richard Kelly’s Donnie Darko (2001), and the Wachowski’s The Matrix 
(1999). 
 But how does film-as-puzzle work as a compensation? Essentially, it relates to the joy 
of the solving of the puzzle. If the mystery is intriguing enough, if the solution is original, 
bold or ingenious enough, it could compensate for flaws in other areas. In addition to 
Elsaesser’s mind game films, heist films such as Ocean’s 11 (Soderbergh, 2001) could also 
qualify as films able to use puzzle as compensation.  
 Puzzle-as-compensation functions in two ways. First is the joy for the audience in 
solving (or watching being solved) not just the big puzzle, but all the smaller puzzles leading 
up to the big reveal. The second is the quality of the final revelation and in this way, puzzle-
as-compensation functions much in the same way as spectacle; if the impact is strong enough, 
if it is ‘water-cooler’ worthy, it compensates. (This could also be thought of as ‘plot twist’ as 
compensation). 
 A particularly good example is the aforementioned M. Night Shyamalan’s, The Sixth 
Sense (1999). The story of a psychiatrist attempting to help a child who can ‘see dead people’, 
it hides information from both main character and audience, and the final revelation that the 
psychiatrist is a dead person has made it one of the more memorable plot-twist reveals in 
recent cinema. However, once the reveal has been made, the film does not pass scrutiny from 
even the most cursory of reflections: only the moments that work for communicating the 
mystery are shown. The rules of the story give the psychiatrist issues with other people seeing 
him, yet he exists in the public sphere – did he not wonder why no-one else could see him? 
Yet the joy and fun of the puzzle, and especially the twist, circumvents the need for story-
world logic. But is it a compensation? To apply the subtraction test, if you take away the 
presentation of the puzzle (either by making the audience aware of the protagonist’s post-
mortem character from the start, or by removing the twist), does it weaken the argument? If 
the argument is about the need to face your fears, then it is certainly augmented by the 
impactful reveal that the main character personifies this more than anyone else; that all his 
decisions have not been simply to help another, but to avoid what he most dreads. Using this 
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rationale, the twist may not have been perfectly executed, but it is not acting as a 
compensation.  
  
12. Promise of the Premise/The Obligatory Scene(s) 
In his book Save the Cat: The Last Book on Screenwriting You’ll Ever Need (2005), 
screenwriter Blake Snyder discusses the idea of the ‘promise of the premise’ and the related 
theory of the ‘obligatory scene’. In a high concept romantic-comedy such as How to Lose a 
Guy in 10 Days (Petrie, 2003), the premise is that, for a story, a female reporter starts dating a 
‘guy’ (who doesn’t know she’s a reporter) and make every deliberate dating mistake she can 
in order to make sure he dumps her within ten days. Unbeknownst to her the ‘guy’ has a 
separate bet running with his boss that he can make any woman fall in love with him – in ten 
days. The promise of the premise comprises sequences that take full advantage of the guy-
tolerating-outrageous-dump-worthy actions from the reporter. These are a logical 
extrapolation of the premise and if were not present, would represent a major disappointment 
in the eyes of the perceived audience. The obligatory scene(s) are a scene or scenes that are 
not just scenes that fulfil the promise of the premise but major plot points: the falling in love 
(for real) scene; the scene-where-he-finds-out-she-is-a-reporter; and the ending-up-with-each-
other-scene.  
 When do these function as compensations? Again, it is a question of emphasis. The 
premise of a film is a plot ‘hook’, not a thematic idea or a fully developed argument. In a film 
series such as The Fast and the Furious (2001-), the promise of the premise is to have super-
fast, super-glamorous car chases with outrageously expensive and customized vehicles. The 
concept would function as a compensation if the film was almost exclusively comprised of 
these sequences with very little narrative surrounding them and the chases themselves not 
driving the story (much like an un-integrated musical). The obligatory scene would be the 
final and biggest chase sequence of the film and could qualify as a compensation for the same 
reasons: it is un-integrated and the glamour exceeds the needs of the narrative or the genre. It 
is interesting to note that the series started with only cars and wheel-based vehicles, but now 
every form of vehicle is involved in the chases (cars, planes, boats, trains, helicopters) and the 
marginal sense of realism of the original films has been abandoned with the later sequels.  
 The Rocky franchise (1976-) furnishes a particularly striking example of this kind of 
compensation. The promise of the premise is the fight at the end of the film, and the 
obligatory scene the training montage. In the first two films, the training montages were 
joyous and very much at the service of the story, yet by the time of Rocky IV (Stallone, 1985) 
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the montages (albeit not all training montages) had a combined running time of 29 minutes 
and 10 seconds, comprising just under 32% of the entire running time of the film (against a 
total running time of 91 minutes and 31 seconds, including credits).   
 
13. Recognition of Self 
As noted by Sinnerbrink (2018, p. 198), audiences derive meaning from engaging with 
fictional characters and their perspectives, be it through emotional engagement or 
estrangement. Audiences can experienced enhanced engagement if they recognise themselves 
in one of a film’s characters, or recognise in them an image of themselves they wish for and 
identify with. For Recognition of Self to function as a compensation there must be significant 
alignment between audience member and character, but what element precisely creates this 
alignment is almost impossible to predict. This makes the compensation less likely to be an 
encoded insurance at the time of creation. The element that impacts and connects the viewer 
to the character does not require much screen time. It could any or all of the following: a 
jacket the character wears, a gesture they make, their voice, turn-of-phrase/vocabulary, 
attitude, hair, overall look, sense-of-humour, personality, sense of interaction, character flaw, 
fashion sense, life or work circumstances. Yet once impact has been made and maintained, 
then the compensation can be absolute.  
 These characters need not be archetypal heroes, nor aspirational. Anti-heroes can have 
impact, as can secondary characters. As the recognition is so personal to each audience 
member, objective examples are problematic, but characters that certainly captured the 
zeitgeist are those such as Patrick Bateman (Christian Bale) from American Psycho (Harron, 
2000), Lester Burnham (Kevin Spacey) from American Beauty (Mendes, 1999), Ben Stone 
(Seth Rogen) from Knocked Up (Apatow, 2007), Juno (Ellen Page) from Juno (Reitman, 
2007), Elizabeth Bennett (Keira Knightley) from Pride and Prejudice (Wright, 2005) and 
Hermione Granger (Emma Watson) from the Harry Potter series (2001-2011).  
 Recognition of self and the consequent connection between audience and character is 
highly dependent, not just on the writing or staging of the film, but on the energy and 
charisma (or lack of it) of the actor. This connection will always function as a compensation, 
as the film clearly does not require this strength of feeling from the audience in order to 





14. Dialogue  
Dialogue serves many functions in a film narrative. Gives the audience a sense of time, place, 
character, provides a sense of realism, provides nuance to the theme, carries plot information 
and exposition. Some practitioners attempt to stay away from dialogue (among them, writer 
and director Sergio Leone, known for his ‘Spaghetti Westerns’), creatively leaning almost 
completely on image and music. Others push dialogue into a realm where it becomes a key 
joy of the film experience itself (such as David Mamet, Aaron Sorkin, Quentin Tarantino, 
William Goldman, Paddy Chayefsky, Diablo Cody, Nora Ephron, Cameron Crowe and James 
L. Brooks). Their dialogue is expansive and dominates the picture to the extent that minimal 
camera movement is used so as not to distract from what the characters are saying. David 
Fincher, a director known for elegant use of camera movement, kept the camera work 
particularly basic and static for The Social Network (Fincher, 2010) to allow Sorkin’s 
dialogue to take centre-stage.  
 In terms of personal style, Tarantino has taken this one stage further and has 
deliberately cultivated a trademark not just for the way in which his characters speak, but 
what they speak about (usually new interpretations of pop-culture references). The dialogue is 
usually so distinctive that viewers can often tell what re-write work he has done – most 
notably Crimson Tide (Scott, 1995) – be it credited or uncredited (Hanson, 2002, p. 35).  
 
15. Strong Sequences 
Although the concept of Strong Sequences is usually a manifestation of the Promise of the 
Premise, such as the sinking of the Titanic in Titanic (Cameron, 1997), or the Obligatory 
Scene (the end courtroom confrontation in A Few Good Men (Reiner, 1992)), it is not 
necessary for it to be a sequence telegraphed by the set-up of the film overall. A Strong 
Sequence is an extended sequence that is of a quality that justifies, both literally and 
metaphorically, the ‘admission price alone’, providing enough satisfaction to sustain flaws in 
other areas.   
 Many of the contemporary Hollywood masters seem masters more of the sequence 
than the film. The aforementioned Titanic is a run-of-the-mill Romeo and Juliet romance with 
little thematic intent or nuanced argument, but the hour-long sequence of the ship sinking is 
(by most accounts) breathtaking. A film that comprises three or four of these sequences 




16. ‘Based on A True Story’ 
In his article, Film Adaptation and Its Discontents: From ‘Gone with the Wind’ to ‘The 
Passion of the Christ’ (2007), Thomas Leitch notes that film predicated with a ‘Based on a 
True Story’ logline are, “authorless, publisherless, agentless. Because the description may be 
claimed or not at the filmmakers’ pleasure, it appears only when it is to the film’s 
advantage… Although they pretend to be transcendental, the truth claims of the tag “based on 
a true story” are always strategic and instrumental,” (Leitch, 2007, p. 282).  
For Leitch, the strategic benefits are not initially issues of fact or truth, but of 
authority:  
 
In the same way, the claim to be based on a true story appeals to the master text of the 
true story—a secularized, authorless Book of Life not to be confused with reality or 
history or the truth—for specific kinds of textual authority, all of them having only an 
incidental relation to historical accuracy… By declining to label or localize their 
intertexts, or by obscuring their specific intertexts behind the more slippery claim to 
be based on a true story, these films mask their internally persuasive discourse, to use 
Bakhtin’s distinction, as authoritative discourse. 
       (Leitch, 2007, p. 287)   
 
Leitch acknowledges mainstream narrative feature film’s ability/intention to function as 
internally persuasive discourses and sees the ‘Based on a True Story’ tag as a specific and 
targeted way to augment the argument by attempting to take any judgement away from the 
audience, to present the discourse as fact, not argument in way that mimics Bakhtin’s (1981) 
authoritative discourse. Leitch further acknowledges that the tag functions as “a support for 
stories that might well have trouble standing on their own…” (Leitch, 2007, p. 286). 
Therefore, the use of the rider ‘Based on a True Story’ as a compensation is quite 
straightforward yet particularly powerful: by a simple appeal to real life, the claim is that ‘this 
really happened’. Leitch actually breaks these claims down further into the eight categories, 
“Don’t blame us; Isn’t this sad/inspiring/heroic; Stranger than fiction; Now it can be told; 
Behind the headlines; Explaining the inexplicable; Not just another movie; You need to know 
this,” (Leitch, 2007, p. 288). The rider can serve to make up for almost all flaws: character 
inconsistencies, plotting inconsistencies, or lack of argumentative logic. For instance, would 
The Wolf of Wall Street (Scorsese, 2013), a completely derivative story of an amoral stock 
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trader, really have been taken as seriously by both critics and audiences if it had merely been 
classed as pure fiction?  
This compensation also directly relates back to ethos, one of Aristotle’s three tenets of 




In marketing the Unique Selling Point (U.S.P.) dominates. What does your product have that 
no others have? Are you the first to market? In business, the ‘first mover advantage’ (F.M.A.) 
applies to individuals or companies moving into a new market – the first to move can 
establish market dominance and brand recognition in their field (Kerin, Varadarajan and 
Peterson, 1992).  Whilst films, being a single product (as opposed to a single type of product, 
such as velcro) cannot dominate a market in the same way, this ‘first to market’ is nonetheless 
a demonstration of uniqueness.  
 This can apply to the film as a whole, or a single element. Thank You For Smoking 
(Reitman, 2005) was the first commercially prominent film to show the big tobacco lobbyist 
world from the inside (with a lobbyist as the hero); most of the film’s running time and 
inventiveness is spent establishing this new world to the audience. There is very little drama 
present, and if there had been another film set within the same world, perhaps it would not 
have fared so well financially (making back over six times its budget in cinemas) or critically 
(an 86% score on Rottentomatoes.com). Consider, by contrast, a minimally dramatic film set 
amongst the familiar world of a jury, for instance. From Dusk Till Dawn (Rodriguez, 1996) 
was the first mainstream film to emphatically and self-consciously switch genres halfway 
through its running time (crime thriller to horror-comedy); an oddity, but also an attempt to 
establish a new filmic storytelling method. Bullitt (Yates, 1968) was the first mainstream film 
to show an extended car chase, at 10 minutes and 53 seconds, and the first to use the San 
Francisco streets as a location for the chase (which has been so oft-repeated now, it has 
become a trope of its own – see The Rock (Bay, 1996) and The Dead Pool (Van Horn, 1988) 
for examples). This clearly paved the way for film franchises such as The Fast and the 
Furious (2001-), which, since it does not have the novelty factor, has to continually raise the 
stakes and production value of the chases to become ‘must see’ sequences.  
As the concept of novelty is a contextual rather than textual element, it follows that a 
film manifesting it will always survive if it is removed, however this is not always the case. 
Again emphasis is key, and in this context a level of extremity or boldness is necessary to 
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indicate the possibility of compensation: a character wearing black shoes for the first time on 
screen will hardly function as a compensatory element, but the first film to feature 3D, IMAX 
or (as in the case of 1950’s American cinema) ‘smello-vision’, may find that this element 
compensates for significant flaws.   
 
18. Homage 
Homage is an allusion or imitation by one artist to another, or respect or reverence paid or 
rendered (Macmillan Dictionary). In film terms, it is usually represented by the inclusion of 
props, dialogue or even mimesis of shot construction. This intertextual ‘doffing of the cap’ to 
a previous master or masterful film can be either self-indulgently obscure or used to create a 
shared sense of collusion with the audience (see Fan Service, below).  
 At the extreme end of homage is pastiche and parody. Pastiche is the making of an 
entire film in the mode of an older film or genre, such as Far From Heaven (Haynes, 2002), a 
romantic drama set in the 1950’s and constructed as if made in the 1950’s, probably by 
Douglas Sirk. Its director, Todd Haynes, returned to pastiche with Carol (2015). By contrast, 
parody is the lampooning of the tropes (either affectionate or otherwise) of genres for comic 
effect, perfected in modern cinema by Mel Brooks (see the ‘western’ Blazing Saddles (1974), 
‘classic Universal horror’ Young Frankenstein (1974), ‘Hitchcockian thriller’ High Anxiety 
(1977) and ‘science-fiction adventure’ Spaceballs (1987) for examples). A film such as Ready 
Player One (Spielberg, 2018) sits between the two extremes, being neither a pastiche nor 
parody, but nostalgically constructed almost entirely of references to other films, computer 
games and pop-culture ephemera.  
 The test of compensation cannot simply be to remove the reference as this will fall 
almost immediately foul of the appeal to genre conventions: you cannot remove what makes a 
film a pastiche or parody and have it remain within genre. A better test is to think of pastiche 
and parody as multi-genre (‘sci-fi-comedy parody’, ‘horror-pastiche’) and then to remove the 
knowledge of the signified: does Far From Heaven succeed in its argument if the audience is 
not aware of the pastiche? That is to say, does the film’s argument work either through the 
technique of pastiche or in its absence? If neither, the pastiche element is being used as a 
compensation. In this way, as Far From Heaven uses pastiche to examine how the past can 
betray by bringing a contemporary issue (in this case, homosexuality) into a copy of a Sirk-
style film, pastiche is not being used as a compensation. 
 In the case of Spaceballs, it becomes a question of whether the science-fiction-comedy 
is funny once awareness of the Star Wars (1977-) or Star Trek (1966-) franchises is removed. 
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If yes, it means the film is not using parody as a compensation (for instance, the gag where 
the President ‘beams’ to another place, only to moments later be revealed as the room next 
door works purely within the science-fiction rules of Spaceballs itself. The ‘beaming’ Star 
Trek reference is a further level of potential enjoyment). Contrast this with the later, less 
critically and financially successful parodic works by Mel Brooks (Robin Hood: Men in 
Tights, 1993 or Dracula: Dead and Loving It, 1995).   
 Ready Player One (2018), presents an interesting conundrum. Most likely by design, 
the film does function without the use of the references (made more general than the 
exclusively 1980’s references used in the book on which the film is based), but the emphasis 
is extreme, the references present in most scenes of the film. The scale of those references 
provide compensation for what is a relatively straightforward action-adventure, a genre that 
does not require homage.  
 
19. Fan Service 
In his article, Superhero Fan Service: Audience Strategies in the Contemporary Interlinked 
Hollywood blockbuster (2016), Bart Beaty defines ‘fan service’ as “a series of narrative 
“rewards”” that are established in the film (Beaty, 2016, p. 324).  
 Fan service has its origins in the Japanese world of anime and manga fandom. This 
concept of ‘servicing’ the fans of a particular franchise to “cater unabashedly to an audience’s 
expressed desires,” (Beaty, 2016, p. 324), originally had very specific manifestations, namely 
gratuitous titillation. In The Glimpse and Fan Service: New Media, New Aesthetics (2008), 
Keith Russell denotes them as “the random and gratuitous display of a series of anticipated 
gestures… These gestures include such things as panty shots, leg spreads (spread legs) and 
glimpses of breasts” (Russell, 2008, p. 105). Other manifestations included “highly detailed 
images of robots and other forms of technology, or strongly eroticized and sexualized 
elements,” and “the muscled bodies of the series stars,” (Beaty, 2016, p. 324). Russell applies 
a new form of seeing to fan service, the ‘Glimpse’. “In the case of Manga and Anime, we can 
gaze and look and glance and also, importantly, we can glimpse”. He regards the glimpse as a 
form of freedom: “Characters and viewers celebrate the freedom of the glimpse, while both 
also experience the function of the gaze”. He contrasts the glimpse to the Mulvey-an male 
gaze, stating that in the case of the gaze “the object of desire is located within a dramatic 
tension that implicates the viewer in the appropriation of the viewed. In the case of the 
glimpse, no such appropriation is implied,” (Russell, 2008, p. 108). Essentially, this is a 
matter of looking without guilt.  
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 However, the entry of fan service into mainstream cinema has broadened the 
definition, now referring to inter-textual references or any other elements that the perceived 
audience (or real audience, if the fan service is directly relating to fan comments) desires. In 
this way, fan service can be thought of as closely related to the compensation of Wish 
Fulfilment – albeit on a micro-scale. Although the list is not exhaustive, in his discussion of 
the Marvel Cinematic Universe Beaty delineates fan service into five distinct categories: Post-
credit scenes, Easter eggs, Crossovers, Linked Repercussions, and Modular Story 
Development (Beaty, 2016, p. 322). Each of these categories are designed to reward the 
audience, and he notes that:  
 
…[A]n expanded notion of fan service is a useful way to denote textual elements that 
reward high levels of engagement with the franchise and with its source materials. The 
frisson of excitement that is generated in a knowledgeable fan when she spots Cosmo 
the Spacedog in Guardians of the Galaxy, for example, is a reward reserved for 
hardcore fans who can be flatteringly positioned as connoisseurs or opinion leaders 
within organic fan communities.  
        (Beaty, 2016, p. 324) 
 
This hierarchy of knowledge is key to fan service as “the elements that serve this promotional 
function variously address hardcore and casual audiences in different ways, establishing a 
hierarchy of knowledge, connection, and intimacy within the consumer base to bring about 
the conversion of casual viewers into deeply committed hardcores,” (Beaty, 2016, p. 322). 
 Fan service is very much the domain of film franchises, as there must be initial fans to 
service. Any film from the M.C.U. would serve as a strong case study, but Star Wars: The 
Force Awakens (JJ Abrams, 2015) is perhaps the most illustrative of how fan service can be 
used as a compensation. The first Disney production within one of the most successful film 
franchises in history, and the first not to be overseen by series creator George Lucas, the 
pressure on the film to succeed financially was immense. In fact, as is fitting for the 
penultimate case study in this chapter, the film contains a combination of most of the 
compensations already outlined. The story, taking place thirty years after the original Star 
Wars trilogy (1977-1983), concerns the next (younger) generation of heroes fighting against a 




Franchise – one of the most financially successful film franchises in history 
Genre Conventions – the film does not attempt to extend the genre and moves from one 
conventional scene to the next, essentially a collection of space and Jedi battles with a Jedi 
apprentice character at the centre of the narrative.  
Cast – The film contains actors that are uniformly attractive, and its use of stars is both 
obvious (Harrison Ford reprising the role that made him a star) and hidden (Daniel Craig as a 
Stormtrooper (uncredited), Simon Pegg as an unrecognizable Alien). These also function as 
Easter Eggs (see Fan Service).   
Author – JJ Abrams provides great security to the audience, as he was hired due to his 
successful track record of rebooting Science-Fiction franchises (Star Trek).   
Visual Pleasure – All categories are utilised, from beauty of cast, machinery and design (from 
the architecture to the handles of the light-sabres).  
Spectacle – the space battles provide regular visual and audio pleasure on a significant scale.  
Wish Fulfilment – The universe of the story provides significant wish fulfilment, a seductive 
place that is full of high technology, adventure and intrigue, and the figure of the Jedi – a 
combination of Samurai and Magician is essentially an aspirational superhero within the story 
space.    
Promise of Premise – The promise is of space battles and Jedi Knights, and the film 
constantly delivers these sequences.   
Obligatory Scene – There are many set up by the narrative, but perhaps the most impactful is 
the reuniting of Han Solo with his ship, the Millennium Falcon. The other obligatory scene, 
designed to be the most emotional, is the meeting of Solo with his son, the villain Kylo Ren. 
The film builds towards this, and when the son kills the father, it is a huge ‘must-see’ moment 
in the canon of the stories.   
Recognition of Self – There is a clear attempt to connect with a new demographic by making 
the divisive decision to cast a person of colour (in this case John Boyega, a British actor of 
Nigerian descent) as the main protagonist (Lee, 2015).  
Strong Sequences – As the film has the pressure of setting up a whole new series of films, 
there can be little closure and the narrative functions as a series of strong sequences that do 
not have to pay-off any narrative set-ups.  
Homage – As the discourses around the film confirm (Collins, 2016), the film is essentially an 
homage to the original Star Wars (Lucas, 1977). Even the visual look of the film – from the 
choice of digital format and grading to the mise-en-scene – puts the film in the realm of both 
pastiche and remix.  
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Fan Service – Much of the above functions as fan service, and from the broadest perspective, 
a sequel itself can be considered a form of fan service. There were many discourses around 
the film both berating and praising the film for the amount of fan service included (Perez, 
2015), from the use of a new ‘cute droid’ BB8 (taking the mantle from R2D2) to a new 
heroine for the female demographic, to bringing back legacy cast members and props (Han 
Solo and the Millennium Falcon) to the various ‘Easter Eggs’ (hidden celebrity cameos from 
cast popular with science fiction fans). 
 
It is also illustrative to note the compensations The Force Awakens did not use. This is not the 
say these elements were not present but that the emphasis was not extreme enough to have an 
impact on the film experience overall. These are the Happy Ending (the ending is hopeful but 
consistent with the narrative that has preceded it), Sensation (extreme sensations in the 
audience are not pursued, apart from the death of Han Solo), Music (written by original 
composer John Williams, this functions more as fan service as the music is not dominating the 
pictures), Puzzle Solving (there is mystery to finding Luke Skywalker, but this comprises only 
one of many narrative strands), Dialogue (functional), True Story (clearly a fiction) and 
Novelty (the film highlights it is a continuation, not a pioneer).   
 
20. Obscurity/Chaos/Confusion 
The final compensation is the least used and it has the highest chance of failure, but still 
worthy of note. It is essentially compensation-by-confusion, the logic being that it is better to 
be obscure than showcase obvious flaws. This is obviously highly problematic as a 
compensation usually represents a joy for the audience to distract from a flaw, so the covering 
a flaw with a larger flaw seems destined for failure. However, it could be argued that a section 
of the audience, however small, can delight in the obscure and the impenetrable. In this way, 
this compensation could function as a subset of the Puzzle Solving compensation, but in 
reverse; not joy generating by the setting up and solving of a puzzle, but the joy from 
attempting to unravel a puzzle that can never be fully solved. Examples of this could be films 
such as the divisive Inland Empire (Lynch, 2006) or even 8½ (Fellini, 1963), although it is 
not limited to art-house or surrealist films – Michael Bay’s Transformers: Dark Side of the 
Moon (2011) could easily be regarded as using confusion as compensation, both narratively 
and through the use of chaos cinema during the spectacle sequences that comprise most of the 
running time of the film. The usual test of subtraction still stands: would the film’s argument 
be weakened or undermined if the aspect of the film in question were removed or substituted 
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with a non-compensatory equivalent? In the case of films where the idea of obscurity is 





To begin with a caveat: as much as the attempt has been made, any list of compensations can 
never be truly exhaustive. There are myriad reasons why a film is considered a rewarding 
experience, many particularly subjective and personal.  
 However, the priority of this chapter was to outline how this thesis defines ‘failure’ 
and how it manifests: how the Cinema of Compensation conceptualizes the creative methods 
that allow the majority of mainstream narrative feature films to achieve external, rather than 
internal success by the definitions of the social practice (to ‘fail’ yet still support the thesis). It 
has demonstrated how these methodologies allow for the internal success of the practice (to 
make a worthwhile argument in a worthwhile way) to be incognizant amongst practitioners 
and institutions.  
In a way, the compensations (for flawed argument) could also be considered as 
‘confusions’. As has been investigated in previous chapters, there is no significant discussion 
of film as a social practice in the canonical instructional literature, which allows for 
practitioners to hold a variety of different and conflicting conceptions, from the highly 
developed to the completely instinctive. This makes it highly possible for practitioners to 
confuse, for instance, the compensations of sensation or spectacle or fan service for the 
internal good of the practice. In the case of the latter, it is a common claim for practitioners 
and institutions to claim that they want to give the audience what they want. Responding to 
criticism of Suicide Squad (Ayer, 2016), screenwriter and director David Ayer defended 
himself by claiming he, “[m]ade it for the fans,” (Robinson, 2017). In some cases, 
practitioners become known for some facet of their writing or directing (compensation rather 
than the internal good) and they begin to focus, even pursue that element (such as M. Night 
Shyamalan and twist endings) which would fall broadly under the Puzzle Solving 
compensation. In this case, unless the conception of the social practice is cognizant, it is likely 
for the practitioner to focus on the compensation rather than the internal good and the overall 
practice suffers.  
The defence of the thesis in previous chapters has thus far focused on the critical 
application of new and existing theoretical frameworks to mainstream narrative feature film, 
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and hermeneutic analysis of dominant industry thought. It has made a significant case for  
mainstream narrative feature film to be considered a social practice in the teleological sense, 
governed by the associated notion of internal goods, and that the most plausible articulation of 
these is the singular good to ‘move the audience to a worthwhile conclusion in a worthwhile 
way’. The case for this articulation to be considered primary has been argued with reference 
to other competing notions, which have been demonstrated to be significantly flawed despite 
their ubiquity. An examination of the industry orthodoxy has revealed the practice of 
mainstream narrative feature film is not conceptualised in the manner the thesis defends, with 
the result the practice currently incognizant and particularly vulnerable to failure. An account 
of how most mainstream narrative feature films can fail the internal good of the practice yet 
the industry survives has been formulated as an appeal to ‘compensations’, as outlined in this 
chapter. The final stage of the defence of this thesis comes in the form of detailed case studies 
in the following two chapters; an exemplar and a problematic counter-example. Although the 
scope of the study is the social practice of mainstream narrative feature film from conception 
to delivery, and as such does not necessarily require an analysis of completed works, the case 







The Exemplar: Toy Story 3 
 
7.1 The Example – Why Pixar’s Toy Story 3? 
 
Crucial to Mulhall’s Cavellian-inspired film-philosophy is that such claims are not to 
be defended by general arguments over the ‘film as philosophy’ thesis, but by detailed 
analyses and critical interpretations of the film themselves. For Mulhall, as for Cavell, 
this is the only way to debate, argue, or defend the claims made for their philosophical 
significance. 
(Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 122) 
 
As the study noted in Chapter 2, following Sinnerbrink, a thesis such as the one defended in 
this dissertation is best defended not simply by general abstract claims, but by appeal to 
specific examples of completed works, interrogated in detail.  
However, before embarking on the analysis, the study needs to address Barthes’ still 
influential contention outlined in Death of the Author that states that, “a text consists of 
multiple writings, issuing from several cultures and entering into dialogue with each other, 
into parody, contestation…” (Barthes, 1967). This is necessary as although theories of 
spectatorship and reception are beyond the scope of this study, the following two chapters 
will nonetheless rely on justifying precise interpretations of the works as definitive. How will 
it do this? Notwithstanding any theoretical objections to Barthes (notably Wolff 1981 and 
Burke 2008), all interpretations of the works contained in this study are not offered as 
speculation on what any physical viewer may comprehend, but rather (using the film in 
conjunction with the orthodoxy of the social practice) as informed judgments on what the 
practitioner or practitioners were intending to communicate. It is a similar approach to that 
taken by Macdonald (2013) in his analysis of screenwriting poetics: 
 
Even if an element is likely to be true, such as a loud and sudden noise creating a 
startling effect in the viewer, it is not perhaps the noise that is significant, but the fact 
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that the screenwriter chooses this moment in the narrative as the appropriate moment 
to startle you, and to use a specific means to do so.  
        (Macdonald, 2013, p. 2) 
 
Kristin Thompson (2003, pp. 36-73) also makes a similar point believing that the most 
significant research questions in the study of screenwriting are concerned with what 
filmmakers thought they were doing, what they thought would be effective rather than any 
ultimate effect. 
In this way, the ‘viewer’ is an entity that exists only in the mind of the practitioner, a 
theoretical construct that the practitioner uses all their talents and training to move to a 
worthwhile conclusion in a worthwhile way. This subjective conceptualisation could be 
highly flawed, if not objectively wrong, but this is not relevant as it is the theoretical construct 
that guides the creative process of the practitioner. The readings of the films offered here use 
the film and the orthodoxy to ‘reverse-engineer’ the intended argument offered by the 
practitioner.  
As the film-as-worthwhile-argument thesis should be defendable using any 
mainstream narrative feature film, then why Toy Story 3? Not only is it animation (which the 
majority of mainstream narrative feature films are not), but it is also a second sequel. A 
second sequel is not usually an indication of quality as the motivation for it is usually 
financial, not creative. Toy Story 3 has nonetheless been chosen as it is one of the most 
accessible examples of successful cinematic argument in modern mainstream narrative 
cinema.  
The film is also selected in large part due to the animation studio that made it. 
Beginning in 1979 as The Graphics Group, part of George Lucas’ Lucasfilm, Pixar became a 
standalone company in 1986 with finance from ex-Apple co-founder Steve Jobs, before being 
bought by Disney in 2006. As of the close of 2019 it has made 21 feature-length animation 
films with an average worldwide theatrical (in cinemas) gross of approximately $660 million 
US Dollars per film and not one has failed at the box office. Even The Good Dinosaur (Sohn, 
2015) with $332 million – widely viewed as a slight disappointment by both critics and 
audiences – ultimately topped the sales charts on DVD (Arnold, 2016). This level of success 
is critical to the choice of case study, as the parameters of the thesis as laid out in Chapter 1 
are concerned with the internal good of the social practice as regards practitioners only 
(defined as screenwriters, directors, and in exceptional cases, creative producers), which in 
most cases would end at the first delivery of what the practitioner considers the final film to 
	 174	
the distributor. The precise delivery process for each film is often unique to that film, and 
usually practitioners have to sign an N.D.A. (Non-Disclosure Agreement) as part of their 
contract, which means unpicking precisely what the director first delivered is difficult, 
especially as they cannot share this information themselves. Therefore, when it comes to 
recourse to completed films, an exemplar can only be selected if it is clear that the director (or 
screenwriter/director) had ‘final cut’ or complete autonomy over the course of the entire 
production, which means the public version of the film is the same cut the practitioner first 
delivered. (It’s worth noting that there is actually a simple process to be certain that the 
opposite is true – that a director has disowned a film – as in extreme circumstances they ask 
for their name to be removed from the credits, and until the year 2000, DGA rules meant that 
the pseudonym ‘Alan Smithee’ would usually be used instead).  
 Due to both Pixar’s and the Toy Story’s previous track record of success, and their 
openness about their workflow, the study can be confident that Toy Story 3 is the film the 
practitioners (Story Contributor/Director Lee Unkrich, Screenwriter Michael Arndt and Story 
Contributors John Lasseter (also studio head) and Andrew Stanton) wanted it to be. It is also 
worth outlining Pixar’s workflow, as they credit their success to an emphasis on story over 
animation tricks and technologies.  
 
Pixar – Typical Workflow 
Pixar has a very dogmatic approach to storytelling. There is no creative priority to enlarge the 
paradigm of a conventional mainstream narrative feature film, instead the focus is to create 
perfect syntagms. Pixar holds that conventional cinematic storytelling evolved naturally as it 
was the form that best served the audience in terms of accessibility and emotional connection, 
and to work against that paradigm is merely to narrow your audience. As discussed in Chapter 
2, they conceive the conventional storytelling/audience relationship as a two-dimensional 
pyramid: the ultimate conventional storyteller works at the bottom of the triangle, providing 
access to the largest possible audience – whereas the ultimate avant-garde storyteller works at 
the top of the pyramid, essentially an artist making work only for other artists or themselves. 
In this way, Pixar’s approach to filmmaking represents the binary opposite to a filmmaker 
such as Terrence Malick.  
This dogmatism is not completely formalized, existing as a series of articles and 
unofficial (but not disavowed) mission statements. On Twitter, Pixar storyboard artist Emma 
Coats put together a list of twenty-two (much shared by the mainstream press) Pixar 
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storytelling rules she observed during her time working for the studio (Cavna, 2012). They are 
as follows (corrected for syntax and grammar):  
1. You admire a character for trying more than for their successes. 
2. You have got to keep in mind what’s interesting to you as an audience, not what’s fun 
to do as a writer. They can be very different. 
3. Trying for theme is important, but you won’t see what the story is actually about until 
you’re at the end of it. Now rewrite. 
4. Once upon a time there was ___. Every day, ___. One day ___. Because of that, ___. 
Because of that, ___. Until finally ___. 
5. Simplify. Focus. Combine characters. Hop over detours. You’ll feel like you’re losing 
valuable stuff but it sets you free. 
6. What is your character good at, comfortable with? Throw the polar opposite at them. 
Challenge them. How do they deal? 
7. Come up with your ending before you figure out your middle. Seriously. Endings are 
hard, get yours working up front. 
8. Finish your story, let go even if it’s not perfect. In an ideal world you have both, but 
move on. Do better next time. 
9. When you’re stuck, make a list of what WOULDN’T happen next. Lots of times the 
material to get you unstuck will show up. 
10. Pull apart the stories you like. What you like in them is a part of you; you’ve got to 
recognize it before you can use it. 
11. Putting it on paper lets you start fixing it. If it stays in your head, a perfect idea, you’ll 
never share it with anyone. 
12. Discount the 1st thing that comes to mind. And the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th – get the obvious 
out of the way. Surprise yourself. 
13. Give your characters opinions. Passive/malleable might seem likable to you as you 
write, but it’s poison to the audience. 
14. Why must you tell THIS story? What’s the belief burning within you that your story 
feeds off of? That’s the heart of it. 
15. If you were your character, in this situation, how would you feel? Honesty lends 
credibility to unbelievable situations. 
16. What are the stakes? Give us reason to root for the character. What happens if they 
don’t succeed? Stack the odds against. 
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17. No work is ever wasted. If it’s not working, let go and move on – it’ll come back 
around to be useful later. 
18. You have to know yourself: the difference between doing your best & fussing. Story is 
testing, not refining. 
19. Coincidences to get characters into trouble are great; coincidences to get them out of 
it are cheating. 
20. Exercise: take the building blocks of a movie you dislike. How do you rearrange them 
into what you DO like? 
21. You have got to identify with your situation/characters, can’t just write ‘cool’. What 
would make YOU act that way? 
22. What’s the essence of your story? Most economical telling of it? If you know that, you 
can build out from there. 
  
The above is a good summary of what in the industry are considered standard story 
development questions. It is worthy of note, in terms of film-as-argument as incognizant 
practice, that at number (3) Coats reminds the reader that theme is “important”, as if it is 
something that writers often reject. Furthermore, even here it is conceived merely as 
“important” rather than “integral”.  The rule about what the writer believes (and therefore 
wants to communicate) is down at number (14) and is conceptualised in very basic terms.  
Yet this adherence to story is, perhaps surprisingly, not typical of either live action or 
animated films made by other studios. In an interview with Scott Myers of Go Into the Story 
(the official Blog of The Blacklist, the top organisation in Hollywood that champions the 
‘best’ unproduced screenplays of the year), senior development executive at Pixar Mary 
Coleman (the person responsible for bringing in Toy Story 3 screenwriter Michael Arndt) 
outlined their overall story-crafting process (Myers, 2012). First is their view of practitioners: 
 
Pixar commits to artists... knowing that there are going to be drafts and screenings that 
fall flat, but instead of panicking and firing people we commit to the long-term 
development process… In the theatre we workshopped a new play for months. At 
Pixar it’s years, literally 5 years, to get the story right… the technology is always a 
tool to serve storytelling.  




The process starts from the top down: 
 
John [Lasseter – then Pixar head] chooses someone he feels is ready to direct… they 
are asked to come up with three original, totally different ideas – different worlds, 
different characters, different genres… Once an idea is picked, we spend the first year 
researching that world and digging into the types of characters found there… But the 
most important work of that first year is finding the core of the story, what it is the 
director wants to communicate to the world. 
        (Myers, 2012, Part 2) 
 
It is worthy of note, with respect to incognizant practice, that the vague “what the director 
wants to communicate to the world” is as far as Pixar seems to attempt in interrogating the 
practice of feature film storytelling. Pixar starts the writing with very rough outlines:  
 
You pitch to the brain trust – a group of the other Pixar directors. One of the most 
unique aspects of our studio is that you get feedback from your peers. And peers who 
are very committed to your success, as much as you are to theirs… You can call on 
individuals or the whole Trust at any point to get the feedback you need. In that first 
year you’re pitching twenty minute overviews of the story, getting feedback, and 
rethinking. We often spend a whole year in outlining before going to a first draft. 
        (Myers, 2012, Part 2) 
 
This is a highly unusual workflow. The idea of using this level of resource at the development 
stage is atypical, as very few organisations have the financial capacity to support such a 
process, nor the talent to make it worthwhile. It is worth contrasting this with the typical 
workflow at this stage for a live-action feature film, which for sake of parity is a typical 
studio-film workflow. A good example is Star Wars VII: The Force Awakens (Abrams, 
2015), also a studio film, also a franchise, also Disney and also with Michael Arndt taking 
screenwriting duties.  
One of the largest studio franchises of all time, on Nov 8, 2012 Arndt was hired to 
write the screenplay, which he worked on for 11 months (Kit, 2013). At this point, it is typical 
that as a commissioned ‘gun-for-hire’ he would be working to a loose plan, but with no 
constant micro-pitching of ideas during the drafting stage as in the Pixar workflow. He would 
turn in a draft which would receive notes from different stakeholders (likely to be primarily 
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producer Kathleen Kennedy, director J.J. Abrams and project consultants Lawrence Kasdan 
and Simon Kinberg) before applying them to the next rewrite. After 11 months of writing, 
Arndt was still hitting story problems and asked for 18 more, but instead of the Pixar ‘artist-
first’ approach, Disney took the ‘release-date first’ approach and fired Arndt – replacing him 
with Abrams and Kasdan in order to make the pre-determined release date (it is an industry 
standard approach to ‘date’ blockbuster films years in advance (give a release date), and the 
process revolves around meeting that deadline, rather than getting the story ready).  
At Pixar, once there is a first draft of the screenplay (in Toy Story 3’s case, Arndt was 
brought in as soon as the idea was chosen, as pitched by director Lee Unkrich) there is usually 
a table read (actors or just Pixar employees who like to act), and then:  
 
[W]hile the writer is incorporating the Brain Trust notes into a second draft, a team of 
story artists begin drawing out the movie, like the comic book... It’s a visual rough 
draft of the whole thing… The Brain Trust watches these reels and gives frank – 
sometimes painfully frank! – feedback. You spend the next 2-3 years in the process of 
putting up reels, getting feedback, and going back to the drawing board before going 
into full production for the final 1-2 years of this process.  
        (Myers, 2012, Part 2) 
 
In this way, the Pixar workflow differs from a traditional workflow as the film is being 
directed whilst it is being written, the visual trial-and-error feeding back into the scripting 
trial-and-error:  
 
[W]hile writing the second draft, they’re [the writer] is working side by side with the 
eight or so story artists who are drawing the movie… It’s a truly unique experience for 
a screenwriter because they’re not only collaborating with the director, but also with 
this very talented group of visual storytellers. The drawings feed the written word just  
as much as the written word feeds the story boards… we don’t use professional actors 
until the last few reels.  
        (Myers, 2012, Part 2) 
 
This process in the live-action studio franchise world would be along the lines of: 
- Script is delivered by the screenwriter (often not the screenwriter that was first 
hired). 
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- Director does their own draft of the screenplay, either themselves, with the original 
writer or a new writer.  Ideally, the creative voice will be maintained, but often it 
is modified or changed completely. Depending how subtle the voice, the 
stakeholders may not even be aware (or in some cases, even care) that it has been 
altered. 
- Script may be rewritten to make certain roles more attractive to ‘marquee-value’ 
talent (in The Force Awakens, this could be to ensure Harrison Ford returned to the 
franchise).  
- Minor rewrites based on casting and rehearsals (certain cast members may not be a 
perfect fit for their role, so dialogue/character interactions are subtly altered). 
- More rewrites during production to solve physical production problems or new 
ideas/opportunities discovered during production. Usually these rewrites are done 
by a different writer, one who is used to working at speed.  
- Final further rewrites during post-production, either to help construct a re-edit, 
pick-ups or looping changes. Looping is the Automated Dialogue Replacement 
(ADR) process whereby the actor re-records their own voice in a studio for more 
flexibility in sound design and mixing. 
 
This non-Pixar workflow demonstrates how maintaining a consistent vision is difficult when 
it comes to the rigors of industrial production. All creative elements of a screenplay contribute 
to the logical through-line of a well-constructed argument, but each stakeholder in a 
production has different priorities and this can have disastrous effects and is why so many 
films ‘fail’ when it comes to the internal goods of the practice. In an ideal production, each 
stakeholder would have their own priorities but will have signed on to the making the ‘same 
film’ (e.g. ‘same vision’, ‘same argument’). The Pixar method takes such a unified approach 
to the collaboration, that the vision of the piece can be maintained throughout – or evolved 
naturally over the course of the process – and the fact that Toy Story 3 is an animation actually 
works in its favour as an exemplar. In animation, every frame is pored – if not obsessed – 
over by many minds, so it is almost impossible for a casual, unnoticed element to be in the 
frame – such as the continuity errors that plague almost all live-action films – or on the 
soundtrack. (The Star Wars universe perhaps has the most notable of these errors, when it 
went unnoticed in Star Wars (Lucas, 1977) that a Stormtrooper had misjudged a doorframe 
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and hit their head to unintended comic effect). This allows for much more precise level of 
control of the frame, and therefore more precise storytelling and argumentation.  
 In summary, described purely in process terms, Pixar’s ability to wholly control the 
creative process from concept-to-screen bestows Toy Story 3 exemplar status as a true 
demonstration of practitioner intention. However, its use as an exemplar would be 
meaningless if the film did not achieve success as defined by this thesis, namely moved the 
audience to a worthwhile conclusion in a worthwhile way. The following section will 
articulate and interrogate both the argument and conclusion of Toy Story 3, demonstrate how 
these manifest themselves in purely cinematic terms with reference to the compensations, and 
finally assess their qualification as ‘worthwhile’.  
 
7.2 Toy Story 3 – Classic Cinematic Argument 
 
Although there will be consistent reference to the screenplay on which the film is based, to 
most efficiently interrogate all elements of the thesis (including all literary and cinematic 
argumentative devices and the process of translation from one to the other) it is necessary to 
analyse Toy Story 3 as a final screen work currently available to the audience in a variety of 
viewable formats.   
 
Toy Story 3 – Synopsis  
The film begins with a toy adventure all set in young boy (and toy owner) Andy’s head. 
WOODY (Cowboy), BUZZ (Astronaut), JESSIE (Cowgirl), BULLSEYE (Horse), and 
SLINK (a slinky dog) are the goodies, MR & MRS POTATO HEAD, THE THREE ALIENS 
and REX (Dinosaur) are the baddies, with HAM (Piggy Bank) as the master villain. Up until 
the climax, the audience is in the world of the adventure (in the real wild west) but as the 
goodies save the day, we cut to what is really happening – Andy playing with toys in his 
room. The sequence continues with a montage to show Andy growing up, until about twelve 
years old.  
 The main story of the film opens with the toys in a trunk, about to execute an 
important plan. They have two phones in there with them – a landline handset and a mobile. 
Rex dials from the landline and the mobile rings. We hear Andy searching for his phone. 
Then the lid opens and we see Andy is now seventeen.  
 He takes his phone from Rex (who won’t let go). The rules are consistent with what 
the first two films have established – the toys have to go inanimate when a human can see 
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them. Andy wrenches the phone from Rex, thinks for a brief moment about his toys, then 
throws Rex back in the trunk and blames his sister for taking his phone.  
 Once he has left, the toys get out. It was all a ruse to get Andy to play with them 
again. Leader Woody makes an announcement and tells them that that was their last, best 
chance, and now they should “close up shop” and prepare for life in the attic. It is not a 
thrilling prospect for any of them, despite their being other toys up there. There is a debate 
(also widely discussed by the characters in Toy Story 2) about loyalty to Andy: a toy’s duty is 
‘to be there’ for their owner whenever they want to play with them. But what to do when their 
owner grows up and doesn’t want to play with them anymore? How long should their loyalty 
last? They all love Andy, but now their future is unclear. Woody is adamant – as long as they 
are owned by Andy, they should always be there, even if in the attic. Mr. Potato Head, always 
the voice of dissention, disagrees – but there is no consensus reached before they are 
interrupted. 
 Andy is leaving for college in a few days and his mother wants him to clear out his 
room, things need to either be taken to college, put in the attic or thrown away. She mentions 
that Andy should think about donating his old toys to Sunnyside Daycare, as they are always 
looking for new toys for the kids. Hassled and irritated, Andy tells her that they’re all junk 
and no-one would want them. He looks at his toys, plastic bin liner in hand and puts all in 
except Woody, who he is going to take to college with him. Andy is going to put the bag in 
the attic, but his mother thinks it is trash and throws the bag out by mistake. Woody sees this, 
but the toys in the bag do not. The toys escape and climb into Andy’s mother’s car – into the 
donation box for Sunnyside. They are hurt by what they feel was a betrayal by Andy and 
think they would be better off going somewhere where they might be played with. Woody 
follows, and again there is the debate about their duty to their owner – especially as this was 
just a mistake. But suddenly the door shuts and all are taken to the daycare centre.  
The toys are welcomed by the Sunnyside toys, led by big pink bear LOTSO, an 
affable old patriarch and KEN (a figurine). Ken makes an instant (and inevitable connection 
with BARBIE (thrown out by Andy’s sister). All but Woody are excited that Sunnyside never 
runs out of children to play with, a veritable paradise for a toy. But Woody sees this as a 
betrayal of Andy – and after a mean-spirited argument with best friend Buzz, Woody leaves 
them there and makes his way out.  
Things do not go to plan, and instead of getting back to Andy, Woody is picked up by 
sweet young four-year-old Bonnie, whose mother works at the daycare centre. She brings him 
home and plays with him and her other toys, and – despite himself – Woody enjoys it. Then 
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he learns a dark truth from a miserable clown toy called CHUCKLES. He explains that he, 
Lotso, and BIG BABY (a large battered baby doll) had a lovely owner called DAISY who 
adored Lotso the most. She lost them on a family outing, but when they managed to finally 
struggle home Lotso had already been replaced. Lotso snapped – he told Big Baby Daisy had 
replaced all of them and they ran away, finding Sunnyside. The newly-bitter Lotso took 
control, turning the centre into a toy prison run on his rules. Chuckles only escaped when 
Bonnie took him home. 
Back at Sunnyside, Andy's toys are thrilled for their first real playtime in years, but are 
put in the toddlers’ room and brutalized by the young children who play nicely but roughly. 
Buzz asks Lotso to move them to one of the older children's rooms, but the nature of 
Sunnyside is revealed. Lotso is using them as cannon-fodder – they need new toys for the 
toddlers’ room, as most don’t last long. Before he can escape and tell the others, Lotso and his 
cronies (big toys) return Buzz to his original factory setting, both erasing his memory and 
returning his personality to that off by-the-book obedient soldier.   
At around the same time Mrs. Potato Head, through an eye she lost in Andy's room, 
sees Andy searching for them. They realize Woody was telling the truth and try to leave. 
Unfortunately, they find themselves literally imprisoned in the room with Buzz as their guard.  
Woody returns to Sunnyside to save his friends. He learns from a world-weary 
CHATTER TELEPHONE that the only way out is through the trash chute. Woody finds his 
old friends. They are overjoyed to see him and he rescues them from Buzz, but in doing so 
Buzz is accidentally reset to Spanish mode instead of his original persona.  
Spanish Buzz instantly falls in love with Jessie and (incorrectly) sees Woody as a 
romantic rival. In a complex prison-break sequence, the toys make it all the way to the trash 
chute, and are about to escape to freedom when they are ambushed by Lotso and his gang. 
Ken, still in love with Barbie changes sides and joins Woody. As a garbage truck approaches, 
Woody reveals Lotso's deception to Big Baby, who in an act of revenge throws Lotso into a 
dumpster about to be collected. Woody and the gang jump over the dumpster to escape, but 
Lotso grabs Woody’s leg and drags him down with him. The rest of the toys fall into 
dumpster trying to rescue him (except Barbie, Ken and Big Baby) as the garbage truck picks 
it up.  
A television falls on Buzz, and his original memory and personality return. The truck 
drops the toys into a landfill, and the Aliens are swept away by a digger. The rest of the toys 
find themselves on a conveyor belt that recycles metal – and chops up the rest. They all hold 
onto something magnetic that will lift them (with the metal) over the spinning chopper – but 
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Lotso is stuck. Despite his misdeeds, Woody and Buzz risk their lives to help him. All avoid 
the chopper, but then realize the conveyor belt now leads to an incinerator. Woody and Buzz 
help Lotso reach an emergency stop button, only for Lotso to betray them again – abandoning 
them to escape. The toys fall into the incinerator and realize finally, that this is their end. They 
stop struggling to escape and hold hands as the heat is about to melt them. But at the final 
moment a GIANT MECHANICAL CLAW reaches down and pulls them clear, operated by 
the Aliens. Lotso is found by a GARBAGE TRUCK DRIVER, who remembering the bear as 
a beloved old toy, ties him to his truck's radiator grille and drives away. Woody and the other 
toys board another truck back to Andy's house. 
Now safe at home, Woody helps the other toys into a box for the attic before saying 
his goodbyes and getting in a different box bound for college. The room now empty, Andy’s 
mom walks in – only to have an emotional moment, declaring to Andy that she wishes she 
“could always be with him”. He hugs her and tells her she always will be. This strikes a chord 
with Woody and he has a change of heart. As they leave the room, he jumps out of the box, 
grabs a sticky-note and pen and writes a hasty note which he sticks to the top of the box full 
of his friends, before jumping in himself. 
Andy reads the note and, thinking the note is from his mother, donates the toys to 
Bonnie. It is not easy for Andy, especially when – to his surprise – he finds Woody is at the 
bottom of the box. He’s even more surprised when Bonnie recognizes him. Initially he takes 
Woody back, but then – realizing they have some special connection – passes Woody on to 
Bonnie, and they play together all afternoon. Woody and the other toys watch Andy go and 
say their silent goodbyes as they begin their new lives with Bonnie. 
Over the credits, we see life in the new version of Sunnyside. Barbie and Ken have 
taken over, and it is now a lovely place to be with a fair ‘tag-team’ system of being played 




Toy Story 3 – The Argument 
 
To appreciate a film as a work of art adequately one must ask how successfully its 
themes have been expressed or embodied by its style and by devices specific to the 
medium.  
(Livingston, 2006, p. 16) 
 
As the study examined in Chapter 5, the concept of ‘argument’ is given various different 
names in the film industry, the two most common being ‘the vision’ and ‘the controlling idea’ 
(McKee, 1998, p. 115). Essentially, both can be reduced to the idea of a narrative feature film 
having a singular theme and singular (but not necessarily simple) attitude to that theme. The 
dominant thinking allows for sub-themes and unlimited narrative complexity, but the ‘idea’ 
that ‘controls’ all elements of the narrative is singular – and the simpler the better. This is not 
to say that the argument has to be obvious or redundant, just expressed so as to be accessible 
to the intended audience.   
 Toy Story 3 is used as an exemplar, as even though the synopsis is a largely 
uninflected account of the key moments of the film, the argument the film is attempting to 
make is signposted with great clarity. To use the terms of the thesis, the worthwhile 
conclusion the film is attempting to move the audience to in a worthwhile way could be 
expressed thus: friendships and relationships should not be thought of as requiring eternal 
loyalty under any and all circumstances, so in order to live a fulfilled life – manifested by the 
ability to form new meaningful friendships and relationships – it is necessary, however 
emotionally painful, to sever or transform an existing friendship or relationship that has lost 
its intrinsic value. In the scenario specific to Toy Story 3, in order to thrive, Woody must 
‘move on’ from original friend and owner Andy (not necessarily sever the friendship, but 
certainly move it from a primary relationship to a secondary one) as their friendship has lost 
its intrinsic value. In this case, through no fault of his own, Andy has grown older and 
essentially grown out of his toys (who will never change) which means he never plays with 
them anymore – and the intrinsic value of this particular friendship is that Andy thrives as he 
plays with the toys, and the toys thrive because he plays with them. When Andy no longer 
fulfils his side of the friendship contract, it loses value for all concerned. If the toys attempt to 
‘hold on’ to the friendship with Andy, flagged in the film as a sense of loyalty and duty “to 
always be there for him”, it will mean they will fail to thrive as they will, at best, spend 
decades sitting unplayed-with in the attic. 
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 In order to effectively defend the thesis using Toy Story 3 as an exemplar, the study 
has to establish: 
(a) that this is the correct conclusion. 
(b) that this conclusion is worthwhile. 
(c) how precisely the film constructs a compelling argument using cinematic tools; and 
(d) how the film does this in a worthwhile way that does not rely on unreasonable 
manipulation or reliance on the compensations.   
 
To first address (b), that the above conclusion is worthwhile can be made with recourse to the 
realms of edifying and unedifying arguments. This is not yet a question of technique, just 
whether the assertion has any intrinsic value. As mentioned in Chapter 2, an edifying 
conclusion can be defined as one that is both plausible and significant. If the conclusion is 
wholly implausible, the argument constructed in support of it will in all likelihood be 
specious. Alternatively, if the conclusion is trivial, it is not worthwhile. The question of 
whether or not the conclusion is true is, perhaps counter-intuitively, not a strict requirement. 
Toy Story 3 gives a conclusion around ideas of loyalty and friendship that, whilst accessible 
and plausible, are certainly complex and perhaps even counter-intuitive to a child still 
learning how to make and maintain friendships. The idea that personal loyalty does not 
necessarily mean blindly committing to the romantic ideal of (to use ‘tween parlance) a 
B.F.F. (Best Friend Forever) is something that requires a strongly developed sense of 
emotional stability, confidence and maturity. Therefore, the exemplar can be said to be 
drawing an edifying conclusion.  
 
How to read a dramatic argument 
To prove (a), that the above is the correct conclusion it is also necessary to simultaneously 
explore (c), precisely how the film constructs a compelling argument using cinematic tools. In 
previous chapters, the study has defined filmic arguments as ones that aim to convince us of a 
stated assertion, providing us reasons to believe within a dramatic context. To isolate the key 
thematic element of an argument is a process of observing what idea is being consistently 
tested, almost on a scene-by-scene basis, by the film. To initially use a McKee-esque analysis, 
it would be to find “the story’s ultimate meaning,” by seeing what exactly is “expressed 
through the action and aesthetic emotion of the last act’s climax,” (McKee, 1998, p. 112). As 
discussed in Chapter 5, McKee’s equivalent to cinematic argumentation is the ‘Controlling 
Idea’, defined as Value plus Cause, where ‘Value’ is the central thematic concept which 
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includes a positive or negative judgement. McKee also states that scene-by-scene “positive 
idea and counter idea argue back-and-forth until at climax one voice wins,” and is revealed as 
the controlling idea (McKee, 1998, p. 119).  
 With regard to the exemplar, what is the action and aesthetic emotion of the last act’s 
climax? For McKee, aesthetic emotion is essentially meaningful emotional experience 
(McKee, 1998, p. 111). The last climax of Toy Story 3 is Woody telling Andy (via a note that 
he knows Andy will mistake to be from Andy’s mom) to pass on the toys to Bonnie – and 
Andy doing it, with a little resistance when he realizes that Woody is in the box along with 
the rest of is old toys. The emotions are strong – the physical and emotional separation of two 
friends – but the meaning in context is clear – both parties are better for it, and there is yet 
another beneficiary – Bonnie.  
To examine the film using McKee’s ‘Controlling Idea’, the ‘Value’ must be 
friendship, as expressed through ideas of loyalty. The positive idea is that friendship is 
defined by unrelenting loyalty, the negative counter-idea that loyalty has limits. The 
relationship is not that of the toys to each other, but of the toys to their owner Andy. This play 
between idea and counter-idea is present in almost every scene in the film. It is first (and 
necessarily) flagged as a central concept at the start of the film, as conventional narrative 
feature filmmaking dictates, when Woody and the other toys try (and fail) for one last play 
time with Andy. What follows is a robust discussion between the toys about their future, and 
the thematic battle-lines are drawn with the key thematic question articulated in the dialogue, 
paraphrased here as ‘despite our positive history/love, what loyalty do we not have to a 
relationship when clearly the other party has moved on?’ Essentially that represents two 
choices – either cling on to the past with ever diminishing returns (this is demonstrated by an 
articulation of what failure looks like: the toys being consigned to the attic – safe, but never 
being fulfilled again, other than the long shot that Andy will someday have kids and they 
might want to play with them) or move on to the scary unknown (demonstrated at the start by 
not defining what this means for the toys).  
This unknown becomes more formed with the option of Sunnyside, but it is still a 
‘newness’ that contains its own inherent terrors. Even when the toys discover the daycare 
centre is essentially a corrupt prison and want to escape, it still presents the dramatic question 
of ‘what now?’ The attic might be a refuge, but hardly a long-term solution: to return home 
cowed, however grateful to be alive, is not presented in the film as a positive option as the 
previous realities of life in the attic are not questioned or modified. In would represent a 
possible, if unsatisfying end to the narrative and would form an assertion along the lines of 
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‘you should retain loyalty out of fear of your life. There is worse out there’. This 
argumentative move would not work as ‘life’ is not the theme – it would instead create two 
themes: loyalty and survival, and they will begin to conflict.  
However, this is not to deny that there are sub-themes. As long as there is one 
overarching theme and argument being made, there can be any number of sub-themes or sub-
arguments, as long as they augment, not undermine the central thesis of the film. A good 
example of this in Toy Story 3 is furnished by looking at the film’s narrative from Andy’s 
perspective. Another way of isolating the main theme and argument of the mainstream 
narrative feature film is simply to ask what the main character learns (or as the study 
examined with Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (Hill, 1970) in Chapter 2, what the main 
character does not learn – to their detriment). This is not always as simple as it seems, as it is 
not always clear precisely who the main character is – either to the practitioner or the 
audience. Consider another highly successful animated film, Frozen (Buck & Lee, 2013). Is 
the main character Anna or Elsa? Both have the same journey. Is this a case, as in the 
aforementioned Lethal Weapon (Donner, 1987), of ‘dual protagonist’? A similar argument 
could be made for Andy being the main character, or at least an equal dual protagonist with 
Woody, as he has a similar journey and performs the final dramatic action in the film (giving 
Woody away to Bonnie). However, categorizing Andy as the main character would be 
incorrect, as his epiphany is instead a good example of a sub-thematic argument. Andy comes 
to understand the need to move on in relationships that have lost their intrinsic value, but it is 
through the prism of coming-of-age; what Andy learns is the need to fully let go of your 
childhood in order to become an adult. This is demonstrated by Andy finally passing over 
Woody, his final and most beloved toy. If he were to keep Woody and take him to college, it 
would be a metaphor for not fully moving on. 
Further sub-thematic arguments worthy of mention, especially in the light of Toy Story 
4 (Cooley, 2019), are those concerning religion, community and parenthood. The religious 
argument implicit in this series views children as God-like beings who give a toy’s life 
meaning and value through their imagination during play; less a conventional friendship than 
a deity-acolyte relationship. ‘To be played with’ is to live a meaning life. As Andy gets older, 
he is no longer the source of meaning, and neither are the younger children who damage the 
toys through inappropriate play. The community argument relates to Woody’s connection to 
the rest of the gang. If he goes to college, the gang will be broken up, and the recognition of 
the need of community is one that is tacitly made by Woody at the close of the film. Woody 
could also be used to represent not Andy’s friend or acolyte, but father-figure – scared of his 
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son outgrowing him and learning to deal with that loss. These arguments are sub-thematic as 
they are worthwhile, valid and complementary to the main argument – but less fully 
developed, providing less reasons to believe their conclusions and not always providing a 
conclusion to the problem-as-stated: the religious metaphor is not developed in the story, the 
conception of ‘play’ left vague and the viewer invited to interpret the Woody-Andy 
relationship as conventional friendship (not sense of awe of hierarchy present); the 
community aspect is not highlighted or raised as a thematic concern and the parenthood 
aspect is inconsistent (is it an awkward stretching of the metaphor if Woody being passed on 
to Bonnie is supposed to represent the grandparent-grandchild relationship). It is interesting to 
note that Toy Story 4 has developed the parent/grandparent metaphor further, although it is 
primarily making a case for personal evolution late in life; knowing when it is time not just 
for post-child/owner life, but new community life.  
To further delineate how Toy Story 3 sets out its argument with such success, it is 
worth revisiting Aristotle’s theory of argumentation previously discussed in Chapter 2, 
namely the concepts of ethos, logos and pathos from Rhetoric, as well as the foundational 
concept of ‘suspension of disbelief’ as outlined in Chapter 5. To start with the latter, before a 
film can convince an audience of an assertion it must simultaneously convince the audience in 
all other areas of story: that the world, characters, situations and resolution (or non-resolution) 
is authentic. Failure in any area weakens the argument. Suspension of disbelief relates directly 
to genre, with comedies (especially animated ones) given more latitude than domestic drama. 
Essentially, the film must convince the audience that the film world is believable enough for 
them to invest their emotions in it, that the characters are believable, that the situations are 
believable and the outcome(s) are believable. If each element of the narrative feature film is 
convincing, then the argument may convince an audience. Toy Story 3 has the foundation of a 
successful argument as it delivers an authenticity to world, character and situation within the 
genre conventions of animated comedy.  
Building on this foundation, Toy Story 3 then also conforms quite clearly to Aristotle’s 
three modes of persuasion. Firstly, ethos: that the film comes from a credible source. The 
definition of ‘source’ being the internal credibility of the screen world has been validated in 
the above discussion of suspension of disbelief. Considering the idea that those presenting the 
film have credibility, this is where both the studio and the franchise become relevant. Toy 
Story 3 comes from Disney/Pixar. As discussed, the track record of Pixar as a mini-studio is 
second-to-none, and the cultural impact of Disney is immeasurable. Both Toy Story (Lasseter, 
1995) & Toy Story 2 (Lasseter, 1999) were critically and commercially successful, so the 
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source of Toy Story 3 is a highly credible one. The two prior films of the series also help 
establish the authenticity and consistency of the fictional world of Toy Story 3. Because 
consistent and deeply imagined, this is a credible, believable world.  
Secondly, logos: that the argument is internally logical. As was mentioned previously, 
the central thesis of the film is one that should be tested scene by scene, and Toy Story 3 does 
this in a highly efficient manner. As noted in the McKee analysis, the central thematic 
question of ‘how to remain loyal when the other party in the friendship has moved on?’ is 
raised at the start of the film, but then is revisited and developed at regular intervals, as 
follows: 
- When the toys escape from the trash 
- At Sunnyside when Woody leaves for the first time 
- At Bonnie’s when Woody enjoys himself 
- When Smiles tells his story about Lotso 
- The confrontation at the garbage chute 
- When Lotso betrays the toys on the conveyor belt 
- When the toys settle for the attic 
- When Andy’s Mom enters Andy’s empty room 
- When Andy donates the toys, including Woody 
 
It is worth noting, that some of these thematic moments are more explicit than others and 
exist on three levels of presentation. When the toys escape from the trash and when Woody 
leaves Sunnyside for the first time the thematic ideas are stated plainly in the dialogue – the 
characters are literally debating the core thematic idea (with Woody arguing for loyalty) in 
what could be labelled ‘direct thematic dialogue’.  A less obvious form of presentation of core 
thematic ideas are moments such as Andy’s Mom enters his room, or the toys settle for the 
attic – there is dialogue around the core thematic idea but it is either oblique or sub-textual. In 
this study, this category will be referred to as ‘indirect thematic dialogue’. The final category 
is demonstrated in the moment when Woody enjoys himself with Bonnie, in a very effective 
non-dialogue story beat played out purely through action – what the study will class as 
‘thematic action’. As Linda Seger puts it:  
 
Once you know what to say, you also need to know how to say it. Theme is the least 
interesting when it’s communicated through talky dialogue, when it’s said rather than 
expressed through more dramatic means. Although lines of dialogue here and there 
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can express the theme… the theme will be far better expressed by concentrating on 
other more cinematic choices”.  
        (Seger, 1994, p. 129) 
 
It should also be noted that in laying out the logic of the argument, Toy Story 3 demonstrates a 
common approach where the precise thematic question is laid out in the dialogue, but the 
answer (and hence the conclusion to the argument) is formed in thematic action. The answer 
as to why this is a common approach can be found in an examination of these “cinematic 
choices” and Aristotle’s third category of pathos.  
For Aristotle, in order to win an argument, the senses and emotions have to be 
invoked. This can certainly be done with simple emotively written text, but as the study 
explored in Chapter 2, the engagement of the emotions and senses is where cinema excels, 
especially over the written word. It is one thing to be told that someone is attractive, quite 
another to experience that attractiveness for yourself. As Cox and Levine pointed out, it is 
cinema’s ability to invoke feelings that makes it so superbly efficient at making impactful 
arguments (Cox and Levine, 2012, p.5). 
Chapters 2 and 5 noted that the conversion from script to screen is a process of 
interpretation, adaptation and transportation, using a myriad of tools specific and often unique 
to the visual and audio arts. What has so far been discussed regarding Toy Story 3 are 
techniques that are wholly text-based without specific recourse to how these moments are 
delivered with sound and vision to the audience (all discussions could have been identical by 
referring only to the screenplay). Therefore, is it necessary to move onto a second stage of (c) 
how precisely the film constructs a compelling argument using cinematic tools. This will also 
refer back to the cinematic techniques and first principles outlined in Chapter 5.   
To focus on one specific scene, near the end of the film the toys end up fighting for 
their lives at the dump, and at one point all appears lost. Below is how the moment was 
written in the original screenplay: 
	
Woody grabs Rex’s hand, slides further toward the inferno.  
 
They are all being pulled inescapably downward.  
 




Buzz...! What do we do?  
 
Buzz looks at her. He reaches out, takes her hand.  
 
Jessie grabs Bullseye’s hoof. Slinky takes Hamm’s hand.  
 
Hamm reaches out to Rex. The Potato Heads hold each other.  
 
Mr. Potato Head grabs Rex.  
 
Buzz reaches out to Woody...  
 
Woody takes Buzz’s hand, and the circle is complete.  
 
As they approach the vortex, heat waves blast their faces.  
 
The Toys close their eyes, turn away.  
 
Woody stares at the fire, shuts his eyes.  
 
This is the end.  
 
A LIGHT from above shines in Woody’s face.  
 
He opens his eyes.  
 
A giant mechanical Claw lowers towards them.  
 
The Claw plunges into the trash around them, closing them in 
its grip, then raises them up.  
 
They soar into the air, away from the ROARING incinerator.  
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Woody looks around in disbelief. The Claw spins, passing in 
front of the crane booth.  
 
INT. CRANE OPERATOR’S BOOTH - NIGHT  
 
In the booth, the Aliens man the joysticks.  
 
ALIENS 
The Clawwwww!!!  
 
They lean into the joystick, steering the Claw to safety. 
 
           (Arndt, 2010, pp. 117-118)  
 
The sequence is emotive, even on the page, but on the screen the emotion is further driven 
and manipulated by elements not on the page. To refer back to Cox & Levine’s comments in 
Chapter 2 that over and above the written word, “Film however has an even larger bag of 
tricks than novels… And films show us faces; they give full rein to our capacity to read faces 
and grasp the significance of gesture. A novelist has to say or hint at things a filmmaker can 
simply show,” (2012, p. 11). Seger further talks specifically how theme (as she conceptualizes 
it) can be best communicated by image, “One of the most important methods for 
communicating theme focuses on the images chosen by the writer, and later by the director… 
You might use images of light and dark to show good and evil, or small versus large spaces to 
show oppression versus freedom,” (Seger, 1994, p. 130).  
The most dominant element not referenced at any time in the script is music. Scored 
by Randy Newman, which gives the sequence a gravitas, seriousness and sense of scale that is 
not present in any other part of the film. As an audience we are mostly confident that no harm 
will befall the toys, but are never completely sure – especially as this is a sequence near the 
end of a second sequel. As referenced in Chapters 5 and 6, music is emotional information 
that tells the audience the emotional significance of the scene. Here, the music pushes the 
significance of the moment. Perhaps the best illustration of this is to imagine music that is 
comedic and comforting. It would indicate that everyone is going to be safe and undermine 
the drama of the situation.  
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Another technique that is not indicated on the page is that of juxtaposition. It is 
unworkable to constantly remind the reader of the look of each character – but the script does 
not remind the reader of the visual juxtaposition of harmless, childlike toys in a horrific 
situation. This juxtaposition is aided by various cinematic and visual tricks, primarily 
character design (most of the toys have large eyes that invite audience empathy, Jessie’s hand 
is made to look much more human as Buzz takes it) and production design – the environment 
is utterly hellish with the palette completely made up from reds, yellows and oranges that 
communicate extreme heat.  
Further, more exclusively cinematic techniques maximize the dramatic tension and 
emotional reaction from the audience. The scene is about the toys accepting their own deaths. 
Buzz is first to do this in the exchange with Jessie, and it should be noted that in a film that is 
dialogue-heavy, this moment becomes completely non-verbal. The question of “What should 
we do?” is answered simply by an offer of a hand. As the central protagonist with the main 
character trait of ‘never giving up’, the key moment of the scene is when Woody finally stops 
struggling and takes Buzz’s hand. It is here that the film uses the standard techniques of 
giving Woody a bigger close-up than anyone else – communicating both the significance of 
his character and the moment – and allowing that moment to be read in all its subtlety and 
complexity.  
Another unique cinematic technique that maximizes emotional impact is editing. The 
timing of the sequence is one that cannot be replicated in the written form and is critical to the 
viewing experience. The toys struggle for a long time, and the seeing of this struggle is 
difficult to watch – yet it is a delicate balance. Too much struggle, and the viewer is bored, 
not enough and they are not experiencing the moment fully – and this sense of struggle and 
desperation is one that is most efficiently communicated on the screen rather than the page. 
The director here made the toys struggle for 30 seconds before Buzz takes Jessie’s hand. The 
time taken between Woody accepting his own death and the rescue is a further 27 seconds. 
This is much longer than is indicate on the page, which reads at approximately 10 seconds. 
Again, this timing is crucial for the audience to wrestle with the potential for the toy’s demise, 
even if they resist it fully. Toy Story 3 stretches this duration to breaking point – pushing, 
especially the adult section of the audience, to consider the death of the toys, before giving 
them the release of a happy end to the sequence.  
To return to Aristotle, this emotional engagement is key to the film arguing 
effectively. The sequence is a culmination of a path that should not have been taken, Woody 
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being punished for clinging to Andy, the others for severing, rather than evolving their 
relationship with their owner.  
As much as all storytelling is manipulation on some level, it is however possible to 
successfully emotionally engage but to do so in an unauthentic, cynical way that does not 
further the argument. As the study examined in Chapter 4, mother! (Aronofsky, 2017) may 
have been a particularly high-profile example of the audiences’ emotions being engaged to no 
edifying end, but it is also possible for a film to have an edifying conclusion that is not argued 
in the worthwhile way, perhaps through manipulations in ethos, logos or pathos as outlined in 
Chapter 6. This is not always by design. With so many creative and institutional elements to 
balance, mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is a difficult process that requires both a 
mastery of the craft and stakeholders that share the same vision for the project. This is a 
significant reason why most films will fail by the internal goods of the practice, to a greater or 
lesser degree.  
So, to answer (d), how does Toy Story 3 construct a compelling argument in a 
worthwhile way that does not rely on unreasonable manipulation or reliance on the 
compensations? To most effectively demonstrate this, let us imagine an alternate version of 
Toy Story 3, one that relies on compensations. To re-cap the complete list, they are as follows: 
(1) Happy Endings; (2) Franchise; (3) Genre Conventions; (4) Casting & Performance; (5) 
Author; (6) Visual Pleasure; (7) Spectacle; (8) Sensation; (9) Wish Fulfilment; (10) Music; 
(11) Puzzle Solving; (12) Promise of the Premise/Obligatory Scene; (13) Recognition Of Self; 
(14) Dialogue; (15) Strong Sequences; (16) Based on a True Story; (17) The First; (18) 
Homage; (19) Fan service; (20) Obscurity, Chaos and/or Confusion.  
Toy Story 3 contains elements that could be viewed as compensations, specifically the 
contextual factors of Franchise, Cast and Author. As noted in Chapter 6, the use of a star (in 
this case, double-Oscar winner Tom Hanks as Woody) is always a contextual, rather than 
textual, benefit and a sequel within a successful franchise will always generate audience 
interest and engagement with the subject material. The same can be said for the promotion of 
Pixar as the ‘author’ of the film. The makers of Toy Story 3 could have avoided these 
compensations by making the same argument through a standalone film not in the Toy Story 
universe, with a non-star cast and promoting the film minimizing the Pixar brand. However, 
although these elements are present, they are ultimately are not functioning as compensations 
as the film makes a functional and accessible argument.   
To remind ourselves of the tests of whether or not a film element is functioning as a 
compensation: if (a) the film argument is functional, or (b) the element is integral to the 
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storytelling, the element is not a compensation. With regard to the latter, this can be proved 
by subtraction, as a compensation is an additive element or emphasis to compensate for 
flawed argument. The previous demonstration that Toy Story 3 has a fully functioning 
argument by successfully applying (even obliviously) Aristotelian principles of persuasion 
goes much of the way to proving that it has no reliance on compensations, however, it is still 
necessary to examine each of them in turn: 
 
(1) Happy Endings: The film does not have a ‘happy’ ending, rather a ‘bittersweet’ 
conclusion that gives not a comforting lie but a painful yet hopeful truth.  
(3) Genre Conventions: The film is a children’s adventure. This requires there to be action 
and different locales but each of the key locations or action set-pieces are used to further the 
story, such as Woody spending time with Bonnie in her home or the furnace sequence. If they 
were removed the argument would not make sense. No genre convention is used 
superfluously.   
 (6) Visual Pleasure: Although the animated images are pleasant to observe, the film does not 
present beauty (be it as character, location, machinery, colour or design) in excess of the 
needs of the narrative.  
(7) Spectacle: Toy Story 3 has no large-scale impressive displays. The largest scale moment in 
the adventure is in the pre-credit sequence that all takes place in Andy’s head. However, it is a 
brief sequence and duration is a critical component of measuring compensation: emphasis 
requires time or repetition.  
(8) Sensation: There is no use of extreme sensation, which is usually more prevalent in 
horror, action and erotic/explicit thrillers and dramas.  
(9) Wish Fulfilment: The film does not rely on any of the four categories of wish fulfilment 
(narrative-led, character-led, universe-led or sensation-led). The audience is not invited to 
want to be Woody, exist in the live-toy world, nor revel in the voyeuristic pleasure of the 
image. Narratively, Woody does not get what he wants but what he needs – and this is 
integral to the argument, not an untethered happy ending.  
(10) Music: There are no extended musical sequences, or music given such prominence or 
screen time to function as a compensation. If the music were removed, the emotional 
engagement (and the argument) would suffer.  
(11) Puzzle Solving: Although like most films, Toy Story 3 uses Noel Carroll’s ‘erotetic’ 
micro question-and-answer model, the film does not function as a mystery. 
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(12) Promise of the Premise/Obligatory Scene: Toy Story 3 is not a ‘high concept’ story that 
contains an obligatory scene that is a key joy to the overall narrative experience. The only 
scene that could be regarded as obligatory is the final scene with Andy, when we ultimately 
find out what happens to the toys. However, this is integral to the argument so is not a 
compensation in the same way that yet another car chase would be in the Fast & Furious 
franchise (2001-).  
(13) Recognition Of Self: As has been previously noted, this significant alignment between 
character and audience member is a difficult compensation to encode at the time of creation, 
and the hyper-real character world of Toy Story 3 further makes this compensation less likely. 
A general sense of identification with a character or characters is key to provoke empathy, but 
‘Recognition Of Self’ requires a fundamental connection. Films that traditionally pursue this 
connection as compensation are dramas that have singular leads and often under-represented 
leads, such as Chiron from Moonlight (Jenkins, 2016) or coming-of-age dramedies, such as 
Edge of Seventeen (Craig, 2016) where every significant plot-point for the protagonist is 
designed to provoke recognition. 
(14) Dialogue: Much like the categories of Visual Pleasure, Spectacle or Sensation, there is 
no emphasis on the pleasures of dialogue that exceeds the needs of the narrative.  
(15) Strong Sequences: Although there are many compelling action sequences that fulfil genre 
conventions and the Promise of the Premise, they neither have the spectacle nor the duration 
that would qualify them as a ‘Strong Sequence’ able to compensate for flaws in the 
storytelling.  
(16) Based on a True Story & (17) The First: Toy Story 3 neither claims to be based on a true 
story nor is the ‘first’ in any category of storytelling.  
(18) Homage: Whilst there is homage to many feature films of the past, most that should be 
familiar to Toy Story 3’s target audience, there is no reliance on them for engagement. This 
can be demonstrated simply by subtraction: would the story moment work without the 
reference to the other cultural product? For instance, there is a sequence where the toys are 
told about the prison rules and being put “in the box”. This is an almost verbatim reference to 
The Bridge on the River Kwai (Lean, 1957), but the sequence works perfectly well without 
that piece of cultural knowledge, functioning as a simple ‘rules of the world’ sequence.     
(19) Fan service: Rather than using the original highly sexual definition of fan service, which 
would immediately disqualify Toy Story 3 from being able to operate in this way, this section 
refers back to Bart Beaty’s more general definition of fan service to “cater unabashedly to the 
audiences expressed desires” and “a series of narrative “awards”” (Beaty, 2016, p. 324), 
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that are established in a film. Using this definition, it is clear that Toy Story 3 does not provide 
fan service, principally due to the fact that the audience does not demand it. This notion of 
‘reward’ fails to be relevant as, unlike most comic book-to-film adaptations, there is no 
‘hardcore’ audience, nor any appreciable hierarchy of fandom that will be rewarded for 
spotting an obscure reference over an obvious one, nor satisfied by the inclusion of a much 
loved character due to vocal lobbying of the practitioners. What references do exist in Toy 
Story 3 function as homage, as outlined above. 
(20) Obscurity, Chaos and/or Confusion: Defined in Chapter 6 as “joy generated by the 
attempt to unravel a puzzle that can never be fully solved,” Toy Story 3 is not constructed 




Toy Story 3 has been used to defend the thesis as it is one of the most accessible examples of 
successful cinematic argument in modern mainstream narrative cinema. In order to do this 
effectively, three foundational elements had to be proved, namely that the conclusion of the 
film was interpreted correctly, that the conclusion could be considered worthwhile, and that 
the argument was constructed in a worthwhile way. As part of this proof, the film’s specific 
manifestation of cinematic methodology of argument was analysed and categorized.  
So far, all elements within the film have been examined, yet there is one further factor 
that relates to the film as an indivisible whole which also significantly contributes to the 
argument being accepted or rejected by the viewer. This factor is complementary to, but sits 
apart from argument construction in that, as was explored in Chapter 2, the film functions as 
both the argument and the evidence for that argument simultaneously.  
Noel Carroll and his fictional ‘skeptic’ go so far as to believe that film-as-evidence is 
a given, but think of film in terms of evidence being “cooked”. For Carroll, films are “made 
up stories expressly designed to fit their general theme,” where “the “evidence” has been 
constructed precisely to cast to best effect the general hypothesis the film is advocating,” 
(Carroll 2006, p. 176).  
In this way Toy Story 3 is highly effective at communicating its argument, as it is not 
only successfully applying Aristotelian concepts of persuasion using cinematic tools, but also 
serves – as all mainstream narrative feature films do – as the evidence to support the 
conclusion that friendships and relationships should not be thought of as requiring eternal 
loyalty under any and all circumstances. What is wrong with saying that the evidence in the 
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film is “cooked” or that the film furnishes its own evidence, is that the film is not presenting 
an evidentiary argument (documentaries might; but fiction films like Toy Story 3 most 
certainly do not). Fiction doesn’t furnish evidence in the ordinary sense of the term. But it 
nonetheless furnishes reasons to believe a conclusion. How does it do this? Not all reasons are 
evidentiary. Some are reminders. Some are conceptual, showing what is implied by 
commitments we already hold; or showing what is possible, given the concepts we hold. 
Some are invitations to imagine or to cognitively and affectively empathise with others and 
their fictional situation (from which we learn such things as what it is like to face a situation). 
All of these are reason generating: they can each give us good reason to hold one belief rather 
than another or make one commitment rather than another. The straightjacket of ‘evidentiary 






The Counter-Example: Mulholland Drive 
 
8.1 Why David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive?  
 
In order to satisfactorily test the thesis, a strong potential counter-example must be chosen: a 
mainstream narrative feature film that appears to contradict the thesis by having all the 
external markers of fulfilling the internal good of the practice (being much loved by, and 
enduringly regarded as an artistic success by practitioners, critics and audiences alike) yet 
does not, by intention nor result, move the audience to a worthwhile conclusion in a 
worthwhile way. Toy Story 3 is, by design, a most conventional mainstream narrative feature 
film so the counter-example should be as unconventional as the mainstream allows. If the 
thesis can survive this challenge, the case for its credibility is significantly strengthened.  
 To quickly summarise the scope and scale of the thesis, it is focused on feature films 
that are “deemed releasable” by a mainstream feature film distributor. This parameter is 
deliberately wide, especially as it does not even require the film be releasable in cinemas, but 
on any platform viewable by any screen device. However, it does disqualify visual art that, 
although created by the same technology, is essentially a non-screen industry work intended 
for release into art galleries and other non-traditional screen spaces. 
  Using these criteria, Mulholland Drive (Lynch, 2001) represents a powerful challenge 
to the thesis. As Todd McGowan, a critical theorist noted for his work on Lynch notes, it is a 
divisive work that “creates a filmic divide between the experience of desire and the 
experience of fantasy,” (2004, p. 67), and is recognized as one of the most significant films of 
this century by film critics, with a 2016 BBC poll of 177 international film critics judging it 
the greatest film of the twenty-first century (Buckmaster, 2016). Screenwriter and director 
David Lynch was nominated for an American Academy Award as Best Director (Academy of 
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, Ceremonies 2002), and other significant film practitioners 
and critics such as Richard Kelly (screenwriter and director of Donnie Darko, 2001), Jaco 
Van Dormael (director of the Camera D’or winning Toto le Heros, 1991), and Thierry Jousse 
(editor-in-chief of Cahiers du Cinema between 1991-1996) cite the film has one of the most 
impactful they have viewed (In the Blue Box, 2010). However, as this chapter will explore, 
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despite the uniformity of praise for the film, there continues to be both debate as to its 
meaning and even whether the film has – or should have – a meaning. 
Mulholland Drive further serves as an effective counter-example as the cinematic 
history and methodology of David Lynch is in direct contrast to that of Pixar and Toy Story 3 
(2010) director Lee Unkrich. To use the Pixar pyramid of conventional storytelling, Lynch 
arguably sits somewhere in the top third, a less conventional storytelling approach appealing 
to smaller but still significant audiences. It is not necessary to detail a full biography here, but 
Lynch’s work as an artist that exemplifies a mysterian philosophy and sensibility is well 
documented. Originally trained as an abstract-expressionist painter (Sheets, 2014) before 
studying under Frantisek (Frank) Daniel (formerly of F.A.M.U. in the former 
Czechoslovakia) who specialized in Russian dramatic art and the Slavic storytelling principles 
of the ‘soul’ and the irrational (Tabachnikova, 2016), Lynch started his feature film career 
with the experimental body horror film Eraserhead (1977), followed up by the conventional 
(but filmed in black and white) biopic The Elephant Man (1980), and the adaptation of the 
popular Frank Herbert science-fiction novel Dune (1984). However, Lynch is perhaps most 
associated with the series of what could be loosely labelled neo-noir films that started with 
Blue Velvet (1986) and continued with Wild At Heart (1990), Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me 
(1992), a prequel to his Twin Peaks (1990-1991) television show, Lost Highway (1997), and 
Mulholland Drive (2001). Only The Straight Story (1999) is an outlier in this period, being a 
conventional road movie about a man using a drive-on tractor to visit an estranged brother 
who has recently suffered a stroke. Lynch also began working in television in 1989, and had 
great success with Twin Peaks (1990-1991). However, this could not be capitalized on and 
after two other cancelled TV shows (sitcom On the Air (1992) and anthology series Hotel 
Room (1993)) Lynch returned primarily to feature film.  
An internationally high-profile screenwriter and director, Lynch is celebrated as a 
purely instinctive storyteller that specializes specifically in the surreal, his key films presented 
as dreams to be experienced by the viewer. In fact, his autobiography, a hybrid of biography 
and memoir is named Room to Dream (Lynch & McKenna, 2018) and he famously believes 
in using transcendental meditation as a creative tool. His book, Catching the Big Fish: 
Meditation, Consciousness and Creativity (2006), is named for the central metaphor he uses 
to express his understanding of the nature of ideas: if you stay in the psychological shallows 
you will only catch little fish, bigger fish require deeper waters.  Xan Brooks of The Guardian 
newspaper notes that Lynch has the appearance “of a corn-fed American dreamer who simply 
likes to show his nightmares to the world,” (Brooks, 2018). Just like real dreams, Lynch’s 
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‘film-dreams’ are evocative yet elusive, and it is this elusiveness that appears not just to be 
the point, but a key part of his global appeal. Lynch is often feted by critics and other 
practitioners precisely because his films are opaque and full of inconsistencies, with no easily 
paraphrased meaning or deconstruction possible. This is what makes Mulholland Drive, the 
most feted work in Lynch’s canon the best possible counter-example. 
 
8.2 Mulholland Drive – Argument or Obfuscation? 
 
It is relevant that, as American film scholar Jason Mittell notes, “the most acclaimed 
American film of this century was a television program,” (2013, p. 27). Mulholland Drive was 
originally filmed as a television pilot, a follow-up to Twin Peaks. However, the network 
rejected it, and eighteen months later Lynch raised the money to complete the project as a 
feature film, shooting an additional eighteen minutes of footage. This is the reason for the 
mosaic-like structure of the narrative, with multiple characters and scenarios that were 
originally intended as the basis for longer storylines.  
 
Mulholland Drive – Synopsis 
The film begins with a montage of 1950s-style jive dancing with various couples moving to 
the music, although the film score playing simultaneously carries a more foreboding tone. The 
figures dissolve into the smiling face of BETTY (who we’ll meet properly later), dressed 
glamorously, as if accepting an award. The off-screen crowd cheer. The image dissolves 
again, and we are in a darkened room. A softly moaning figure – as if in distress – rocks 
under some much less glamorous bedclothes.  
A limousine drives down a dark winding road, revealed by a street sign to be 
Mulholland Drive. Inside sits RITA, a dark-haired woman in her twenties in cocktail party 
dress. The car stops, which disturbs her. She says, “What are you doing? We don’t stop here.” 
Instead of answering, the driver points a gun at her, but before he can shoot the limousine is 
hit by a car driven by drunk, high-spirited teens. Rita staggers out and struggles to downtown 
Los Angeles, sneaking in an apartment to rest. She falls asleep.  
At a diner called Winkies, the awkward DAN tells his breakfast companion that he 
eats at this particular Winkies as he has recurrent nightmare where he is confronted by a 
HORRIBLE FIGURE in the car park. They investigate and the figure appears, and Dan 
collapses in fright. 
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Rita continues to sleep and we see a middle-aged man in wheelchair, MR. ROQUE, 
call a mysterious man (we do not see his whole face), telling him that, “the girl is still 
missing”. The mysterious man makes another call, answered by another person whose face 
we do not see. This person makes yet another call to a seedy motel phone next to an ashtray. 
We now see BETTY, an aspiring actress, arrive at the airport with an OLD 
FRIENDLY COUPLE that she has met on the plane. When the couple leave her and get into a 
cab, they continue to smile huge forced fake smiles. Betty arrives at an apartment complex, to 
be met by MRS. LENOIX, but the woman tells her “Just call me Coco, everybody else does”. 
Coco shows Betty to her apartment (owned by Betty’s Aunt). After Coco leaves, Betty is 
shocked to find Rita there, who claims to be a friend of Betty’s Aunt. The two talk, Betty 
communicating her excitement to be in Hollywood, “this dream place.” Rita goes back to 
sleep.  
Meanwhile director ADAM has his film taken over by two odd-acting MOBSTERS, 
and they demand he cast an unknown actress named CAMILLA RHODES as the star (Mr. 
Roque listens in from his office). Adam storms out. 
Across town, JOE, an incompetent hit man attempts to steal a book full of phone 
numbers, but keeps killing people by mistake.  
Betty speaks to her Aunt, and finds out that Rita was lying. Rita reveals she has 
amnesia (it’s now clear that Rita took her name from a film poster in the apartment). To help 
Rita remember who she is, Betty opens Rita's purse, revealing it contains a large amount of 
cash and an ODD BLUE KEY. 
On returning home, Adam is beaten up and thrown out of his own house when he 
finds his wife cheating on him. 
Betty and Rita go to Winkies to find out more about Rita’s car accident. A waitress 
called DIANE serves them, and Rita remembers the name DIANE SELWYN. They find 
Diane Selwyn in the phone book, but she does not answer their call.  
After Adam learns his bank has cut him off, leaving him penniless, he agrees to meet a 
mysterious figure called THE COWBOY. 
At the apartment, a ‘crazy’ older neighbour called LOUISE knocks on the door, telling 
Betty that something bad is happening, but seems confused as to who Betty is and who is in 
danger.  
Adam meets The Cowboy on his ranch at night, and the man calmly suggests he cast 
Camilla Rhodes.  
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Rita helps Betty audition for a role, where Betty gives a clichéd, if well executed 
performance. Yet when Betty goes to the audition, despite the odd unprofessionalism of the 
others in the room, she makes a different, more sensual choice and gives an outstanding 
performance, which impresses everyone. Betty is taken to the studio where Adam is casting 
his film, The Sylvia North Story. Camilla Rhodes auditions and Adam resentfully picks her 
for the role. Adam and Betty briefly lock eyes – and the moment is significant – but Betty 
bolts before she can meet him, claiming she is late to see a friend. 
Betty and Rita break-in to Diane Selwyn's apartment. In the bed, they find a woman’s 
body – and she has clearly been dead for several days. Frightened that they are in danger, they 
go home where Rita disguises herself with a blonde wig. The distress connects them further, 
and that night Betty and Rita have sex. Rita starts talking Spanish in her sleep, and keeps 
saying “Silencio”. She wakes Rita and insists they go to a theatre club called Club Silencio.  
The EMCEE gives a convoluted speech about everything being an illusion. A singer 
comes on stage and sings Roy Orbison’s ‘Crying’ in Spanish. She collapses but her voice 
continues, revealing it to be a recording. Both women are highly moved and cry, and Betty 
opens her purse to find a BLUE BOX inside that matches Rita's key. They return to the 
apartment, but when Rita finds the key she realises that Betty has disappeared. Rita unlocks 
the box, and it falls to the floor. 
There is a short sequence where Betty’s Aunt comes into the bedroom only to find it 
empty, before we see Diane in her own bed (we do not see her face). The Cowboy tells her to 
wake up, only to then realise that the body on the bed is dead. He leaves. Then Diane Selwyn 
wakes up in bed, clearly the same apartment that Betty and Rita broke in to. She looks exactly 
like Betty, but is a failed actress driven into a deep depression by her failed affair with Camilla 
Rhodes, a successful actress who looks exactly like Rita. Camilla invites Diane to a dinner 
party at Adam's house – on Mulholland Drive. Diane is driven alone in the back of a 
limousine, in a variation of the first scene with Rita. The car stops suddenly and Diane says 
the same line, “What are you doing? We don’t stop here.” This time, Camilla comes out of the 
bushes and leads Diane up to the party via a back way. Diane meets Adam’s mother, who 
looks exactly like Mrs. Lenoix. This version also tells Diane to “Just call me Coco, everybody 
does”.  
At dinner, Diane mentions that she came to Hollywood when her Aunt Ruth died and 
left her an inheritance, and she and Camilla met when they auditioned for The Sylvia North 
Story. A woman who looks like the original "Camilla Rhodes" from earlier in the film kisses 
Camilla, and they smile awkwardly at Diane. Adam and Camilla try to make an 
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announcement that looks to be about their engagement, but can’t stop themselves from kissing 
and laughing as Diane watches, tearful. We then see Diane meet hit man Joe (who looks the 
same) at Winkies, and it looks like she is paying him to kill Camilla. A stranger, Dan (also 
looks the same), notices them. Joe says that when the job is done, Diane will find a blue key 
in her apartment. When she asks what it is for, he just laughs.   
Later, Diane stares at the blue key on her coffee table. Overcome by guilt, she 
hallucinates at she masturbates, eventually shooting herself after being chased by a cackling, 
nightmarish vision of the Old Friendly Couple from the airport. The screen dissolves into a 
backdrop of Hollywood where images of a happy Betty and Rita (in blonde wig) are overlaid. 
Back at the nightclub, a woman whispers, "Silencio." 
 
Mulholland Drive – The Argument 
They key question is simple: Is there a worthwhile argument being presented in a worthwhile 
way in Mulholland Drive? If none can be detected even after close study, the film represents 
an awkward exception to the thesis. If a non-edifying argument is present, or an edifying 
argument presented in a manipulative way or reliant on the compensations, then the film will 
be a failure by the definition of the thesis but may still be consistent with it; such a failure 
may be a reason why the film is admired by critics and audiences, but not mass audiences. 
Yet if Mulholland Drive does, despite popular perception, present a meaningful conclusion 
using ethical cinematic argumentation methodology, then it becomes not a counter-example 
but an exemplar of the thesis – and in this section the study will argue that this is indeed the 
case.   
 Using the same analytical apparatus to detect and justify an argument as used with Toy 
Story 3, Mulholland Drive may have a significantly more nuanced argument than the Pixar 
film, but it is consistent, comprehendible and worthwhile nonetheless. It can be stated in a 
way that maintains Lynch’s mysterian worldview, that: even though there is enrichment, 
humour and validity in the search for meaning, human memory, identity and consciousness 
are of such complexity that only a surface subjective level of understanding of who we are can 
be comprehended.   
 This somewhat sceptical conclusion, and even the attempt to find a conclusion, 
certainly goes against the grain of those who typically embrace and revere Lynch’s work, but 
could go some way to explain why Mulholland Drive in particular has grown in reputation to 
become a key part of his canon as opposed to other works that have been ill-received or 
become more marginalized over time.  
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 So, again, to effectively defend the thesis, the analysis has to establish: 
(a) that this is the correct conclusion. 
(b) that this conclusion is worthwhile. 
(c) how precisely the film constructs a compelling argument using cinematic tools; and 
(d) how the film does this in a worthwhile way that does not rely on reasonable 
manipulation or reliance on the compensations.   
 
Obviously, for a practitioner such as David Lynch proving (a) is not straightforward, 
especially as he is actively discouraged from attempting any transparency, both by audiences 
and critics (as outlined below), who constantly cite reticence to even attempt to unravel or 
articulate any meaning behind his screen works. Unlike Toy Story 3, where there is a reliable 
objective perspective, and great clarity given to every moment-to-moment cause-and-effect 
event sequence, Mulholland Drive does not prioritize transparency of storytelling. Therefore, 
the hermeneutic exercise has two levels: before any argument can be demonstrated, it must 
first be clarified what precisely the audience is seeing.    
 Most of the discourse around Mulholland Drive is not about the meaning of the film 
overall, but of the meaning of the events that have taken place in the narrative. There are 
essentially two schools of thought, the first most dominant interpretation is expounded by 
academics and critics alike typified by McGowan (2004, 2015) and Thomas (2006), who all 
believe it to be quite clearly a film of two halves. In Subjective Realist Cinema: From 
Expressionism to Inception (2014), Matthew Campora offers an explanation of the film that 
“is drawn from a growing consensus of commentators who view the film’s first movement 
(and all its various strands) as a dream and its second as a waking frame that provides clues to 
making sense of the dream,” (Campora, 2014, p. 69). Tom Charity, a film critic from Time 
Out, says, “For me the first half is the dream of a failed starlet idealising herself as a talented 
ingénue with a beautiful young woman who loves her. Then, about two-thirds of the way 
through, she wakes up and is faced with reality: she is a failed actress who has been dumped 
by her lover and is working as a waitress,” (Charity, in Lewis, 2002). Belgian film director 
Jaco Van Dormael is quite explicit. “The film was crystal clear to me, because of its very bold 
time structure. Two-thirds of the film is but a dream,” (Dormael, 2010, 1 minute, 8 seconds).   
The second, minority school of thought is one championed more commonly by critics 
than academics and is epitomized by figures such as Stanley Kauffman and the BBC’s Jane 
Douglas. Douglas defers all judgement as to meaning, “I'm not a subscriber to the theory that 
the first half of the film is a dream and the second half reality because I think it's too easy… I 
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do believe that in some ways it is better to just watch it without constantly trying to work out 
what it means,” (Douglas, in Lewis, 2002). Kauffman claims that “sense is not the point: the 
responses are the point,” (Kauffman, 2001). As mentioned earlier, such opinions and theories 
might be a minority view when it comes to interpreting Mulholland Drive specifically, but do 
expose the base-state uniform reaction to Lynch’s work, which is a general reticence to 
deconstruct. This is worthy of note and will be re-examined at the end of this chapter with 
specific reference to Mulholland Drive.  
 The dominant ‘Betty’s Dream’ understanding of the narrative is clearly the most 
justified. Although there is momentary confusion once the blue box has been opened and we 
are in the second reality where Betty is Diane, once the film ends it is a straightforward 
process to reinterpret and reassemble the previous scenes into a consistent, meaningful 
narrative. The opening of the jive dancing dissolving into a moaning figure under the bed 
sheets becomes a conventional framing device when taken with the interpretation of Betty as 
Diane’s fantasy self. It is also a view that takes the Ockham’s Razor approach: other 
interpretations are of course possible, but rely on far wider and less justifiable logical leaps.   
 Now that there is a solid basis on which to deconstruct the argument, (a) that the 
above is the correct conclusion, and (c) precisely how the film constructs a compelling 
argument using cinematic tools can be addressed. Why is the conclusion that (to paraphrase) 
‘true meaning in life is not comprehendible but worth exploring’ the most credible 
interpretation? The primary recourse is to the film itself and to apply McKee’s method to find 
Mulholland Drive’s ultimate meaning by seeing what is expressed through the action and 
aesthetic emotion (where emotion and meaning arrive together instead of separately) of the 
last act’s climax. To re-cap, McKee’s version of cinematic argumentation is the ‘Controlling 
Idea’, defined as Value plus Cause, where ‘Value’ is the central thematic concept which 
includes a positive or negative judgement. McKee also states that scene-by-scene “positive 
idea and counter idea argue back-and-forth until at climax one voice wins,” and is revealed as 
the controlling idea (McKee, 1998, p. 119). 
 So, what is the action and aesthetic emotion of the last act’s climax? The reveal that 
Betty is actually Diane, a failed (and dumped and humiliated) actress who is masturbating 
through a fever-dream of both her perfect life and her demons, and who then commits suicide. 
Diane seems to learn that she is a bad actress, that she will never be as successful or talented 
as Camilla, that she is a victim and that life is not worth living before killing herself. This 
would indicate quite another conclusion and argument, along the lines of the more prosaic 
‘Love can destroy you if you let it define you’ or ‘Jealousy can destroy you if you let it define 
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you’, ‘Hollywood can destroy you if you let it define you’, or the more obviously Lynch-like 
‘Dreams can kill you if you let them define you’.  
Although, in defence of the latter, and with recourse to identifying the core thematic 
idea by seeing what is being tested in most scenes, there is certainly a recurrence of dream 
references and sleep iconography in the film (beds, the idea of Hollywood being the city of 
dreams – and the fact a tag-line for the film was ‘A love story in the City of Dreams’). 
However, this particular McKee approach fails when it comes to Mulholland Drive, as the 
aesthetic emotion of the last act’s climax does not relate to theme. This is one reason why the 
argument of the film can feel elusive, as it is not tethered completely to the main character’s 
direct experience.   
  A method of assessing the key thematic element of an argument by observing what 
idea is being consistently tested on a scene-by-scene basis by the film is more effective here. 
So, what is being tested? On a casual viewing, there seem to be many abstract concepts 
touched upon at various times during the narrative: love, sex, jealousy, randomness, romance, 
fame, talent, self-respect, desire, fantasy, ambition, optimism, feminism, capitalism, 
corruption, nostalgia, dreams, nightmares, identity and violence to name but a few. These can 
all fit under a vague conception of the nature of ‘Hollywood itself’, and the setting provides 
opportunity for satire that could also indicate meaning. It is also unsurprising that a high 
number of themes are embedded in the work, given the television-pilot origins of the project. 
However, these are all sub-thematic concepts that complement the main thesis of the film, as 
although they have thematic points to make, they do not contradict the main thematic idea, 
and as they represent more of an unfinished flow of ideas and points-of-view, none of them 
the basis for a fully developed argument. The only thematic idea that is being consistently 
tested throughout the film is Lynch’s mysterian point of view. 
 Various conceptions and manifestations of mystery are present in every frame of the 
film, from the most surface level of Betty and Rita trying to solve the mystery of Rita’s past, 
but broadening out as the film reveals its design to mysteries of perception, identity and 
reality. To use McKee’s ‘Controlling Idea’ paradigm, the ‘Value’ must be mystery, the 
positive idea being that all mysteries can be solved, the negative counter-idea that some 
mysteries are unsolvable, a common push-and-pull battle naturally present in almost any 
mystery narrative. In terms of genre, Mulholland Drive is set up as a neo-noir mystery with all 
the necessary tropes and signifiers (femme fatale, amnesia, organized crime, glamorous lives 
with seedy underbellies), where the initial set-up is deliberately conventional: the two main 
characters attempt to solve a mystery, therefore setting up mystery as a central concept with 
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both the characters and the audience on the lookout for clues. However, unlike Toy Story 3, 
there are no big clear discussions of these thematic ideas, with the audience expected to do 
more cognitive work to discern thematic point-of-view.  
To now consider (c) how precisely the film constructs a compelling argument using 
cinematic tools, the issue of the both the events and argument of the film being opaque to 
sections of the audience is not due to the absence of a worthwhile argument being made in a 
worthwhile way, but the fact that the film uses unconventional cinematic methodology to 
make the argument. 
To return to the design of the film, as much as the initial appearance is as of a neo-noir 
film, the film functions as an almost perfect exemplar of the ‘Mind-Game Film,’ (Elsaesser, 
2009), briefly discussed in Chapter 6. 
The mind-game film is often referred to as a ‘puzzle’ film (Panek, 2006) and Elsaesser 
defines it as comprising films that are ‘playing games’ with either the characters or the 
audience (or both), with the latter due to certain crucial information being withheld or 
ambiguously presented (Elsaesser, 2009, p. 14). Elsaesser puts Mulholland Drive into this 
category and notes that some mind-game films “put the emphasis on “mind”, featuring 
characters with unstable mental conditions where perception of reality is a central concern 
(Elsaesser, 2009, p. 14). Further, Elsaesser notes various common themes of the mind-game 
film to be “the nature of consciousness and memory,” and that “they address not just the usual 
(genre) issues… but also epistemological problems (how do we know what we know) and 
ontological doubts (about other worlds, other minds) that are in the mainstream of the kinds of 
philosophical inquiry focused on human consciousness, the mind and brain,” (Elsaesser, 
2009, p. 15). 
He also notes that an overriding common feature of mind-game films is that they 
“delight in disorienting or misleading spectators,” and that “spectators on the whole do not 
mind being “played with”: on the contrary, they rise to the challenge,” (Elsaesser, 2009, p. 
15). Elsaesser identifies as a potential root cause of the rise of the mind-game film across all 
national cinemas, and its increasing prevalence as a storytelling form, the need for the modern 
mainstream narrative feature film to exist on a variety of platforms that make them constantly 
accessible. This provides both an incentive and a need for practitioners to create work that can 
sustain multiple viewings, lest the work be deemed basic or simplistic. Typical mind-game 
narration revolves around “unreliable narrators, the multiple time-lines, unusual point of view 
structures, unmarked flashbacks, problems in focalization and perspectivism, unexpected 
causal reversals and narrative loops,” and typical mind-game central characters suffer from 
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some kind of psychopathology such as amnesia to highlight “conundrums about the relation 
of body, brain and consciousness that challenge concepts of “identity””, (Elsaesser, 2009, p. 
18) all elements of which are present in Mulholland Drive.  
 In this way, in the period since its release, the storytelling structure of Mulholland 
Drive has become increasingly conventional, which may account for the increasing esteem in 
which the film is held. But how precisely does this ‘puzzle’ narrative structure relate to the 
forming of the argument? The answer is that Mulholland Drive argues unconventionally as it 
is the structure itself that carries most of the weight of the argument – the presentation of the 
argument itself supports the conclusion. This is filled in and made more nuanced by the 
characters and their interactions (the plot is a mystery, amnesia and identity are key themes), 
but the shape of the argument dominates the content, quite efficiently organizing the plethora 
of thematic ideas into the category of sub-thematics. Given the conclusion, that “even though 
there is joy, humour and validity in the search for meaning, human memory, identity and 
consciousness are of such complexity that only a surface subjective level of understanding of 
who we are can be comprehended”, it is clear that the puzzle structure is a very efficient form 
of argument presentation. Film theorist David Roche believes that Lynch’s films are detective 
stories only in the sense that they turn the audience into detectives in order to understand the 
narrative. Roche believes that Mulholland Drive is a mystery film constructed wholly “by the 
spectator-detective's desire to make sense” of it (Roche, 2004). It should also be noted that in 
laying out the logic of the argument, Mulholland Drive uses only action to communicate both 
the thematic question and answer. (By comparison Toy Story 3 lays out the precise thematic 
question in dialogue and answers it (and hence presents the conclusion to the argument) in 
thematic action.) This certainly makes both thematic question and answer less explicit in 
Mulholland Drive but, as discussed, the argument is strengthened as a consequence. To have 
the audience to go to the significant cognitive effort to assemble the puzzle, only for more 
mystery to remain is one way to attempt the viewers to feel the conclusion as well as 
comprehend it.  
In this way, Mulholland Drive adheres quite strictly to Aristotle’s theory of 
argumentation. Ethos and logos are both are applied conventionally – David Lynch has 
considerable credibility as an artist and the argument is logical, if requiring some assembly, as 
detailed above. However, when it comes to the intrinsic cinematic strength of pathos, the film 
takes an unusual argumentative approach. Pathos in filmic storytelling is ordinarily used to 
invoke emotions embedded in the narrative, rather than senses generated through 
spectatorship. However, the story structure, philosophical themes and performance style of 
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Mulholland Drive make meaningful emotional engagement and/or identification problematic, 
and instead the film prioritizes the engagement (deliberate or otherwise) of the senses rather 
than the emotions.  
 Let us take the example of the unreliable narrator, common not just to mind-game 
films, but a staple of German Expressionism, itself the main inspiration for the ‘noir’ genre. 
The revelation that Betty is not who she first seemed comes a full thirty minutes before the 
close of the film. At this point, over and above the cognitive work of assessing this new 
identity and reality for stability and permanency, the audience now has to learn about and 
potentially care for this new iteration of the character; what is gained in terms of narrative 
impact is lost in terms of emotional connection. Audiences may like, or even prefer, this new 
Betty/Diane, but they had built up a relationship with the previous incarnation that may (or 
may not) have to be jettisoned. So there is not only a new character to contend with, attention 
is also split. In fact, it should be noted that the use of this technique combined with the 
psychopathologies of paranoia and amnesia, and the motif of the doppelganger, push 
Mulholland Drive away from being just a ‘noir’ (in the sense that it is a crime story with 
visual and thematic roots in German Expressionism), towards a film solidly in the tradition of 
German Expressionist filmmaking. Essentially the film could be viewed as an homage to The 
Cabinet of Doctor Caligari (Campora, 2014, p. 68), which covered much of the same ground 
on the nature of identity and reality (complete with unreliable narrator and twist/reversal 
ending).  
 It is also important to note that Lynch’s cinematic storytelling method may be 
unconventional in terms of classic Hollywood cinema, but very conventional in its obedience 
to the traditions of Slavic storytelling imparted to him during his student years. One of Frank 
Daniel’s exercises included writing three versions of the same scene: a poetic version, a 
comedic version and a tragic version, with a final version having to include all three elements. 
The goal was to engage the senses of the audience, not their intellect (Dormael, 2010, 17 
minutes, 54 seconds).  
 However, any loss of emotional connection with Betty may not represent as 
significant an issue as it would be in a more conventionally told narrative version of the 
argument, such as Shutter Island (Scorsese, 2010). The performance style – up to the point of 
revelation – in Mulholland Drive does not encourage empathy. Essentially, Lynch uses a 
heightened Brechtian level of performance, an extreme style that goes against the grain of 
realism (Watts, 2017). It is Brechtian in that it constantly reminds us that we are watching a 
construction rather than reality. Only when Betty is revealed as Diane does the performance 
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style change to something more akin to conventional screen realism, but again, there is 
limited time in which to connect with the character. In a conventionally-told film, the 
audience would usually care about the main character as their journey embodies the argument. 
If this does not emotionally engage us, the argument is weakened or lost altogether.  
In Mulholland Drive, Lynch’s argument-building does not rely on pathos-as-emotion, 
but pathos-as-sensuous (in the Miltonian, non-sexual, sense (Fallon, 2014)) by manipulation 
of mise-en-scene (Jousse, 2010, 3 minutes, 48 seconds). This brings the analysis to (d) that 
the construction of the argument is done in a worthwhile way that does not rely on 
unreasonable manipulation or reliance on the compensations. Whereas there does not appear 
to be any unreasonable manipulation present (as Mulholland Drive neither relies on emotion 
or sentimentality, nor attempts to falsely present real-world facts to create its argument), a 
case could be made for sensation-as-compensation. However, this case would have to rely on 
the everyday interpretation of the term, as in this context sensation-as compensation is defined 
by the use of extreme sensation to distract from film-as-argument flaws, and as much as 
Mulholland Drive attempts to evoke unsettling sensations, these are clearly at the service of 
the story and not extreme enough to function as compensation. It is relevant to note, however, 
that although Mulholland Drive does not use sensation as compensation as defined by this 
thesis, it is often cited as a compensation by other practitioners, critics and audiences, who 
either cannot or refuse to read or accept the argument the film is making. French Director 
Guillame Nicloux (Valley of Love, 2015) comments that “What I like in films is to be very 
much disturbed and lost, like when you’re looking at a painting you don’t understand”, 
(Nicloux, 2010, 1 minute, 48 seconds) screenwriter and noted Lynch fan Michael Souhaite 
(Roxane, 2019) comments that, “Lynch really works on creating a feeling. He keeps titillating 
the audience with lots of sounds, which put them into a trance, a dreamlike state,” (Souhaite, 
2010, 9 minutes, 36 seconds) and Peter Travers of Rolling Stone magazine sums up the 
position well in his comments that “Mulholland Drive is all of a dark, dazzling piece, and 
lapses in clarity seem a small price to pay for breathtaking images like these,” (Travers, 
2001).  
The only other relevant compensations are those of (5) Author, (6) Visual Pleasure 
and (11) Puzzle-solving. With regards to the latter, objections can certainly be raised towards 
the film with regards the comprehension of the argument and the cognitive demands placed 
on the audience, but the argument is sincerely made – as the study has noted, the puzzle form 
being a justifiably efficient choice (with recourse to cinematic tradition) to both structure and 
become the evidence for the argument. Puzzle films essentially have only three basic 
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conclusions (that can then be further nuanced): everything is solvable; nothing is solvable; or 
some things are solvable. Mulholland Drive uses the mosaic-like structure to argue the latter, 
with the occasional story strands left undeveloped and the non-gratuitous engagement of the 
senses indicating further layers of meaning integral to this conclusion.  
With regard to (5) Author, Lynch as an artist carries considerable credibility. 
However, this would only function if the film itself failed to function meaningfully as 
argument, and as the study has examined, that is not the case with Mulholland Drive, a 
cognitively challenging but nonetheless coherent narrative.  
Regarding (6) Visual Pleasure, scopophilia, the concept of obtaining pleasure from 
looking, is a core element of the cinematic experience – so visual-pleasure-as-compensation is 
purely predicated on emphasis. As the study has noted, as much as the images (and sounds) 
Lynch creates in Mulholland Drive are lauded, and like the everyday use of the concept of 
sensation, often cited as compensations by viewers refusing or unable to perform the 
cognitive work required to interpret the story coherently, there is no over-emphasis on them 
separate from the logical and effective construction of the argument; that this argument is 
functional also negates any function of the images as compensation.  
Finally, there is the question of (b) that the conclusion is worthwhile. To recap this 
conclusion it is that: Even though there is enrichment, humour and validity in the search for 
meaning, human memory, identity and consciousness are of such complexity that only a 
surface subjective level of understanding of who we are can be comprehended. In terms of an 
edifying conclusion within Western society, it is uncommon but certainly not unique in 
mainstream cinema and literature, the unknowable-ness of consciousness a relatively familiar 
science-fiction preoccupation, especially those stories involving robotics, androids or cyborgs 
(such as those written by Isaac Asimov). It is reminiscent of, but much more optimistic than 
Douglas Adams’ answer to ‘the meaning of life, the universe and everything’: ‘forty-two’, 
(The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy, 1979). The idea that such a complex question can have 
such a simple answer is absurd in the extreme.  But worthwhile or edifying does not mean 
unique. A worthwhile conclusion is largely dependent on social and societal context, and can 
be quite familiar if its restating has value at that historical time and place. One example of this 
is the winner of the American Academy Award for Best Picture, Green Book (Farrelly, 2018), 
a perhaps over-simple tale of the ‘we’re all just people, we can get along if we just tried to 
understand each other’ variety. A very familiar conclusion to be sure, but one that could well 
have value in increasingly divisive times. The conclusion of Mulholland Drive is far from that 
of Green Book, as Jaco Van Dormael states: “I think that Lynch’s work contributes to the 
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fight against simplification, against a trend of unambiguous movies, which provide answers 
the way television news does. His work speaks to a different kind of awareness, a different 
perception, of what we believe to be reality, without knowing what it is. Is it what we 





Mulholland Drive represents a strong putative counter-example to the thesis of the internal 
good of mainstream narrative feature film being to move an audience to a worthwhile 
conclusion in a worthwhile way. In direct counterpoint to Toy Story 3 (yet still within the 
bounds of a mainstream narrative feature film ‘deemed releasable’), it is atypically developed 
and narratively obscure, and at face value seems to be a failure as defined by the thesis. But, 
crucially, it is also a film lauded by audiences, critics and other practitioners alike. In fact, a 
very common position on the film, as with most of David Lynch’s work, is to resist analysis, 
of either story or meaning. 
 Mulholland Drive certainly has, by mainstream multiplex narrative standards, told its 
story by unorthodox means, but once unpacked this story is coherent, consistent and logical 
with all cinematic elements at the service of delivering a compelling argument to support the 
conclusion that ‘Even though there is enrichment, humour and validity in the search for 
meaning, human memory, identity and consciousness are of such complexity that only a 
surface subjective level of understanding of who we are can be comprehended’. The argument 
could be construed as weaker if it were difficult for the viewer to interpret, but it is still 
present nonetheless and potentially the cognitive work required to grasp it could equally be 
construed as a strengthening of the argument: the effort aligns the viewer with the characters.   
 The evidence has been laid out above, but there is still one problematic factor to 
discuss. Those who laud Mulholland Drive also tend to resist any significant analysis to find 
meaning. How does this reconcile with the thesis? How can the internal good of the practice 
be to move people to a worthwhile conclusion in a worthwhile way, if some audiences regard 
any meaning as unimportant, yet enjoy mainstream cinema?  
 The response is two-fold: the ‘easy’ response is to dismiss such an audience as the 
exception that proves the rule. Even Lynch’s most successful cinematic works are seen by 
relatively modest audiences, not all of which wish to avoid analysis. This would mean that the 
meaning-averse audience is an outlier; particularly small and not representative of typical 
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mainstream audiences. In purely numerical terms – David Lynch has never made a film that 
had grossed more than $31 million US Dollars in American cinemas (Dune, 1984), with 
Mulholland Drive making $7.2 million compared to independent comedy My Big Fat Greek 
Wedding (Zwick, 2002) drawing in $242 million (Boxofficemojo) – this is a valid position.  
 However, a more robust response is the claim that, just in the same way that the 
internal good of the practice of film-as-meaningful-argument is incognizant to most 
practitioners, the meaning-averse audience is equally incognizant in recognizing which 
elements of the film have triggered their on-going engagement with it. The film is Lynch’s 
most well-received cinematic work (both at the time and reflectively) and this could be due to 
the fact that it is Lynch’s most successful attempt at layering his narrative, deliberately or not, 
to suit different levels of engagement and, thus, different audiences.  
 Mulholland Drive, clearly influenced by Lynch’s favourite films (Fox, 2019) Sunset 
Boulevard (Wilder, 1950) and The Wizard of Oz (Fleming, 1939), has struck a Schrödinger’s 
Cat-like perfect balance of being both a solvable and unsolvable mystery simultaneously; it is 
at once possible to find an interpretation – yet with some (but not equal) validity, due to either 
extraneous narrative elements or a lack of interest in doing the cognitive work, also possible 
to swallow whole the Lynchian mysterian standpoint. However, the incognizant element for 
the engagement of the meaning-averse audience is the presence of a solvable ‘surface’ 
mystery (even if not consciously desired by this audience) that in this case allows for coherent 
argument.   
 One way to test this theory is to consider another film from David Lynch, one that 
shares almost identical narrative and structural elements to Mulholland Drive but is resolutely 
insoluble. That film is Inland Empire (2006). It shares with Mulholland Drive the Hollywood 
setting, the puzzle-like structure, the dream/nightmare-like atmosphere, the focus on sensation 
over emotion, the Wizard of Oz/Sunset Boulevard homages and the central character 
attempting to solve a mystery, as well as featuring regular Lynch actors Laura Dern, Harry 
Dean Stanton and Mulholland Drive alumni Justin Theroux, Laura Harring and Naomi Watts. 
Most of the narrative is concerned with an actress Nikki Grace (Laura Dern) starring in a film 
but becoming confused about what is real and what is fiction. Yet, unlike Mulholland Drive, 
Inland Empire presents no key, metaphorical or otherwise, to help decode the events depicted 
on screen. If the audiences, critics and practitioners that champion the ability of Lynch’s work 
to not require analysis or even speculation as to the meaning of physical on-screen events 
other than a subconscious engagement with the feel and tone of the work, then there should be 
the genuine expectation that Inland Empire would be equally well received. 
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 Yet Inland Empire became Lynch’s least successful film to date, so much so that one 
critic thought the film resembled “the work of an old genius with Alzheimers,” (Brooks, in 
Leigh, 2007). Whereas Mulholland Drive topped the aforementioned ‘Best Films of the 
Twentieth Century’ critics list, Inland Empire does not appear and made only 11% of the 
previous film’s US theatrical gross (Boxofficemojo).  
 In fact, Inland Empire is a good example of a film that truly fails by the terms of this 
thesis. It is all sensation and mystery and puzzle. But, despite what various sectors of the 
viewing audience might hope for, it is untethered to the internal good of the practice and the 
film is unable to engage. Momentary sensation may happen, but with no argument to structure 
the narrative, sustained engagement does not. The conclusion may be worthwhile, but the 
argument for it is not made in a worthwhile way; in fact, the mode of storytelling almost 
completely obscures it. Often quotidian elements are used to help anchor the audience, but 
here those elements are missing.   
This may indicate a loss – momentary or otherwise – of the media-specific 
motivational virtue of creative generosity. As with Terrence Malick, a practitioner who 
concentrates on unpopular topics that will limit their audience is not ungenerous if they are 
trying to genuinely attempting to communicate with that audience. However, placed in the 
context of Lynch’s oeuvre (as of 2020, Inland Empire represents his final feature film), it 
does suggest an increase of self-indulgence; Inland Empire could be considered to be Lynch’s 
Knight of Cups (Malick, 2015), a film targeted not just for audiences at the top of the ‘Pixar’ 
pyramid, but purely at Lynch himself.  
 It is worth revisiting the fear of didacticism here, as it seems that this is what unites 
general audiences, critics, practitioners and mentors. In terms of Lynch specifically, one 
possible explanation for the view that his films can appear to work independently of meaning 









As the study comes to a close, it is worth reiterating what the thesis is not. It is not a general 
theory of story or narrative, nor a universalisable conception of art. The thesis is not 
applicable to any other screen form and is not concerned with what mainstream narrative 
films are in the ontological sense, nor what they could or should be doing. The new 
hermeneutic developed based on the notion of film-as-argument and demonstrated in the case 
studies is not offered as a new theory of spectatorship, but as an illustration of film-as-
argument in action and a diagnostic for practitioners to assess how argument manifests in 
their work.  
 The study had a singular aim. To offer a new, teleological understanding of the social 
practice of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking from conception to delivery that will 
positively impact professional application. It defended the thesis that: 
 
a) The tradition and current practice of making mainstream narrative feature films is 
based on the ‘Internal Goods’ of the practice. 
b) The ‘Internal Goods’ are singular, namely to move people in a worthwhile way to a 
conclusion that is worth having. 
c) Most practitioners do not conceptualize mainstream narrative feature films in this way, 
which makes the tradition an incognizant practice.  
 
The study used the teleological account of social practice rather than the more traditional 
sociological or cultural understanding, and justified why mainstream narrative feature film 
should be considered a social practice in this sense, in terms of its ends. The teleological 
account of social practice concept considers that human virtues are necessary for a 
practitioner to excel at a specific practice but do not define what it means to excel at that 
practice, and as such the concept of internal goods are deemed necessary to describe these 
ends. The thesis offered an account not just of these internal goods of the practice as noted 
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above, but those virtues necessary but not sufficient to excel, those of courage, honesty, 
justice, curiosity, creative compassion and creative generosity.  
Taking a critical hermeneutic approach, the study constructed its argument by:   
 
(a) Recourse to dominant thought in the areas of film-philosophy and professional 
practice. 
(b) Comparison of the central thesis to other competing and more prevalent notions of 
the internal goods. 
(c) Providing an account that allows for the high failure rate (as defined by the thesis) 
of completed mainstream narrative feature films. 
(d) Analysis of completed mainstream narrative feature films, including a strong 
counter-example. 
 
The investigation into academic thinking with regard to the ability of film to argue, noted that 
the current orthodoxy is that mainstream narrative feature film can meaningfully argue. 
Analysis of the dominant theories of professional screenwriting and directing practice 
revealed a significant gap in the doxy: that of film-as-argument. Although the professional 
literature indicates a reticence to explicitly explore this area, there are consistent implicit 
references throughout. 
In order to test the validity of the thesis, the study evaluated and critiqued other more 
dominant yet uninterrogated conceptions of the internal goods of the practice. These other 
accounts were defined, investigated and the evidence to support their primacy was found to be 
insufficient, although it was noted that they do have the effect of obscuring the more valid 
internal good of film-as-worthwhile-argument, making the practice incognizant and resulting 
in many flawed creations.  
The magnitude of these flawed creations required an account of how an industry 
survives despite most of the outputs not meeting the standard of the practice. The Cinema of 
Compensation was new conceptual work offered that provided an explanation of how various 
creative elements (both textual and contextual) can be applied to compensate for flawed 
argument.  
 Finally, the case for film-as-worthwhile-argument was made with recourse to two case 
studies: an exemplar and a counter-example. Both case studies established that the thesis is 
sound and can apply to any mainstream narrative feature film, however seemingly 
problematic. 
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Whilst impossible to prove definitively, the thesis represents a significant account that 
should be taken seriously as extensive evidence exists to support this conception, over and 
above the other accounts of the practice. As the above demonstrates, this evidence has been 
taken from industry and non-industry sources, from academics, critics, professional creative 
mentors and the practitioners themselves (the latter, in McIntyre’s view (1981, pp. 188-189), 
the only source truly qualified to assess and articulate the internal goods of their practice).  
Due to the incognizant nature of these internal goods, the evidence to support the 
account of film-as-worthwhile-argument is necessarily hermeneutic in nature. Perhaps the 
most critical evidence examined comes from the professional ‘gurus’ that have influenced 
successive generations of practitioners, industry executives and educators, and their almost 
pathological avoidance of conceptualizing the internal goods of the practice as worthwhile 
argument construction, instead obscuring the idea under such inconsistent, imprecise and 
awkward euphemistic terms such as “subject” (Field, 2005, p. 32), “idea”, (Seger, 1994, p. 
120) or  “living philosophy,” (McKee, 1998, p. 115) – or avoiding it altogether. Yet the 
‘shape’ as film-as-worthwhile argument is ubiquitous, be it in the lyrics to the opening 
sequence of the 2015 American Academy Award ceremony, “Sometimes when they hit, you 
must admit, they sometimes change your view of it in ways both big and small,” (Neil Patrick 
Harris’ Opening Number, 2015, 6 minutes, 52 seconds) to critics assessing the argument 
instead of the film (Chang, Debruge, Foundas, 2013). 
 
9.2 Implications of findings 
 
The study is significant for a variety of reasons. First, whilst film as a social practice has been 
considered in the sociological and cultural sense (Turner, 1988) this study is the first account 
to define it in a teleological sense. More significantly, although film’s ability to function as 
argument is not a new concept in academic circles, the idea of it being definitive of the 
practice represents a wholly original notion. The thesis defended, that of film-as-worthwhile-
argument is not how the practice is currently conceptualized either within the academy (even 
with a creative practice focus), or the mainstream narrative feature film industry – essentially 
no-one is conceiving of the practice in this way – which means the study represents a 
significant addition to knowledge and the potential for academic and industry impact.    
This potential impact may not be welcome, especially amongst practitioners. As was 
noted in the introduction, if proven to a satisfactory degree, the thesis could be regarded as 
highly contentious. It is without prejudice, but the thesis makes the claim that practitioners 
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have either misunderstood and/or are largely unaware of essential the nature of their practice. 
This claim is likely to experience some resistance, no matter how well-researched and 
articulated the claim. So in order to convince a potentially reluctant industry, it is imperative 
to explore the possible benefits of being thus “woke”?  
The answer is that it is not enough to simply have the virtues of the filmmaker, as the 
very concept of internal goods demonstrate that these are no guarantee of excellence in any 
given social practice. A practitioner can be brave, honest, curious, creatively compassionate 
and generous – yet still fail. If practitioners accept the conceptualization of the internal goods 
of the practice as ‘worthwhile argument construction’, a higher percentage of film stories will 
connect with audiences by communicating their arguments effectively using the various 
cinematic tools and thus avoiding becoming pointless or confused on the one hand, or 
ruthlessly didactic on the other.    
The speculation outlined in Chapter 5 that the ‘gurus’ have avoided this account of 
mainstream narrative feature filmmaking due to a fear of didactic screenplays and films 
dominating the industry represents a valid, if somewhat myopic, point of view. If professional 
practice were to consciously adopt the conception of filmmaking’s internal good set out in 
this thesis, there would certainly be a period of readjustment in which inexperienced 
practitioners create obvious and didactic work, but this is a question of craft, talent and skill, 
not of the practice itself. The ongoing benefit to the practice of cognizance is significant. How 
can you do your best work when you are unaware of the fundamental nature of your own 
practice? Unaware practitioners spend resources in the wrong areas, and successes are overly 
dependent upon luck. 
A more significant danger, perhaps, is to the industry as a whole. The speculation, as 
outlined in Chapter 4, that institutions are quite happy to dismiss their practice as ‘just 
entertainment’ to downplay its influence for fear of regulation or litigation is a legitimate 
concern. Openly admitting that not just a primary aspect, but a driving force of mainstream 
narrative feature filmmaking is to attempt to influence may not be welcome by all concerned, 
but fortunately for the industry the influence of media on human behaviour is unlikely to ever 
be definitively qualified or quantified, and thus does not represent a substantial basis to resist 






9.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The scope of the research has been necessarily focused on proving that the current tradition 
and practice of mainstream narrative feature filmmaking is to move the audience to a 
worthwhile conclusion in a worthwhile way. It has been qualitative and interpretative in 
nature and has not examined precisely what arguments are being made to see if there are any 
tendencies, and if any trends can be found, if there is an explanation for those trends.  
This approach belongs in the realm of scholarship sometimes referred to as ‘literary 
Darwinism’, research into the evolution of narratives: why some stories survive, some thrive, 
and others diminish. Anthropologist Daniel Smith has tracked specific narratives and found 
evidence to support their significant influence on human behaviour (2017). Such research 
would extend the scope of this study by providing hard data to illustrate any potentially 
dominant arguments told and re-told in a cinematic context, and whether any behavioural 
influence can attributed to them, as Green and Brock’s (2000) research suggests.  
 All social practice evolves and transforms over time. As stated above, this study has 
been an interpretation, a description of the traditions and internal good of the social practice of 
mainstream narrative feature filmmaking at this precise moment in time. The film, and screen 
industries in general, are currently in a period of great flux. Large institutional disruptors are 
continuing to enter the practice such as Netflix, Amazon and Apple, changing not just how 
mainstream narrative feature films are financed and made, but also how they are seen. It would 
be both fascinating and propitious to repeat the study in five or ten years to assess if new 
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